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Abstract 
Egypt has been under a permanent state of emergency for nearly 100 years. This 
thesis aims at exploring and understanding Egyptian emergency law and its 
contextual background. It uses a combination of historical and theoretical 
perspectives to explore how Egypt’s emergency law has developed since its 
introduction by Britain to the present day. Chapter two examines theories of 
emergency powers and the failure of traditional theories of emergency powers to 
explain and justify the permanent state of emergency in Egypt. Chapter three 
discusses British imperialism in Egypt to show how Britain introduced and enshrined 
martial law in Egypt’s constitution, as well as other laws, to protect Britain’s 
political and economic interests in Egypt. Chapter four examines the legal 
framework of emergency law developed in Egypt after Britain’s departure to show 
how emergency law developed and expanded from a temporary measure to a 
permanent one. Chapter five explores the major human rights violations that 
occurred during, and as a direct result of, the use of a state of emergency. 
Chapter six examines contemporary imperialism to show how economic pressure 
from neo-imperialist organisations is used as a tool to enforce certain economic and 
political ideologies and policies. Further, it examines the resulting increased poverty 
in developing nations and the subsequent uprisings that occur. This study further 
explores how different political regimes use such uprisings as justification for using 
the force that is permitted under a state of emergency. Chapter seven explores how a 
minority group of elites have used the permanent state of emergency in Egypt to 
protect their political and economic interests.  
The research concludes that, given Egypt’s history, it would be naïve to believe that 
formal constitutional or legal constraints could protect the population from dictatorial 
‘emergency’ forms of rule. Further, given the country’s record of colonial and neo-
colonial oppression, it is unrealistic to conclude that the solutions lie in Egypt alone. 
As a result of these conclusions, this thesis recommends social equality, new forms 
of genuinely participatory democracy, democratic control over all aspects of life 
(including production, finance and key levers of the economy), guarantees of basic 
 vii 
social rights such as education and health, and guarantees of core legal rights such as 
habeas corpus, open civilian trials and the presumption of innocence.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of Egyptian emergency 
law and its contextual background. It uses a combination of historical and theoretical 
perspectives to explore how Egyptian emergency law has developed since its 
introduction by Britain to the present day. 
1.1 Background 
Given Egypt’s extended use of emergency powers, the country presents a rich 
subject of study for the following reasons: 
1. Emergency rule has been in effect in Egypt for most of the past 100 years. 
2. Egypt provides a textbook example of emergency rule. For instance, it 
developed from martial law under British rule to emergency law under 
Nasser, and it evolved from temporary measures to a permanent one.1 
3. Emergency law is the main cause of human rights breaches in Egypt. 
National and international human rights groups such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch have recorded many cases of alleged 
torture, arbitrary detention and police brutality during periods of emergency 
law.2 
4. Theoretically, emergency law should be used as a last resort to protect a 
country. This is not the case in Egypt. Emergency law and other exceptional 
laws in Egypt have been used as the first resort by different political regimes 
to protect their political and economic interests and suppress their opponents. 
5. The separation of powers has been violated. The executive authority headed 
by the military dominates all legislative and judiciary powers. 
6. No comprehensive studies have examined Egypt’s experience and its 
underlying causes. Further, studies have failed to examine the importance of 
the deep state and neo-imperialist organisations to justify the long and 
permanent state of emergency in Egypt. 
                                                          
1 Reza Sadiq, ‘Endless Emergency: The Case of Egypt’ (Working Paper No 08–11, Boston 
University, 2007) 532–534. 
2 Human Rights Watch, Egypt—Events of 2004 (2005) <https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2005/country-chapters/egypt>. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
The following research questions underpin this thesis: 
1. What theories of emergency powers, if any, can explain, justify or clarify 
Egypt’s emergency rule? 
2. Why has Egypt suffered from a long and permanent state of emergency rule? 
3. What human rights breaches have occurred in Egypt under emergency rule? 
4. How can the concept of the deep state help in understanding Egypt’s 
emergency rule? 
5. What, if any, recommendations can be offered to end emergency powers in 
Egypt? 
1.3 Egypt as a Case Study 
This thesis focuses on Egypt because it is one of the most populous countries in the 
world and the largest country in Africa and the Middle East. Egypt is in a strategic 
geopolitical location, making it an object of interest for the great powers. The 
country links three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia) and connects two waterways 
through the Suez Canal (the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean). After the 
Suez Canal was constructed, Egypt’s importance increased in the eyes of the 
superpowers.3 
By 1880, most ships passing through the Suez Canal were from Great Britain.4 By 
1913, more than 20 million tonnes of shipping passed through the Suez Canal, 12 
million tonnes of which belonged to Britain.5 Egypt was also politically strategic 
because of its central position among Arab, Muslim and African countries. 
Egypt is a large country, covering around 1,001,450 km2. Ninety-five per cent of the 
country is desert; however, despite its arid terrain, Egypt is an agricultural country 
that is well known for the fertile land formed by the Nile. It depends on the Nile for 
agriculture because it experiences low annual rainfall. Egypt’s geopolitical position 
has influenced its socio-political environment. Most of the Egyptian population 
                                                          
3 Graham Chapman and Kathleen M Baker (eds), The Changing Geography of Africa and the Middle 
East (Routledge, 1995) 129. 
4 Robert L Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882–1914 (Princeton 
University Press, 1966) 12. 
5 Keith Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of the Empire, 1918–22 (Manchester University 
Press, 1984) 110. 
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(estimated at 99.38 million people in 2018) live around the narrow ribbon of the Nile 
valley, which has helped foreign and domestic rulers to control the country.6 
Egypt was subject to invasion from France between 1798 and 1801. Napoleon 
Bonaparte introduced the Napoleonic Code to Egypt’s legal system during France’s 
occupation in 1798. Subsequently, many Egyptian jurists studied and trained in 
France, and Egypt’s legal system now uses a combination of Islamic sharia law and 
the Napoleonic Code.7 
The Egyptian legal system is considered a civil law system based on codified laws.8 
The supreme law is Egypt’s written constitution, and the country’s most important 
legislation is the Egyptian Civil Code of 1948. Much of this code was based on 
France’s civil code, with part also based on Islamic sharia law, especially in the area 
of family law.9 
Egypt was first occupied by Britain in 1882.10 In November 1914, Britain declared a 
unilateral protectorate over Egypt, replaced Khedive Abbas Hilmi II11 with Hussein 
Kamel and changed the title from khedive to sultan and then king.12 On 18 December 
1914, Britain declared Egypt independent from the Ottoman suzerainty.13 
1.4 Historical Sequence of Emergency Law in Egypt from British 
Rule to the Present 
Britain first introduced martial law in Egypt when Sir General John Maxwell 
declared martial law on 2 November 1914. Britain justified its declaration because of 
the beginning of World War I.14 Martial law was originally designed to guarantee 
                                                          
6 Justin Robertson and Maurice A East, Diplomacy and Developing Nations: Post-Cold War Foreign 
Policy-Making Structures and Processes (Routledge, 2005) 166. 
7 Mohamed S E Abdel Wahab, ‘Update: An Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal 
Research’ (New York University) (December 2012) 
<http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Egypt1.html>. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Anthony F Lang Jr, From Revolutions to Constitutions: The Case of Egypt (Blackwell Publishing, 
2013) 350; Sadiq, above n 1, 535. 
11 Khedive was the title of the viceroy of Egypt under Turkish rule in 1867–1914; see Oxford English 
Dictionary. 
12 Jeffery, above n 5, 110. 
13 Egypt remained under the province of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 to 1914. 
14 David French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916 (Routledge, 2014) 47. 
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discipline and order in the army. It permits the use of all means of force and includes 
the suspension of ordinary laws.15 
Martial law was used to protect Britain’s interests in Egypt during World War I and 
II. Britain used martial law to arrest, detain, exile and impose taxes on Egyptians, 
and to try Egyptian nationalists before military courts. Egypt’s anger regarding 
Britain’s interference in the country contributed to the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, 
in which demonstrations took place throughout Egypt in a call for independence. 
In 1922, Britain declared Egypt an independent kingdom;16 however, in reality, the 
country only gained partial independence because Britain was still responsible for 
defending Egypt, communicating with the British Empire, safeguarding foreign 
interests and minorities, and the status of Sudan.17 
On 19 April 1923, the Egyptian Constitution was issued by Royal Decree No 42 of 
1923, which was modelled after the Belgian Constitution of 1830–1831 and 
described by Britain and the king as a liberal document.18 The 1923 constitution 
adopted a parliamentary system and supported the separation of state powers.19 
The 1923 constitution was widely criticised because the committee that formed it 
was not elected, but was appointed by King Ahmad Fouad, who ruled from 1917 to 
1936. The constitution deprived students, farmers and workers of their right to 
protest. More importantly, it failed to end Britain’s occupation.20 
This thesis suggests that the 1923 constitution was a liberal constitution in name 
only. In reality, it provided the king with the power to abolish the parliament. King 
Fouad attempted to reduce the parliament’s authority to a consultative branch; 
consequently, the parliament never lasted for its full period of four years and was 
                                                          
15 Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 30–35. 
16 Sudan was under Egyptian–Anglo joint rule from 1899 to 1955. 
17 Sherif Omar Hassan, Emergency Powers of the Executive in France, the United Arab Republic, and 
the United States (Master Thesis, Cornell University, 1968) 92. 
18 Dawood I Ahmed and Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Islamization and Human Rights: The 
Surprising Origin and Spread of Islamic Supremacy in Constitutions (University of Chicago, 2014) 
57. 
19 Mohammed El-Bendary, The Egyptian Revolution: Between Hope and Despair: Mubarak to Morsi 
(Algora Publishing, 2013) 116. 
20 Ibid. 
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regularly dissolved by a royal decree,21 thus violating the rule of law and the 
separation of powers. 
Britain established the 1923 constitution to pacify Egyptian nationalists who were 
fed up with Britain’s involvement in their country, and to demonstrate that Egypt 
was on the path towards becoming a democratic state. However, Britain instead 
enshrined martial law in the constitution. For example, Article 45 gave the king 
authority to declare martial law. 
Britain then reinforced the martial law mechanism by introducing Military Rule Law 
No 15 of 1923, which gave Britain authority to suppress Egyptian nationalists and 
other European citizens living in Egypt, such as Germans and Austrians, to protect 
British interests in Egypt. Further, Act No 15 gave the prime minister, who was 
appointed by Britain to act as a military governor, the authority to exercise martial 
law. 
To strengthen its position in Egypt, Britain expanded and developed martial law in 
the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which required Egypt to declare martial law if 
Britain entered a war or was threatened by war. This thesis suggests that this treaty 
demonstrated that Egypt had never been an independent country. Britain continued to 
be the real controllers of Egypt and ruled through the use of martial law, along with 
expanded and exceptional measures, to protect its political and economic interests. 
This thesis also argues that Britain established military courts in which to try 
Egyptians because it did not trust Egypt’s national courts. 
On 3 September 1939, Britain forced Egypt to declare martial law according to the 
Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The declaration of martial law lasted until 4 
October 1945. On 31 May 1948, martial law was declared again as a result of the 
Arab–Israeli War. This declaration of martial law lasted until 1950. 
Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of the Arab leaders who played a major role in 
challenging Western control. In 1938, Nasser graduated from the royal military 
academy as a second lieutenant and joined the Egyptian military in an anti-British 
colony. While serving in Sudan, he created a revolutionary organisation, called the 
                                                          
21 Ahmed Abdalla, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt, 1923–1973 (American 
University in Cairo Press, 2008) 5. 
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Free Officers, which planned to overthrow both the royal family and Britain. In 
1949, Nasser invited General Naguib to lead the Free Officers because Naguib was 
an older man with a well-recognised name.22 
On 23 July 1952, Naguib and Nasser, along with the Free Officers, led a coup that 
deposed the royal family. It is important to explore the 1952 coup in this thesis 
because after 1952, Egypt suffered from a domestic version of emergency law that 
enshrined the dictatorial style of rule. 
1.4.1 Coup of 1952 
In response to the coup on 23 July 1952, King Farouk signed an abdication act on 25 
July in favour of his son. A regency council was then established to maintain the 
appearance of the kingship until the establishment of the Egyptian republic.23 
The Free Officers banned the 1923 constitution and dissolved all political parties. 
They justified their coup on the grounds that it would end corruption, imperialism 
and capitalism and establish social justice. Nasser’s rule succeeded in ending British 
imperialism, introducing land reform and ensuring the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal, as well as enshrining military rule. After the success of the July 1952 coup, 
Naguib was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Naguib 
established, and became chairman of, the Revolutionary Command Council, and 
Nasser was appointed vice chairman. In September 1952, Naguib became the prime 
minister.24 He was a key figure who called upon the army to return to its barracks to 
pave the way to establish a democratic state ruled by civilians. Nasser was the deputy 
prime minister and the minister of the interior at the same time. In June 1953, Naguib 
was declared the first president of Egypt, while also remaining the prime minister, 
                                                          
22 On 4 February 1942, the British surrounded the royal palace and forced King Farouk to appoint 
Mustafa El-Nahhas as the prime minister. At this time, Naguib submitted his resignation to the king, 
but the king refused it. For more details, see Ahmed Aboulenein, ‘Naguib: The Sidelined General 
President’, Daily News Egypt (online), 24 July 2012 
<http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/07/24/naguib-the-sidelined-general-President-2/>. 
23 Josep Puig Montada, ‘Oppositional Movements in Egypt, from 1952 to Mubarak’s Downfall’ 
(2013) 39(3) Nómadas: Critical Journal of Social and Juridical Sciences 1–17. 
24 Glenn Fowler, ‘Mohammed Naguib, First President of Egypt, Dies’, New York Times (online), 20 
August 1984 <http://www.nytimes.com/1984/08/29/obituaries/mohammed-naguib-first-president-of-
egypt-dies.html>. 
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the chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and the commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces.25 
Nasser assumed full power in 195426 and kept Military Rule Act No 15 of 1923 for 
some time to suppress his opponents and consolidate his power. Act No 15 of 1923 
was then replaced by Act No 533 of 1954, which was in turn replaced by Emergency 
Law No 162 of 1958. 
Nasser issued the 1956 constitution, which went into effect on 24 June 1956 and 
abolished the monarchy and the multi-party system. The 1956 constitution gave 
wide-ranging powers to the president. It was later revised in 1958 and 1964 to give 
the president extraordinary powers. 
Nasser relied on public support to advance his own interests to control Egypt, and he 
depended on his charismatic patriots to impose a new socialist style of dictatorship to 
stifle his opponents.27 Thus, Nasser established Emergency Law No 162 of 1958 as a 
tool to consolidate his power. 
It is important to examine Emergency Law No 162 of 1958 in this study because of 
its contribution to enshrining the permanent state of emergency in Egypt, as well as 
dictatorial rule. 
1.4.2 Emergency Law No 162 of 1958 
Egypt’s emergency law, which was introduced by Nasser in 1958, is still in place 
today, despite the fact that Egypt has been ruled by a number of different political 
regimes that have issued a number of different constitutions since 1958. 
Nasser issued Egypt’s emergency law through a presidential decree based on the 
1956 constitution, which granted power to the president to issue decrees that had the 
force of law after receiving approval from the parliament in its first session. 
However, Law No 162 of 1958 was unconstitutional because it was not submitted to 
the parliament until 1964. This violated Article 53 of the 1956 constitution, which 
                                                          
25 Aboulenein, above n 22. 
26 In 1954, Naguib was arrested and placed under house arrest. Nasser assumed power in 1954 and 
officially became the president in 1956. 
27 Molefi K Asante, Culture and Customs of Egypt (Greenwood Press, 2002) 30. 
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required the president to submit any presidential decree to the first sitting of 
parliament. 
Article 1 of Law No 162 of 1958 gave the president power to declare a state of 
emergency ‘whenever security or public order in the territory of the republic or area 
is at risk, due to war or a state threatening the eruption of war, unrest at home, public 
disaster, or the spread of an epidemic’.28 
Declaring a state of emergency under Law No 162 of 1958 had to include the reason, 
the area covered and the date it was entered into force. The declaration of a state of 
emergency could be either oral or written,29 and it gave the president significant 
powers in the following areas: 
1. restricting people from exercising freedom of assembly 
2. restricting the movement of people 
3. allowing the arrest of suspects or people who allegedly posed a danger 
4. allowing the arrest and search of people and places without restriction 
5. controlling communications, newspapers, publications and all means of 
expression prior to publication, and seizing and shutting down places of 
printing 
6. seizing any property, imposing security on companies and institutions, and 
postponing debts and obligations for what is seized or imposed by the 
government 
7. decommissioning weapons and ammunitions 
8. evacuating regions or cutting off transportation between areas.30 
Law No 162 of 1958 used vague and elastic concepts such as protecting public order 
and security. The declaration contained the date of declaring the state of emergency 
but did not include the date of ending the declaration. 
Nasser died in 1970 and Muhammad Anwar El-Sadat became the president of Egypt 
from 1970 to 1981. He was one of the Free Officers in the 23 July 1952 coup and 
                                                          
28 Article 1 of Act No 162 of 1958 (issued on 27 September 1958) (enacted in June 1967) translation 
provided by Panda Unite Organization <http://pandaunite.org/act-162-of-1958/>. 
29 Ibid, Article 2. 
30 Ibid.Article 3. 
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was involved in supervising the abdication of King Farouk. He began as a minister of 
the state and rose through the ranks to become the vice president to Nasser.31 
In 1971, Sadat abolished the temporary constitution of 1964 and established a new 
constitution, which was based on an authoritarian style with a single-party 
structure.32 For example, Article 148 gave the president authority to declare a state of 
emergency with the parliament’s approval. The declaration was supposed to be for a 
limited time. The 1971 constitution gave the president 15 days to submit the 
declaration to the parliament. The constitution used vague, flexible and undefined 
concepts to assist in the continuation of the permanent state of emergency. 
After the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, Muhammad Hosni Mubarak 
became the president of Egypt from 1981 to 2011. He graduated from the Egyptian 
Air Academy and served as its director from 1966 to 1969.33 In 1972, Mubarak was 
appointed as the commander of the Egyptian Air Force, and in 1975, Sadat appointed 
him as the vice president and the senior member of the regime party (i.e., National 
Democratic Party).34 
Mubarak’s regime used the assassination of Sadat in 1981 as a reason to crack down 
on any opposition to the regime. Since that time, emergency law has been 
consistently renewed every two to three years without interruption. 
This thesis suggests that successive regimes have kept the same emergency law since 
1958 because it is a comprehensive law and has been effectively used as a tool to 
consolidate their rule and suppress their opponents. 
Mubarak’s regime has justified the extended permanent state of emergency in Egypt 
since 1981, arguing that it is necessary to protect national security and public order, 
and to help fight terrorism and combat drug trafficking. 
This thesis proposes that successive regimes have used elastic and vague concepts in 
different constitutions and emergency laws to expand their rule and silence anyone 
who could pose a threat to their interests. 
                                                          
31 Magdalena Alagna, Anwar Sadat (Middle East Leaders) (Rosen Publishing Group, 2004) 43–44. 
32 Robert L Maddex, Constitution of the World (Routledge, 1996) 72. 
33 ‘Profile: Hosni Mubarak’, Al Jazeera English News (online), 11 February 2011 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/12/200912693048491779.html>. 
34 Ibid. 
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1.4.3 Revolution of 2011 and coup of 2013 
On 25 January 2011, Egyptian people joined the Arab Spring to demand freedom and 
dignity as well as a change to the regime and the abolition of emergency law. On 18 
February 2011, Mubarak handed over his authority to the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF). The military banned the Egyptian Constitution of 1971 and 
made a number of constitutional declarations to consolidate its power, promising to 
hand over authority to a democratically elected president. 
In May 2012, the military ended the state of emergency in theory, but did not abolish 
Law No 162 of 1958. Instead, the regime used an informal emergency law by 
creating exceptional laws that increased the use of force, increased the number of 
arrests and tortures, and imposed harsh sentences such as the death penalty. On 30 
June 2012, Muhammad Morsi was elected as the first civilian leader from a non-
military background. On 30 November 2012, the Egyptian Constituent Assembly 
finished writing the constitution. A referendum was held on 15–22 December to vote 
on the 2012 constitution, with 63.8 million people voting yes. This was signed by 
Morsi.35 
However, the 2012 constitution still gave power to the military to try civilians 
accused of harming the armed forces, which led to human rights violations. In 
January 2013, President Morsi declared another state of emergency for one month in 
three cities: Port Said, Suez and Ismailia. The state of emergency was declared after 
demonstrations took place against Morsi and to protest police brutality. 
This thesis argues that even an elected president could not manage to rule without 
declaring a state of emergency and retaining the use of military forces against 
civilians. The military and the state of emergency were tools used by Mubarak’s 
regime to crush his opposition. 
The military and its elite started to put obstacles in place to prevent Morsi from 
performing his duties. Demonstrations broke out against Morsi, led by his opponents 
(leftists and secular groups with military support). They called for Morsi to resign 
and to arrange for another election. 
                                                          
35 ‘Early Results Show Egypt Constitution Approved’, ABC News (online), 23 December 2012 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-12-23/egypt-constitution-approved-in-vote-say-rival-
camps/4441796>. 
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On 3 July 2013, a military coup overthrew Morsi and appointed Adly Mansour as the 
interim president. The military banned the 2012 constitution and issued a number of 
constitutional declarations to stabilise its rule. 
In August 2013, interim President Adly Mansour declared a state of emergency for 
one month and then extended it for two months to control the clashes between 
Morsi’s supporters and the military. General Abed El-Fattah el-Sisi was elected in 
2014 and remains in power today. A new constitution was introduced in 2014, and a 
state of emergency has been declared several times under his rule. Egypt continues to 
be under a state of emergency today. 
1.4.4 Major human rights breaches in Egypt as a result of emergency rule 
In the name of protecting national security and public order, emergency law has been 
the main cause of numerous human rights violations in Egypt. As a result of 
emergency rule, Egyptians have suffered from continuous control being exercised 
over their lives. Their movements have been constrained, their belongings have been 
confiscated, their publications have been monitored and they have been prohibited 
from conducting gatherings or peaceful demonstrations. 
Emergency Law No 162 of 1958 is controversial because it imposed restrictions on 
fundamental rights, including non-derogable rights. It also gave the president 
authority to establish special courts, or state security courts, to try civilians who were 
accused of ordinary crimes such as demonstrating against the military or violating 
the emergency orders. 
All Egyptian constitutions, from 1923 to the current 2014 constitution, have 
prohibited torture. However, many detainees have been subjected to torture and ill-
treatment by security forces and have died as a result of torture and neglect.36 The 
police have used emergency law as a justification for using excessive force to beat 
                                                          
36 Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Rash of Deaths in Custody—Holding Police Accountable Key to 
Saving Lives (21 January 2015) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/21/egypt-rash-deaths-custody>. 
 12 
and kill civilians.37 Opponents have been electrocuted, hanged naked to force 
confessions and give up information, and forced to memorise confessions.38 
After the coup of 3 July 2013, the military introduced many new laws to stabilise its 
authority. It established an unofficial permanent state of emergency by issuing new 
laws such as counterterrorism and protest laws. These laws have been applied in 
ways that have increased human rights breaches. 
The informal permanent state of emergency has made the situation worse, resulting 
in more human rights violations by increasing the number of offences criminalised 
by these laws. Successive political regimes have used this type of informal 
emergency as another instrument to suppress the regime’s political opponents and 
journalists. 
Therefore, Egyptian emergency rule offers a global testing ground for theories of 
emergency law. Egypt provides a textbook example of the organic tendency of 
emergency rule to transform from exceptional law to the norm. 
1.5 Methodology 
This thesis employs a critical socio-legal methodology. Wheeler and Thomas note 
that ‘the word socio in sociolegal studies means to us an interface with the context 
within which law exists, be that a sociological, historical, economic, geographical or 
other context’.39 
Social research can be useful in formulating new theories and framing new laws. 
Legal research provides knowledge that broadens the outlook of executives, 
legislators and the judiciary. 
A number of factors form the context of social research: 
1. The theories that social scientists employ to help understand the social world 
affect what is researched and how research findings are interpreted. 
                                                          
37 Heba Morayef, A Free Egypt’s First Task is to Rein in the Army (25 May 2012) Human Rights 
Watch <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/25/free-egypts-first-task-rein-army>. 
38 Patrick Kingsley, ‘Egypt’s Secret Prison: “Disappeared” Face Torture in Azouli Military Jail’, The 
Guardian (online), 22 June 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/disappeared-
egyptians-torture-secret-military-prison>. 
39 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 35. 
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2. Existing knowledge of the researcher’s area of interest forms an important 
part of the background within which social research takes place. In practice, 
this means that someone planning to conduct research must be familiar with 
the literature on the topic or area of interest. 
3. Assumptions and views about how research should be conducted influence 
the research process. It is often presumed that a ‘scientific approach will and 
should be followed, in which a theory is framed and then tested using 
detailed measurement techniques.’40 
 
Traditional doctrinal research focuses first and foremost upon particular past and 
present structures – doctrines, practises, judgements of law itself as primary causes 
of current and future legal developments with little or no requirement for reference to 
extra-legal social considerations in explaining such developments.  Socio-legal 
approaches by contrast focus upon the power of other social developments to 
influence the doctrines, practices, judgements of law. So, do they explore the wider 
social consequence of such legal developments. 
Different social theories, attempting to categorise, elucidate, distinguish and explain 
social phenomena, see this interface of law and other social phenomena, in different 
ways, with different forms and degrees of autonomy and influence or dependence of 
developments on both sides of the boundary,  
As Cownie and Bradney say ‘the best socio-legal research will explicitly address 
issues of theory and method, and readers will be able to identify the researcher’s 
engagement with the relevant methodological and theoretical literature, thus giving 
their work the intellectual rigour its needs’. 41 
Different social theories seek to provide elucidations and explanations of social 
phenomena by reference to principles of social causation meaning the exercise of the 
causal powers of specifically social structures, relations, practices, institutions 
themselves. Whereas socio-biology e.g. looks to try to explain social phenomena by 
reference to biologically programmed individual intentions, specifically social theory 
looks to past and present social practices, institutions and relations themselves as 
having their own relative autonomy and causal power in influencing and directing 
their own development and that of each other.  
A critical approach, which is also a properly scientific approach, looks not only to 
issues of internal coherence of such theories, of the reliability of the data from which 
they have been derived, and the compatibility of such data with the theories in 
                                                          
40 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2012) 5–6. 
41 Watkins, Burton (eds), Above n39, 38. 
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question, but so too does it look to ongoing testing of such theories by reference to 
new data,  to which they should be applicable, by virtue of the level of generality of 
the theories in question,  and to the further development, correction, expansion or 
even rejection of such theories in light of such new data. 
Principled social research involves social scientific theory testing and development, 
including critique of theories not supported by relevant facts. And, of course, such 
criticism can be extended to apply to policies based upon such unsupported or 
incoherent theories. 
critical approach involves a degree of ethical interpretation of existing situations of 
fact of criticism of human rights violations and the application of – reliable, 
powerful, well established social theories to establish realistic possibilities for ethical 
progress in the situations under consideration. As a result, the thesis recommends, 
Social equality, new forms of genuinely participatory democracy, democratic control 
over all aspects of life, including production, finance and the key levers of the 
economy, guarantees of basic social rights such as education and health, and 
guarantees of core legal rights, such as habeas corpus, open civilian trials and the 
presumption of innocence. 
Social theories are differentiated by the ways in which they divide, categorise, 
conceptualize such institutions and relations, and in particular by their causal 
prioritisation of particular relations – ideological, political, economic, or legal, in 
shaping particular societies, states, historical periods, etc. 
Typically, particular theories are constructed on the basis of particular sets of data, - 
drawn from particular societies and historical periods. Such theories are then used to 
interpret, explain, elucidate other data sets –from other societies or historical periods. 
This is a central example of social – and socio-legal – research, using a well-
established theory to cast light upon established facts. 
As long as a theory continues to generate significant new knowledge through 
verification, it should not be dismissed on the basis of some degree of refutation. It 
can be legitimately worked upon, corrected or extended to address such issues. 
This does not necessarily require the collection and processing of completely new 
empirical data from the situation in question. It can take the form of finding new 
significance, new connections, and new interpretations of already existing data. 
Much social research of this form, including this thesis, uses both secondary and 
primary sources. The historical facts addressed in this thesis are mainly collected 
from credible secondary sources (e.g., books and articles). This thesis relies on 
secondary sources that examine the history of martial law under Britain and 
emergency law postcolonialism to the present day. As a result of limited access to 
information, the researcher had to heavily rely on secondary sources to examine the 
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military’s economic empire. Data and information will be gathered from the sources 
outlined below: 
A. International Conventions 
Information collected from international conventions is from primary sources, 
including the United Nations’ (UN) international conventions and Arab, African, US 
and European human rights conventions. These conventions are examined to obtain 
better knowledge of the human rights articles that prohibit human rights breaches. 
B. Human Rights Reports 
Examples include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other human 
rights organisations. Information on human rights violations are collected from 
primary sources, including public inquiry reports by Amnesty International and other 
human rights organisations. These reports highlight the major human rights 
violations that occurred during emergencies and show how successive regimes have 
misused and violated these rights. 
C. Relevant Statutes and Egyptian Legislation 
Examples include Egyptian constitutions from 1923 to the current 2014 constitution, 
as well as other constitutional declarations since the 2011 revolution. Emergency 
Law No 162 of 1958 and other exceptional laws (e.g., Protest Law and Terrorism 
Law) are examined using primary sources. These resources show how emergency 
law developed from a temporary and exceptional law to a permanent and ordinary 
one. 
D. Books and Journal Articles 
Some books will be bought from international bookstores, and some data will be 
collected from the University of Western Sydney (UWS) library and UWS online 
databases such as LexisNexis and Hein Online. 
1.6 Outlining the Emergency Power Theories 
Various traditional theories have attempted to explain and specify conditions of 
justification for emergency rule. Most of the recent literature on emergency powers 
has focused on theory and practice in liberal democratic countries. This thesis will 
 16 
discuss emergency rule in Egypt as an important country in the developing world 
that has suffered from a continuous permanent state of emergency. 
Certain theories seek to justify forms of martial law as an application of law rather 
than an extra-legal development. These are called models of accommodation42 and 
include: 
1. classical models of accommodation, consist of Roman dictatorship, France’s 
state of siege and the United Kingdom’s (UK) martial law. 
2. modern comparative context, consist of constitution provisions, legislative 
provisions and interpretive legislations. 
3. business-as-usual model. 
4. extra-legal model. 
5. illegality model. 
6. realistic model. 
This thesis critically examines a range of different theories of emergency law. It 
applies and tests theories that focus on the central importance of the political and 
economic spheres in shaping legal developments in particular types of societies. This 
thesis examines the political and economic factors by exploring the concept of the 
deep state theory. 
Traditional theories have failed to explain the permanent state of emergency in Egypt 
and the real beneficiaries of such an arrangement. Thus, it is important to introduce a 
new theory. The deep state can be defined as a state within a state. It functions as a 
hidden empire headed by the military and its elite. This hidden empire has its own 
government and a separate budget. It works secretly to protect its political and 
economic interests and prevent any attempts by civilians to challenge its rule. This 
thesis examines Egypt’s history and causation, as well as the beneficiaries of the 
prolonged use of emergency rule. 
It is worth examining different types of deep state to help define the deep state that 
can be observed in Egypt. Identifying the similarities and differences between 
different types of deep state will show who is really exercising power and benefiting. 
                                                          
42 Gross and Ní Aoláin, above n 15, 17–34. 
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This research considers Nathan Brown’s definition of the deep state and examines 
the deep state in the United States (US), Turkey and Thailand. 
While few studies have examined and explained the concept of the deep state and its 
roots, several authors have drawn attention to what they call the ‘dual state’, ‘parallel 
state’ or ‘deep state’. The reason for examining different meanings of the deep state 
is to discern whether all deep states have the same framework, the same elite and the 
same objectives. 
It is important to examine traditional emergency power theories to understand their 
weaknesses and determine how they failed to explain and justify the long and 
permanent state of emergency in Egypt. 
1.7 Testing the Traditional Theories 
It is important to test the traditional theories with reference to the facts of the 
Egyptian situation, and to determine whether any of the theories can be applied to 
Egypt’s case. Important questions need to be asked regarding these traditional 
theories, including: 
• Which theories, if any, can explain the continuous state of emergency in 
Egypt? 
• Can any of these traditional emergency power theories explain what is 
happening in Egypt? 
• Can any of these traditional theories provide any future understanding of why 
Egypt has been under a permanent state of emergency? 
• Are these theories applicable in Egypt? 
This thesis suggests that traditional emergency theories have failed to answer any of 
the above questions for the following reasons: 
1. Traditional emergency power theories are based on developed countries, 
whereas Egypt is a developing country. Traditional emergency power 
theories may apply to the developed world, but they are not necessarily 
applicable to the developing world, including Egypt. 
2. Emergency power theories fail to explain the case of Egypt, which has 
suffered from a continuous and permanent state of emergency since 1914. 
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3. Traditional emergency power theories fail to examine the expanded and 
exceptional authority granted to different political regimes in Egypt as a 
result of the continuous state of emergency. 
4. For example, successive Egyptian constitutions have enshrined a state of 
emergency and expanded the president’s authority to issue decrees. An 
example of this is the 2007 constitutional amendments to Article 179 of the 
1971 Egyptian constitution. The purpose of these amendments was to 
strengthen the president’s authority to refer civilians to military courts. 
Further, the 2014 constitution made the military courts an independent 
judiciary, and Article 154 of this constitution gave the president power to 
declare a state of emergency without specifying the reason for imposing the 
special measures. This thesis suggests that giving such authority to the 
president affected the system of checks and balances, as well as the 
separation of powers. 
5. Traditional emergency power theories ignore the military’s interference in 
legislative and judiciary branches. The legislature and judiciary branches 
serve as a rubber stamp to legalise executive measures and actions. 
6. The expansion of the scope of military power has permitted the use of 
excessive force against peaceful civilians, increased the illegal arrest and 
detention of people for unlimited periods and increased the authority of 
military courts to try civilians and impose harsh sentences such as the death 
penalty. These measures have caused countless human rights violations. 
Further, to maintain its hold on Egypt, the military established the National 
Defence Council to expand its authority on issues related to internal and 
national security.43 
7. Traditional emergency power theories are based on the notion that a state of 
emergency law is a temporary resort used in exceptional cases, but this is not 
the case with Egypt. Emergency law in Egypt developed from a temporary 
exception law with limited scope and formal declaration to a permanent law 
with expanded scope using ill-defined and vague concepts. The scope of 
power exercised by the military has been expanded to permanently declare 
and extend emergency law. 
                                                          
43 Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Military Power Grab Creates Conditions for Abuse (21 June 2012) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/21/egypt-military-power-grab-creates-conditions-abuse>. 
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8. Emergency power theories assume that the aim of declaring a state of 
emergency is to counter terrorist acts and protect national interests. Egyptian 
emergency law targets opponents of regimes, including journalists, liberal 
political activists and the Muslim Brotherhood. During the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution and again after the 2013 coup, the military dealt with 
demonstrators and opponents as if they were thugs who had been paid to 
bring down Egypt.44 The military justified its measures as preventing the 
country from falling. 
9. Emergency power models ignore the fact that Egypt has suffered from 
informal states of emergency. Various regimes have used a combination of 
emergency law and informal emergency provisions, which has increased the 
number of punishable crimes and caused mass arrests, resulting in the 
detention of civilians for uncertain periods and the torture of opponents for 
political reasons. 
10. Traditional emergency power theories disregard the fact that imperial 
Western powers have supported different political regimes in Egypt, thereby 
preventing real democracy. The unlimited and unconditional support from 
certain Western powers shows their hypocrisy and double standards. They 
pretend to support democracy in the developing world; however, in reality, 
they have supported autocratic regimes. This has led to an increased number 
of human rights violations, making the situation worse in Egypt. 
11. Traditional emergency power theories disregard contemporary imperialist 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, which place too much pressure on the governments of developing 
nations to accept certain policies to pay their debts. These policies cause 
inequality because they increase both poverty and the gap between the rich 
and the poor, thereby benefiting minority group elites. 
12. Extending and expanding emergency law will not solve the problems of 
public disturbances and terrorism. In fact, emergency law is part of the 
problem: lifting and abolishing the controversial emergency law was a major 
cause of demonstration and one of the main demands of the Egyptian people 
before and after the 2011 revolution. 
                                                          
44 ‘Egyptian Army Using Martial Law: Critics’, National Post (online), 20 December 2011 
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/912407786?accountid=36155>. 
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13. Traditional emergency power theories overlook the economic interests 
behind declaring and extending a state of emergency. In the case of Egypt, 
the state of emergency was important for the regime to protect the country’s 
deep state economic interests. 
1.7.1 Reza Sadiq Reza and Liguori’s proposed model 
Few studies have examined the permanent state of emergency in Egypt; however, 
many researchers (e.g., Gross Ní Aoláin and Kent Roach) have addressed the effect 
of emergency law in Western countries. Further, while emergency law is a growing 
area for Western scholars, fewer researchers are dedicated to the subject of Egypt. 
Sadiq examines emergency law in Egypt based on duration, scope of emergency 
powers that have been exercised and targets against whom the emergency law is 
directed. Sadiq concludes that the Egyptian emergency law was designed to maintain 
control over Egyptian people and to strengthen the state’s domination.45 The gaps in 
his study are as follows: 
1. The study is based on the banned 1971 Egyptian constitution. 
2. It was published in 2007, before two significant events: the 2011 revolution 
and the 2013 coup. Further, the military issued a number of constitutional 
declarations and exceptional laws after 2007 that gave the military massive 
powers. 
3. The study ignores the interventions of neo-imperialist organisations in 
Egypt. 
4. It fails to discuss the deep state and its political and economic interests. 
5. It does not suggest any emergency power theories that are applicable in the 
case of Egypt. 
There is a debate regarding the long and permanent state of emergency in Egypt, as 
well as an attempt to adopt a new model to resolve the issues. In an attempt to fill 
some of the above gaps in relation to the Egypt case, Liguori suggests giving the 
                                                          
45 Sadiq, above n 1, 551–552. 
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Egyptian regime sufficient emergency power to deal with serious threats, while 
limiting its actions and providing accountability.46 
Liguori suggests that Egypt should follow different emergency power theories than 
other countries because Egypt is still an immature democratic country.47 According 
to Liguori, Egypt could adapt two possible types of emergency power in its 
constitution: 
1. A neo-Roman model would include a mechanism for a formal declaration of 
emergency along with prescribed emergency measures. It would spell out 
permissible emergency actions and procedures to be followed before a state 
of emergency could be declared.48 
2. A legality model would allow the executive to take action outside normal 
constitutional procedures without declaring a state of emergency. These 
actions would be subject to immediate ratification from the legislature and 
judicial review.49 
This thesis argues that Liguori suggests that certain models are suitable for Egyptian 
conditions without examining the history and justification for the long and 
permanent state of emergency. Liguori ignores the fact that Egyptians demanded the 
abolition of emergency law after the 2011 revolution. This was because the law was, 
and remains, the main cause of human rights violations. Further, emergency law is 
the mechanism used to protect the regime’s political and economic interests. In her 
recommendations, Liguori accepts the need for the continuous application of 
emergency power in Egypt. In addition, Liguori ignores the fact that emergency law 
is supposed to be the last resort for tackling exceptional problems in any country. 
However, in Egypt’s case, emergency law has often been used as the first resort, 
resulting in many cases of human rights violations. 
                                                          
46 Michelle A Liguori, ‘A New Emergency Law Model for Egypt’ (2012) 19(3) Human Rights Brief 
14. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid 15. 
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1.8 Deep State Theory 
1.8.1 Introduction 
After the fall of Mubarak in 2011, and again after the July 2013 coup, the deep state 
became a focus of discussion in academic analysis. There are various types of deep 
states, and each state has its own deep state. 
This thesis argues that the postcolonial deep state in Egypt can be defined as a 
coalition of elites headed by the military, the anti-revolutionaries from the old guard 
regime, the judiciary, businesspeople, members of fake oppositions and the media. 
These elites enjoy external financial and political support from various Western 
powers and use pressure from Western-dominant organisations such as the IMF and 
the World Bank to maintain control of the country and prevent any modernisation or 
real democracy from taking root. 
The deep state can also be defined as a state within a state. It functions as a hidden 
empire headed by the military and its elite. This hidden empire has its own 
government and a separate budget. It works secretly to protect its political and 
economic interests and prevent any attempts by civilians to challenge its rule. 
Many observers were shocked by the way in which Mubarak was removed in 2011, 
because he was believed to have had tight control of Egypt. However, in reality, the 
deep state is a single power that works beneath the surface of politics, and it was in 
fact controlling all aspects of Egypt. The Egyptian revolution in 2011 succeeded in 
overthrowing the head of the regime, but not the entire regime. Thus, the deep state 
regime has continued to control Egypt to the present day. 
1.8.2 Outline of the deep state framework 
This thesis proposes a theoretical framework for understanding the deep state as 
follows: 
1. Nature of state power and definition of the deep state: The nature of the deep 
state will show who is exercising power and who benefits from this power. 
Defining the deep state in other countries can provide a better understanding 
of the similarities and differences between the Egyptian deep state and the 
deep state in other countries. 
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2. Separation of powers: It is important to examine the principles of the 
separation of power in Egypt because the executive branch has consistently 
overruled the legislative and judiciary branches. 
3. Political rule of the Egyptian military: The Egyptian military acts as the head 
of the deep state and is supported by police, intelligence services, judiciary, 
state media and businesspeople to maintain its power over the country.50 On 
11 February 2011, President Hosni Mubarak resigned and the SCAF took 
over and ruled the country for one and a half years, promising a democratic 
transition to a civilian president.51 
4. Economic rule of the military as the head of the deep state: As the head of 
the deep state, the military enjoys cheap government land, no taxes and 
cheap labour. Some experts believe that the army controls around 15–40% of 
the Egyptian economy.52 The military budget is not subject to parliamentary 
checks because it is part of national security and is considered a taboo or 
secret subject. The public are not allowed to discuss it. 
5. Deep state and the media: The deep state controls sections of the media and 
gives it a small amount of freedom. However, the media has been used as a 
tool by successive regimes to mobilise the public in the service of political 
and economic agendas.53 The media played a substantial role in the 
overthrow of the first Egyptian democratic regime in 2013. 
6. Business elite and the deep state: The group of business elites known as 
‘whales of the Nile’ comprise officials from Mubarak’s regime and business 
members of the National Democratic Party, all of whom have played a 
crucial rule within the deep state.54 The business elite have benefited from 
crony capitalism, which means that regime officials favour a limited group 
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of family and friends and give them unfair advantages to make money and 
occupy the majority of political positions.55 
7. Businesspeople during Mubarak’s era benefited from regime corruption. 
Using the deep state, they built their economic, political and military 
influence in Egypt during the privatisation period between 1990 and 2000. 
8. Fake opposition: The deep state in Egypt feared a loss of power, especially 
after Morsi became the first elected civilian from a non-military background. 
In response, the deep state began putting obstacles in place to jeopardise the 
civilian president’s plans and portray him as a failure of a president. The 
deep state created a fake opposition group called Tamarod (Rebellion), 
which the military used to justify the 2013 coup and the ousting of Morsi. At 
this point, the deep state regained its footing and power.56 
Based on this analysis, the deep state model may explain and substantiate the long 
and permanent state of emergency in Egypt. As the head of the deep state, the 
military did not want to give up or share its rule, and it protected itself against both 
internal and external factors, as outlined below: 
A. Internal factors 
1. The military suspended the constitution and nominated Adly Mansour as the 
interim president. On 8 June 2014, El-Sisi was elected as the president of 
Egypt. The military was the main engineer of the coup and used a coalition 
of forces that shared the same benefits and interests.57 
2. Most officials of the old regime, including Mubarak, the police chief and 
low- and high-ranking police officers, were cleared of all charges and 
received no punishment for killing hundreds of civilians.58 
3. Thousands of Egyptian political activists who launched the 2011 revolution 
were arrested and faced harsh punishments, including torture. Morsi and his 
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regime were arrested and received harsh sentences, including life 
imprisonment and the death penalty. 
B. External factors 
1. Different political regimes in Egypt have benefited from the financial and 
political support of Western powers. This support has served to maintain 
their control and has prevented any real opposition or challenge to the 
regimes. 
For example, the political and economic interventions of the US caused Egypt to lose 
its popular sovereignty because it became reliant on US aid, which totalled around 
$1.5 billion a year. This money was provided to help Egypt financially, and for the 
purchase of military equipment59 such as tear gas and tanks, which were often used 
to suppress opponents. The US justified its aid under the guise of stabilising the 
region and promoting democracy.60 On 27–28 June 2011, the US Trade and 
Development Agency held a forum in Washington at which Egyptian businesspeople 
had the opportunity to meet US company leaders to discuss work possibilities in 
Egypt. However, in reality, the forum was designed to give US businesses the 
opportunity to build relationships with Egyptian businesspeople other than Mubarak 
capitalist cronies, most of whom had been jailed or no longer held power.61 
Although the US suspended military aid after the coup on Morsi in 2013, the Obama 
administration refused to classify it as a coup.62 Instead, the US gave $580 million to 
the Egyptian government for training and counterterrorism and border security 
protection.63 
2. The debt pressure on Egypt from the IMF and the World Bank to enforce 
certain policies only served to increase poverty and enlarge the gap between 
the rich and the poor. This in turn forced the deep state to use emergency law 
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once again to suppress the majority of the poor and working-class people 
who posed a potential threat to its interests. 
So, does a critical approach involve a degree of ethical interpretation of existing 
situations of fact of criticism of human rights violations and the application of 
reliable, powerful, well-established social theories to establish realistic possibilities 
for ethical progress in the situations under consideration? As a result, this thesis 
recommends social equality, new forms of genuinely participatory democracy, 
democratic control over all aspects of life (including production, finance and key 
levers of the economy), guarantees of basic social rights such as education and 
health, and guarantees of core legal rights such as habeas corpus, open civilian trials 
and the presumption of innocence. 
1.9 Aims of the Thesis 
This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Egyptian 
emergency law and its contextual background. To do this, this study will: 
• show which model, if any, can explain and justify the permanent state of 
emergency in Egypt 
• demonstrate how Britain enshrined martial law through the 1923 constitution 
and the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936 with a view to controlling Egypt to 
protect Britain’s political and economic interests 
• show how different political regimes in Egypt have developed and expanded 
the use of emergency law and other exceptional laws to suit their needs 
• describe the major human rights breaches caused by the extension of 
emergency law 
• show how the IMF and World Bank have used debt pressure to justify their 
intervention in developing countries 
• examine how the deep state, headed by the military and its elite, has benefited 
from the state of emergency. 
1.10 Purpose of the Thesis and Gaps in Previous Studies 
This thesis focuses on the development of emergency law in Egypt from 1914 to the 
present day. Emergency law has been used as a strategy to consolidate the power of 
regimes and suppress the opposition rather than protect the public. 
Few studies have examined the permanent state of emergency in Egypt; however, 
many researchers (e.g., Gross Ní Aoláin and Kent Roach) have addressed the effect 
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of emergency law in Western countries. Further, while emergency law is a growing 
area for Western scholars, fewer researchers are dedicated to the subject of Egypt. 
Studies of Egypt have tended to focus on emergency law as a phenomenon rather 
than addressing it as the main cause and real beneficiary of its continuous use. 
Traditional emergency power theories have failed to explain and justify the long and 
permanent state of emergency, and no studies have yet covered the permanent state 
of emergency. Most studies focus on Western traditional theories; therefore, there is 
a need to investigate this topic in the context of Egypt. A major reason for studying 
emergency law is to show how it evolved from a temporary and exceptional law to a 
permanent and ordinary one established by Britain and developed by successive 
Egyptian regimes. In addition, emergency law has been the main cause of human 
rights violations. 
No comprehensive studies have examined the role of imperialism and neo-
imperialism in the continuous and permanent state of emergency in Egypt. Further, 
no studies have examined the role of the deep state in enshrining the permanent and 
lasting state of emergency to protect its political and economic interests. 
The problem in Egypt is that the old and new constitutions can be hollow promises 
that, while they reflect the people’s aspirations, leave them unfulfilled. Although 
rights and freedoms are guaranteed, they can be limited by law under the justification 
of protecting national security and public order. Constitutions are written using 
flexible language, which provides authority to limit the constitution and the rule of 
law through exceptional measures. For instance, freedom of expression and protest 
was granted in the 2014 constitution; however, the use of terms such as ‘public 
order’ and ‘national security’ were vague and undefined, thereby undermining the 
value of these rights. The constitution does not outline any rights that must not be 
violated under any circumstances. Thus, the constitution is a tool used by the regime 
to express the state’s authority without limitations. It protects the security of the state 
but does not protect citizens from the state’s abuse of power. 
1.11 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2: Theories of Emergency Powers 
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This chapter focuses on groups of theories that address the concerns of emergency 
regimes in democratic societies. These theories include classical models of 
accommodation, modern comparative context and categories of accommodation 
(constitutional provisions, legislative provisions and interpretive provisions), 
business-as-usual model, extra-legal model, illegality model and realistic model. This 
chapter explores these models and examines which model could explain the 
permanent state of emergency in Egypt. 
Chapter 3: Egypt Under British Imperialism 
This chapter examines British imperialism in Egypt and shows how Britain 
controlled Egypt to protect Britain’s interests and prevent other European powers 
from gaining any power. In addition, the chapter examines how British military rule 
developed in Egypt through the appointment of a military governor and the hiring of 
a British counsellor in each Egyptian ministry. This chapter is important to 
demonstrate how Britain enshrined martial law through the 1923 constitution and the 
Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936 with a view to controlling Egypt to protect Britain’s 
political and economic interests. 
Chapter 4: Legal Framework of Emergency Law in Egypt 
This chapter explores the Egyptian emergency law legal framework from 1952 to the 
present day. In addition, it explores Egyptian Emergency Law No 162 of 1958. The 
chapter shows how different political Egyptian regimes have developed and 
expanded the use of emergency law and other exceptional laws to suit their needs. 
Chapter 5: Major Human Rights Violations During the State of Emergency 
This chapter examines the major human rights breaches caused by the extension of 
emergency law. It highlights major violations and examines them in accordance with 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the UN 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, and the Convention on Human Rights of the US, Europe and Africa. 
This chapter proves that emergency rule was the main cause of human rights 
breaches. 
Chapter 6: Contemporary Imperialism 
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This chapter discusses how the IMF and World Bank have used debt pressure to 
justify their intervention in developing countries. It argues that this is a political and 
economic strategy that has created more poverty and benefited a limited group of 
people. 
Chapter 7: Deep State in Egypt 
This chapter explores how the deep state, which is headed by the military and its 
elite, has benefited from the state of emergency. In addition, it demonstrates the ways 
in which references to the deep state can explain the permanent state of emergency. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Recommendations 
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Chapter 2: Theories of Emergency Powers 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two aims. First, it aims to identify theories that address concerns 
related to emergency regimes in democratic societies. These theories include 
classical models of accommodation, modern comparative context and categories of 
accommodation (constitutional provisions, legislative provisions and interpretive 
provisions), business-as-usual model, extra-legal model, illegality model and realistic 
model. Second, this chapter aims to examine whether any of these models can 
explain or justify the long and permanent state of emergency in Egypt. 
This chapter is important in terms of exploring the limitations of traditional theories 
regarding emergency power in addressing the ongoing state of emergency law in 
Egypt. 
2.2 Classical Models of Accommodation 
In democratic countries, the discourse around emergency regimes is governed by 
models that can be grouped into a general category called models of 
accommodation.1 The classical models of accommodation can be divided into three 
varieties: 
1. ancient Roman dictatorship 
2. France’s state of siege 
3. the UK’s martial law.2 
2.2.1 Ancient Roman dictatorship 
In the ancient Graeco–Roman world, different legal tools and conceptual frameworks 
were developed to manage threats to the stability of the state. For example, the 
Romans swore in a dictator in times of emergency. The ancient Roman constitution 
contained a complex system of checks and balances on the executive authority, with 
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 31 
the Roman Senate able to issue edicts and decrees. This system was used to 
effectively govern Rome when the consuls were away from the city.3 
The Roman Republic established an executive branch of government that was 
headed by two consuls with unlimited and veto powers. Every consul was only 
elected for one year, which could not be renewed. If two consuls did not agree on 
something or did not act well together, they could appoint a dictator on the 
recommendation of the Senate. This dictator could exercise power for either six 
months or until the end of the consul’s elected time. 
The Roman dictatorship gave power to the Senate to declare a state of emergency, 
and the dictator was given authority to exercise special powers4 such as resolving 
military issues and suppressing uprisings.5 The dictator could suspend constitutional 
and ordinary law; their power was absolute and their sentences could not be 
appealed.6 They could also declare war and rule over civil lawsuits. However, they 
depended on the Senate for budget issues.7 
After the dictator finished their role and stepped down, the ordinary system of 
government returned to normal constitutional orders. For example, Lucius Quinctius 
Cincinnatus was made a dictator in 458 BC to save a Roman army headed by one of 
the consuls besieged by an enemy army.8 When he finished his mission, Cincinnatus 
stepped down, relinquished his special power and returned to work on his farm.9 
However, things were different in the case of Gaius Julius Caesar, who was initially 
appointed as a dictator in 49 BC. At first, he held the position for only 11 days, and 
then was reappointed in 48 BC. After 45 BC, Caesar began being reappointed as 
                                                          
3 John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers 
(Oxford University Press, 2004) 211–212. 
4 William Vazquez Irizarry, Exception and Necessity: The Possibility of General Theory of 
Emergency (Puerto Rico University) 10. 
<https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/sela/VazquezIrizarry_Eng_CV.pdf>. 
5 Patricia Mindus, ‘Sorting Out Modern Constitutional Provisions on Emergency: A Taxonomic 
Framework’ , Ernst Cassirer Summer School organised by the Swedish Collegium for Advanced 
Study in collaboration with Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies (20–22 August 2009) 112. 
6 Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal and Extra-Legal Emergencies (Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, 
2008) 2. 
7 Mindus, above n 5, 121. 
8 Gross and Ní Aoláin, above n 1, 25. 
9 Ibid 26. 
 32 
dictator on an annual basis; this was then changed to every 10 years, and then 
became unlimited.10 
In the final period of the Roman Republic, between 135 BC and 71 BC, Rome was 
affected by several slave disturbances, which reflected the centrality of the slave 
economy and society, with most land devoted to slave farming.11 During the Roman 
Empire period, there were 12 civil wars and rebellions, including three servile 
wars.12 Head concluded that: 
Rather than providing a model for a constrained and delineated recourse to 
emergency power, the Roman Republic’s descent into dictatorial rule points more 
to the increasing resort to authoritarian forms of rule to suppress the upheavals 
produced by the creation and threatening rise of an exploited class.13 
2.2.2 Neo-Roman model 
The ancient Roman model has been resurrected in modern times and is referred to as 
the neo-Roman model. According to John Ferejohn and Pasquino, the neo-Roman 
dictatorship was rediscovered by Machiavelli, an Italian philosopher who is known 
as the father of political science. Machiavelli argues that a dictator is selected 
according to public order and that the responsibility is not in the dictatorship, but in 
its use by rulers who deviate from the real meaning of the institution.14 
In addition, Harrington, an English political theorist, does not identify the power 
given to the president, but instead suggests that the power given should be necessary 
to protect the country, and it should be within the realm of emergency powers.15 
The main difference between the ancient Roman dictatorship model and the neo-
Roman model is that the neo-Roman model gave emergency powers to the elected 
president, while the ancient Roman dictatorship gave emergency powers to a non-
government person who was deemed to have special virtues and capabilities.16 
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Rossiter, a US historian and political scientist, believes that the Roman dictatorship 
was a short-term authoritarian rule that was formed within the limitations of 
constitutional boundaries and directed to maintain the existence of the constitutional 
order so that a free and democratic society could protect itself and its constitutional 
order in extreme emergencies.17 
Rossiter adds that three important factors need to be considered to justify the 
constitutional dictatorship: first, a democratic complex system; second, a 
constitutional state designed to function during times of peace and/or any exigencies; 
third, the government system should be altered to a necessary degree during times of 
crisis to deal with the threat and then restore ordinary situations. The main purpose 
of these steps is to preserve the state’s independence, preserve the existing 
constitutional order and protect the social and political rights of the country.18 In 
conclusion, Rossiter believes that a dictatorship should not be initiated unless it is 
necessary for the preservation of the state and its constitutional order. Additionally, 
the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should not be made by the 
person who will constitute the authoritarian rule.19 
This thesis examines two examples of the neo-Roman model: Germany’s Weimar 
Republic and the US constitution. 
2.2.3 Germany’s Weimar Republic 
The Weimar Republic is an example of the neo-Roman model that was established in 
Germany between late 1918 and 1933. It is an example of the irrelevance of any use 
of constitutional restraints on emergency power under capitalism, especially when 
the ruling elite feels fundamentally threatened.20 Article 48 of the Weimar Republic 
constitution states that: 
In the event of a state not fulfilling the duties imposed upon it by the Reich 
Constitution or by the laws of the Reich, the President of the Reich may make use 
of the armed forces to compel it to do so. 
If public security and order are seriously disturbed or endangered within the 
German Reich, the President of the Reich may take measures necessary for their 
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restoration; intervening if need be with the assistance of the armed forces. For this 
purpose, he may suspend for a while, in whole or in part, the fundamental rights 
provided in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153. 
The President of the Reich must inform the Reichstag without delay of all 
measures taken in accordance with paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article. These 
measures are to be revoked on the demand of the Reichstag. 
If danger is imminent, a state government may, for its own territory, take 
temporary measures as provided in paragraph 2. These measures are to be revoked 
on the demand of the President of the Reich or of the Reichstag.21 
Article 48 of the Weimar Republic constitution gives the Reichstag president the 
power to invoke emergency powers without the prior consent of the Reichstag. The 
president has the power to take such measures with the aid of military forces if 
public order and security are seriously threatened. The president is only required to 
immediately inform the Reichstag.22 Article 48 deliberately uses elastic concepts and 
vague definitions such as public security and order to justify calling upon the armed 
forces to restore a situation. 
Article 48 institutes a modern version of the ancient Roman dictatorship. The 
Reichstag has the power to abolish the presidential emergency power decree via a 
simple majoritarian action. The constitution provides constitutional accountability 
for the overuse of power. The president can be prosecuted or removed from their 
office or be subject to criminal prosecution.23 
Article 48 has become a constitutional mechanism for the declaration of an executive 
arrangement of executive decrees, mostly during times of economic disturbances. 
However, according to Article 25 of the Weimar Republic constitution, the president 
of the Reich can dissolve the parliament and call for a new election within 60 days.24 
Between 1919 and 1932, Article 48 was invoked more than 250 times, mostly as a 
result of economic uprisings.25 Ebert, the first president of the Weimar Republic, 
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used Article 48 on 136 occasions, which included overthrowing the elected 
governments in the states of Saxony and Thuringia. Ebert’s regime, which was 
legitimised by the Weimar Republic constitution, relied on the military to consolidate 
his dictatorship.26 On 30 January 1933, Hitler was appointed as a chancellor, and on 
27 February 1933, a fire damaged the Reichstag building. The fire paved the way for 
Hitler’s authoritarian rule, and the Nazis used the fire as an excuse to enable 
President Hindenburg to sign a presidential decree (the Reichstag Fire Decree), on 
the basis of Article 48 of the Weimar Republic, for the protection of people and the 
state. This paved the way for the establishment of the single-party dictatorship by 
abolishing and suppressing all other political parties.27 Hitler used Article 48 to give 
legality to his authoritarian rule. Thousands of his decrees were based on the 
Reichstag Fire Decree.28 Article 48 of the Weimar Republic gave the government the 
authority to suspend many rights, including the right to private communication, 
freedom of the press and freedom of assembly.29 
This thesis suggests that the lessons drawn from the Weimar Republic show how 
regimes can use a constitution to enshrine dictatorial rule. This is done by using a 
state of emergency and preventing any real democracy. 
2.2.4 United States Constitution 
The American Revolution of 1776 was vital to the establishment of the US, which 
eventually replaced the UK as the ascendant capitalist power in the twentieth 
century. The revolution was based on the country’s refusal of Britain’s absolutism 
and monarchism. The US Declaration of Independence proclaimed the right of 
revolution to secure the rights to life and property.30 
However, from this promising and egalitarian start, executive power in the US has 
increasingly expanded over time. During the civil war in the 1860s, President 
Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus and allowed military tribunals to try, 
imprison and exile thousands of people accused of evasions, trading with enemies, 
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burning bridges and other forms of damage.31 These measures were temporary and 
were ratified by Congress. Thus, instead of suspending the constitution, Lincoln 
suspended habeas corpus and allowed military commissions to try people accused of 
being destructive to the war effort.32 In 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act of 
1917 against many of the anti-capitalist defenders of the 1917 Russian Revolution. In 
1918, Congress passed the Alien Act, which authorised the US government to deport 
non-citizen and naturalised citizen members of anarchist groups.33 In 1940, Congress 
approved the Alien Registration Act 1940 (the Smith Act), which required all non-US 
citizens to register with the government. The Act allowed the deportation of any 
person who was accused of using force or causing harm or violence against any 
government in the US.34 More than 900,000 Japanese, Italian and German people 
were classified as enemy aliens, and more than 9,000 of them were detained. Around 
120,000 Japanese people were ordered to leave their West Coast homes and live in 
detention centres.35 
In the US, the president’s preeminent political position gives them the unique 
authority to define the nature of political reality. This often makes it difficult for 
Congress to challenge the president’s decisions.36 For example, in 2001, the Bush 
administration used far-reaching measures under the guise of the war on terrorism 
and protecting people from terrorism. These measures effectively allowed the use of 
indefinite detention without trial.37 Head states that: 
The post-9/11 practices were not simply the product of the Bush administration or 
the Republican Party … the lawlessness assertions of executive powers and 
blockages of judicial review went further under Obama, who claimed the right to 
assassinate people, including US citizens via drone attacks.38 
Over time, the US ruling elite have adopted measures to suppress the working class. 
These laws were designed especially against socialists, and particularly the Marxists, 
who strived for a further social uprising.39 Successive US administrations have 
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asserted emergency or emergency-type powers that are potentially authoritarian. The 
US constitution has been deliberately interpreted in many ways to grant the president 
emergency powers that do not need to be granted by Congress, and in many cases 
where no other level of government even has to approve it.40 Such measures continue 
to be carried out by the Trump administration in the name of fighting terrorist 
groups. 
In conclusion, different political US administrations have used the constitution in 
ways that have given them significant powers. They have consistently interpreted 
articles of law using justifications based on vague and elastic concepts of protecting 
national security, which in turn leads to many cases of human rights violations. 
2.2.5 French state of siege 
Another classical model of emergency power is France’s state of siege, which was 
established in the midst of the French Revolution in 1791.41 The 1791 decree of 
France’s National Constituent Assembly distinguished between a state of peace and a 
state of siege to deal with social chaos and economic crises.42 The state of siege 
meant that the government transferred its power to the military commander in any 
area under threat by the occurrence, and for as long as the threat persevered.43 This 
was then codified by the Constituent Assembly.44 It formed the statutory basis of the 
modern state of siege that established the rule of implementation and the 
continuation of a state of siege.45 
France’s state of siege model underwent many changes and can be divided into two 
parts: 
1. Actual state of siege: 
The actual state of siege applies when enemies take over any territories and/or 
current and ongoing military operations. These actions include suspending the law. 
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2. Constructive state of siege: 
The constructive state of siege applies when civilian institutions are disrupted only to 
the extent necessary, and normal life is not fully disturbed, although there might be a 
danger to constitutional rights and obligations.46 
The concept of declaring a state of siege gradually expanded to include foreign 
invasion and rebellion to combat political opposition, and expanding police powers 
to try, before military tribunals, civilians accused of any offence against the 
constitution, public order and safety of the republic.47 For example, in the state of 
siege used during the suppression of the February 1848 Revolution in France, the 
masses deposed the Orleans monarchy of Louis Philippe, who ran away to Britain. 
Following this, an elected government called the Second Republic was announced. 
This government stood up with businesspeople and the bourgeoisie and closed the 
National Workshops.48 On 23 June 1848, around 170,000 working-class people 
protested over the closure of the National Workshops.49 General Cavaignac was 
appointed by the government to supress the uprising using 120,000–125,000 soldiers. 
The battle resulted in the deaths of 5,000 people, with a further 15,000 arrested and 
4,000 deported.50 The French Constitution of 1852 gave the head of state (the 
president, and then the emperor) the authority to declare a state of siege after 
receiving confirmation from the Senate.51 
Different political regimes in France have used the state of siege, enshrined in the 
constitution, to crush the working class and prevent demonstrations against the 
regime. Head suggests that ‘most depictions of this institution by legal scholars are 
also deprived of any examination of its historical role and repressive content’.52 Head 
gives the following example of how regimes have used emergency powers to crush 
workers. 
In March 1871, Paris workers opposed the efforts of the royalist majority of the 
National Assembly to restore the monarchy, as well as the provisional government’s 
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decision to disarm the National Guard. At the time, the National Guard employed 
many workers who had fought the German military during an earlier state of siege.53 
After working-class representatives won a number of municipal elections, they 
formed the Paris Commune government,54 which was subjected to oppression with 
help from German Chancellor Otto Bismarck. Bismarck was an aristocrat, a landlord 
and a member of the ruling business class, which used military operations to crush 
the working class, resulting in 20,000 deaths, 38,000 arrests and 7,000 
deportations.55 
On 16 May 1877, the executive issued a decree giving the legislature authority to 
declare a state of siege if it was in session. The declaration of the state of siege would 
be for a limited time, and then it would cease.56 The constitution was amended again 
in 1878 to give the parliament authority to declare a state of siege only if there was 
imminent peril; again, the declaration would be for a limited time and in a limited 
physical territory.57 According to Article 1 of the 1878 law, a state of siege could be 
declared in response to the events of an invasion or armed uprising.58 Further, 
Articles 7–9 and 11 of the 1878 constitution gave authority for the civilian authority 
to be handed to the military when a state of siege was declared. The constitution also 
gave military tribunals jurisdiction over civilians in all crimes and offences against 
the safety of the republic and the constitution. The military had the right to search 
and suspend meetings and ban publications that were deemed to cause chaos.59 
On 2 August 1914, a state of siege was imposed to cover all of France. Three days 
later, a law was declared that the state of siege would remain in force until the end of 
World War I.60 On 27 April 1916, the ability of the military to hold tribunals over 
civilians in peacetime ended. However, in cases of threat, the military tribunal was 
still allowed to try civilians over specific offences found in the Code of Military 
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Justice.61 During World War II, the Act of 8 December 1939 made an executive 
decree for a permanent state of siege.62 
Article 16(1) of France’s constitution of 1958 gave authority to the executive to 
declare a state of siege in the following cases: 
1. when the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the 
integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments 
are under grave and immediate threat 
2. when the proper function of the constitutional governmental authorities is 
interrupted. 
Under this constitution, the president of the republic could declare a state of siege 
after formally consulting with the prime minister, the president of the Houses of 
Parliament and the Constitutional Council, and after informing the nation of such 
measures. When emergency powers were being exercised, the National Assembly 
could not be dissolved. After 30 days of exercising the emergency powers, the 
president of the National Assembly and the president of the Senate would refer the 
matter to the Constitutional Council. There, 120 members from both the National 
Assembly and the Senate would decide whether the conditions mentioned in Article 
16 (1) still applied. They would then publicly announce their decision. If they 
decided to extend the state of siege, the 30 days mentioned above could be extended 
to 60 days, or any moment thereafter, to make a decision in the same manner.63 
Article 36 of the constitution stated that the ‘state of siege shall be decreed by the 
Council of Ministers’, and its extension over 12 days may only be approved by the 
parliament.64 
Egypt and France were connected by France’s occupation of Egypt from 1798 to 
1801 under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, who aimed to challenge Britain’s 
expansion into the Middle East and protect France’s interests. France claimed that it 
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wanted to liberate Egypt from tyranny and injustice, but instead it used force against 
Egypt under the guise of protecting security and order.65 
As an example of a French state of siege declared outside France, France 
implemented a state of siege in Algeria in April 1955. French authorities did not 
want to declare martial law under a state of siege because the constitution of the 
French Republic did not contain emergency regulations and because of the domestic 
situation in North Africa.66 Thus, French authorities established a new legal bill that 
was passed by the majority of France’s National Assembly on 3 April 1955. The 
declaration of martial law was first limited for six months and then extended to cover 
all of Algeria after the Philippeville incident in August 1955. The declaration of 
martial law gave France’s governor-general in Algeria absolute dictatorial power.67 
There are several recent examples of a state of siege being invoked in France. 
President Jacques Chirac declared a state of emergency for three months in 2005 
after there was rioting in the suburbs of Paris. In November 2015, President Holland 
declared a state of emergency after the Paris attack.68 In May 2016, France’s 
parliament extended the state of emergency for two months to protect two major 
sporting events from sabotage (Euro 2016 soccer and the Tour de France cycling 
race).69 On 6 July 2017, the parliament extended the state of emergency for the sixth 
time, making it the longest state of emergency since the Algerian War in the 1960s.70 
The lessons drawn from France’s state of siege show that France has used it to crush 
working-class opponents of the regime. Elastic concepts such as protecting the 
country’s independence and the integrity of its territory have been used to justify the 
ongoing use of emergency powers. Further, France’s state of siege shows that even 
liberal democratic countries cannot function without the use of such emergency 
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powers. A state of siege in France is supposed to be declared for a limited time; 
however, in practice, France has remained under the state of siege declared in 2015 
without interruption. Thus, it is under a nearly permanent state of emergency. 
2.2.6 United Kingdom martial law 
The notion of martial law has its roots in medieval England, where it was designed to 
guarantee discipline and order in the armed forces. The concept of military law, or 
martial law, expanded from the fourteenth century. It was applied to both serving and 
discharged soldiers and sailors, as well as thieves, brigands, rioters and publishers of 
disloyal books.71 During times of peace, the Crown can only suspend or dismiss 
soldiers and sailors, but during times of war, the Crown can subject them to military 
trials.72 Martial law was used as the fundamental emergency tool of the common law 
system in Britain. According to Gross and Ní Aoláin, martial law has always been 
unclear in its functioning and implementation.73 For example, the Stuart kings used 
the justice of martial law as a means to punish civilians with the death penalty, which 
was an irregular use of procedures.74 
In 1628, the British parliament adopted the Petition of Right, which was a document 
that granted rights to citizens. It stated that martial law only applied to soldiers and 
only during wartime. The definition of when martial law could be invoked was then 
expanded to cover any territory occupied during an aggressive occupation, and to 
deal with special crises.75 The king could declare martial law in peacetime, when the 
parliament tried to limit the king’s rights. As a result, the English Revolution, or the 
English Civil War (1642–1660), was launched between parliament’s supporters and 
the Crown. The outcome of the revolution was the abolition of the monarchy, and the 
parliament was granted more power in political matters, as well as limited checking 
power by a constitutional agreement.76 
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Martial law was a matter of discussion between 1865 and 1899 because it was related 
to the common law and the right to repel force with force, and martial law was an 
expression of the royal prerogative.77 
Dicey was a British jurist who was opposed to martial law, stating that it is unknown 
to the law of England. However, he also distinguished between two uses of martial 
law. First, ordinary law can be suspended and replaced with military law, with all 
people having the potential to be placed under arrest, jailed or executed.78 Second, 
martial law is used to maintain public order at whatever cost of blood or belongings. 
This has the following characteristics: its legal source is the common law right to 
meet force with force that is shared by both the regime and citizens; and the 
requirements of the circumstances determine which measure is used.79 Martial law 
offers the authorisation of all means necessary for the repression of internal revolts 
or riots, and it is assumed to be preventative rather than punitive.80 Dicey’s views 
have been described as double standards because of his opposition to martial law. 
However, he still allowed martial law to be used in colonial states and permitted the 
use of force there. 
Military tribunals and commanders were not authorised to try persons for their 
participation in the riots or invasion in Britain.81 However, in contradiction to this, 
Britain used special military courts in Egypt to try Egyptian nationalists. The next 
chapters will present a wider discussion of this topic. 
An example of British martial law can be found in Ireland, when Britain declared a 
state of martial law after the Easter Rising in 1916. This state lasted for five days. As 
a result, 124 members of the Crown forces were killed and 388 were injured. A 
further 180 civilians were killed and 614 were injured. The commander-in-chief of 
the British army issued martial law regulations to include a curfew and the power to 
fire upon any civilians carrying arms.82 On the second day of the uprising, martial 
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law was extended to cover all of Ireland, and the Crown forces were given massive 
and sweeping powers to take any necessary action to end the uprising.83 
Further, in 1919, Britain declared martial law in Amritsar, India, in response to the 
massacre of anti-British protesters. Brigadier-General Rex Dyer ordered his soldiers 
to open fire on 20,000 people, which resulted in 380 people killed and 15,000 
injured. In later trials, 180 people were sentenced to death and 264 were sentenced to 
transportation for life.84 
In Egypt’s case, Britain declared the first state of martial law on 2 November 1914 
and appointed a British governor who was given massive authority and the power to 
remove the military’s authority from the jurisdiction of the courts.85 
Britain used martial law to consolidate its power in Egypt because it was afraid that 
other superpowers might curtail its financial and political interests in Egypt and 
simultaneously use Egypt’s resources for their own benefits. 
Senior British advisers—the acting consulate-general and the foreign office in 
London—reported that it was important for Britain to declare a protectorate over 
Egypt to end Turkish sovereignty. The declaration of martial law was also used to 
protect Egyptian ministers and other Egyptians cooperating with Britain from 
prosecution for treason by national courts. In addition, martial law was used to 
replace Khedive Abbas, who rejected Britain’s interference in Egypt, with Khedive 
Hussein.86 
The assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the sirdar of Egypt and the governor-general of 
Sudan, gave Britain more excuses to stabilise its imperialist agenda and crush the 
enduring vestiges of independence in Egypt and Sudan.87 The usefulness of martial 
law led Britain to use it to extend the scope of its power. Britain relied on the legal 
basis established in the 1923 Egyptian constitution and the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty 
of 1936, which gave Britain the right to call for a state of martial law. In 1939, after 
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World War II was launched, the declaration named the prime minister as a military 
governor, rather than an army commander. This new role had dual political and 
military authority, which the prime minister could use against political opponents. 
Martial law enshrined the rule of a single person, without any real political 
opposition.88 In addition, martial law gave the government strong powers (i.e., 
verdicts of military courts could not be appealed, but were submitted to the military 
governor for approval).89 
This thesis argues that Britain’s martial law in Egypt paved the way for Nasser to 
develop the Egyptian version of emergency law, which expanded to include different 
types of exceptional laws, with ever greater numbers of punishable crimes, to the 
present day. 
2.2.7 Failure of classical models of accommodation 
Head critiques the classical models based around six fundamental flaws that they all 
share. They are as follows: 
1. The classical models are all examples of how emergency powers paved the 
way to authoritarian regimes and used brutal methods to deal with uprisings. 
They show how the ruling elite used constitutional restraints whenever they 
felt fundamentally threatened by dissatisfaction from below.90 
2. There are clear problems in these models in terms of defining what 
constitutes an emergency. Emergencies are an inherently elastic concept, as 
well as open-ended and politically controlled. An example of this is the false 
claim of weapons of mass destruction that was used to justify the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 by the US and its elite. 
3. These models are often based on the phenomenon of militant or intolerant 
democracies that claim to stand for the defence of core values of a 
democratic order. An example of this is Article 18 of the German Basic Law, 
which was issued after World War II. It allowed people to be stripped of 
their political rights to suppress the free democratic basic order. 
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4. In these models, the reality that the executive claims to represent may be 
false, as may be their claims about defending democracy. 
5. Models of accommodation may be quite accommodating towards models of 
semi-legality or extra-legality. 
6. Under these models, the legislatures and courts become a rubber stamp for 
executive actions.91 
In conclusion, the classical models of accommodation show how different political 
regimes interpret emergency rules based on ill-defined and vague concepts enshrined 
in the constitution. These regimes expand and develop the notion of emergency to 
suit their needs and to crush their opponents both inside and outside their countries. 
These models also show how the executive overrides the legislature and the judiciary 
to serve its own benefits, which has led to many cases of human rights abuses. 
2.3 Modern Comparative Context Categories of Accommodation 
This section examines the modern comparative categories of accommodation, 
including constitutional accommodation, legislative accommodation and interpretive 
legislation. It shows how these modern comparative models fail to explain the 
continuous state of emergency in Egypt. 
2.3.1 Constitutional accommodation 
The constitutional accommodation approach has been adopted by most democratic 
countries. It was inspired in its basic outlines, if not its distinctive mechanism, by the 
Roman Republic’s emergency institutional provisions.92 Constitutional 
accommodation models are based on the assumption of temporal separation between 
emergency and normalcy by providing an ex ante constitutional framework.93 
Constitutional accommodation provides a general framework that is required to 
address the essentials of specific crises and the measures needed to deal with them. 
However, this model is unsuccessful at anticipating all exigencies.94 Some countries 
have explicit provisions in place for extraordinary measures used by the executive in 
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the case of an emergency. Examples of this model include the Netherlands, Portugal 
and some states of the US.95 
2.3.2 Legislative accommodation 
The legislative accommodation approach contains provisions that consist of 
legislation giving exceptional power to the executive. Examples of countries that 
have used legislative provisions are the US and the UK. Canada also has legislation 
for emergencies.96 
Emergencies can be vast and unpredictable, and the drafter of a constitution cannot 
attempt to predict all future exigencies or provide detailed and explicit arrangements 
for all occasions. Constitutional emergency provisions must necessarily use broad 
and elastic language that sets a general framework for emergency rule.97 This can 
then be supplemented with legislative provisions. These types of legislative 
accommodations can be divided into two separate types, as outlined below. 
2.3.2.1 Legislation that can modify the existing law 
Legislation assists with dealing with specific challenges to facilitate the needs of 
security and state safety. Some modifications were introduced into the ordinary 
system, and any legislative provisions that were created out of the law to respond to 
an emergency situation became part of the ordinary legal system.98 Gross and Ní 
Aoláin called this the emergency ordinary model, which focused on introducing 
emergency-driven legal provisions into existing ordinary rules.99 
2.3.2.2 Special emergency legislation 
Emergency legislation must always be enacted under the established procedures of 
the law. However, existing legislation may be inadequate for dealing with some 
emergencies. Thus, in cases of special emergencies, efforts must be made to create 
supplementary emergency norms. An example of this is the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001.100 
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2.3.3 Interpretive legislation 
Interpretive models permit the judiciary to interpret legal powers in such ways as to 
authorise emergency measures and actions by the government.101 This model gives 
constitutional provisions and normal laws a new understanding of legislation without 
any explicit amendment or replacement being exercised by judges. Interpretive 
legislation occurs when the judiciary responds by interpreting existing constitutions 
and legal provisions in such ways as to effectively address challenges and enable a 
response from the regime.102 This allows a new understanding to be brought to the 
context without explicit alteration or replacement.103 
The law is usually flexible enough to allow judges to accommodate an emergency 
within the framework of the existing legal system.104 The model of interpretive 
accommodation applies ordinary rules during times of crisis but changes the 
scope.105 This model focuses on judicial interpretation and the delicate act of 
balancing competing interests by courts.106 
2.4 Business-as-usual model 
The business-as-usual model denies that any special accommodation or new 
understanding of law is required. It maintains that a good legal system is ready to 
deal with a crisis without any new additions or interpretations. This model rejects 
changes in the existing constitutional provisions, legislation and judicial 
interpretation. This model does not allow a departure from the normal legal system at 
any cost.107 
The business-as-usual model embodies two theories. The first theory is constitutional 
absolutism, which means that the government cannot take action to reduce or 
suspend any fundamental rights protected by the constitution at any time, and the 
regime cannot exercise any special emergency powers that have not been clearly 
outlined by the constitution.108 The second theory is constitutional perfection,109 
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which means that the constitution anticipates every exigency and provides within its 
framework all the powers that are necessary for the government to face any 
exigency.110 The ordinary legal system is presumed to provide the necessary answers 
for any crisis without the need to resort to extraordinary governmental powers.111 
2.5 Extra-legal model 
This model relies on maintaining the rule of law, which needs to be temporarily 
abandoned in serious situations. It allows any type of executive response to take any 
action to deal with emergency situations. However, it is up to the people to ratify or 
reject the executive action, either directly or indirectly.112 This theory enables the 
executive to take any action to deal with emergency situations. Political realists 
believe that there is no room for a legalistic–moralistic approach when dealing with 
emergencies, especially when the existence of the state is threatened.113 
2.6 Illegality model 
The illegality model allows the executive to do what it deems fit without the need for 
popular endorsement. Once again, the political realist argument is that when dealing 
with an emergency, there is no space for any kind of legalistic or moralistic 
approach. The executive can take vital action both during an emergency and when 
the survival of the state is disturbed. This model has been criticised because of the 
possibility of the executive using arbitrary measures. 
Dicey suggests that the legislature should pass a law to give officials the authority 
they need to act in a spirit of legality. Further, he argues that in cases when there is 
no time to enact such a law, officials must do what they think is necessary and react 
with one of two options. First, officials can act in a way that does not take them 
outside the law, and they will be able to validate themselves with the defence of 
necessity to deal with an emergency, thus showing a judge that what they did was 
necessary to deal with the emergency.114 Second, officials can act outside the law by 
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depending on the act of indemnity to bring them back within the law to legalise their 
illegality, as long as what they did was both sensible and not cruel.115 
Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), a legal academic scholar who served the Nazi regime in 
Germany, justifies the use of the state of exception to suspend the rule of law and 
grant the executive exceptional power.116 Article 48 of the Weimar Republic gives 
the president the power to issue decrees without obtaining consent from the 
parliament. Schmitt justifies the use of exceptions and emergencies as an excuse to 
increase dictatorial conceptions to protect the state and society from any threat.117 
Schmitt proposes a revolutionary dictatorship called a sovereign dictatorship 
whereby the dictator can change the entire existing order and transform it into 
something else, with the norms becoming subservient to the exception.118 Schmitt 
claims that ‘the sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception’. Schmitt’s 
definition maintains the sovereign as someone standing outside the legal system, yet 
still belonging to it.119 The sovereign can distinguish between friends and enemies, 
and the state can use decisive ways to protect itself from any danger or global threat 
or war.120 This model argues that any failure to use a decisive tool to protect the state 
will leave the state in chaos;121 thus, the judiciary and the parliament should allow 
the executive to be the only serious contestant and the main player.122 
Agamben, an Italian philosopher who investigated the notion of the state of 
exception, notes that the state of exception becomes the paradigm of the government. 
It is not a simple generic term of martial law or emergency law, but a state of non-
law whereby the law can be changed.123 Agamben believes that theorists have failed 
to find a theory of the state of exception in public law but established a direct or 
indirect connection between the state of exception and the law. In doing so, they 
                                                          
115 Ibid 46–47. 
116 Head, above n 11, 14. 
117 Ibid 15. 
118 Gross and Ní Aoláin, above n 1, 164. 
119 Austin Sarat, Sovereignty, Emergencies, Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 142. 
120 David Dyzenhaus, ‘Intimations of Legality Amid the Clash of Arms’ (2004) 2(2) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 244–245. 
121 Michael McConkey, ‘Anarchy, Sovereignty, and the State of Exception’ (2013) 17(3) Independent 
Review 415–428. 
122 Dyzenhaus, above n 120, 245. 
123 Bas Schotel, ‘Defending Our Legal Practices: A Legal Critique of Giorgio Agamben’s State of 
Exception’ (2009) 1(2) Amsterdam Law Forum 114. 
 51 
granted the state an exception.124 Agamben’s analysis of the state of exception differs 
from Schmitt’s politically. Schmitt endorses exceptionalism as a political choice, but 
for Agamben, the exception becomes the rule because there is no relation between 
law and anomie, and law and politics.125 
2.7 Realist model 
According to the realist model, when the state is under threat and the survival and 
fundamental interests of the nation are endangered, legal and ethical considerations 
are mostly irrelevant.126 This model gives power to the executive to abuse its 
authority based on the concept of necessity. 
There are two schools of thought on the realist model. The first one is the political 
realist school. According to this approach, as explored by Head, concerns of legality, 
morality and democracy, even if taken into account for political or tactical reasons, 
are secondary or subordinate to the quest for continued existence. This approach is 
more pervasive than generally acknowledged. Maxims such as ‘necessity knows no 
law’ give vent to this outlook.127 The second school, developed by British and US 
courts, is used to justify anti-democratic and military coups. It does so as long as the 
new regime accommodates British and US interests or global capitalism. This 
approach has been used to justify the legality of a number of military-backed coups, 
including Pakistan in 1958 and Uganda in 1966.128 
2.8 Testing the Models with Reference to the Egypt Case 
Different political regimes in Egypt have continued to use the state of exception 
based on the premise of fighting terrorism and protecting the country from chaos. 
However, in reality, the state of exception has been imposed for an extended time, 
and some would argue permanently, to protect the deep state’s economic and 
political position in Egypt. 
Few people have contributed to the discussion or been able to explain why Egypt has 
suffered from a permanent state of emergency. Liguori advocates for certain models 
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to be applied to Egypt but ignores its long history of emergency law. Liguori 
proposes a controversial model and assumes that it will suit Egypt’s situation after 
the 2011 revolution. However, the model she suggests is not applicable and cannot 
explain what is happening in Egypt. 
2.8.1 Liguori’s proposed model and thesis criticism 
In the debate on the extended permanent state of emergency in Egypt, a number of 
new models have been suggested in an attempt to resolve the issues. Liguori states 
that: 
Egypt should adopt two types of emergency powers in its new constitution: one 
based on the neo-Roman model, with a formal declaration of emergency and 
prescribed emergency measures that may restrict ordinary constitutional norms, 
and the other largely based on the legality model allowing the executive to take 
actions outside the normal constitutional procedures in the face of an emergency 
situation without declaring a state of emergency, provided that such actions are 
subject to immediate ratification by the legislature and judicial review for 
compliance with ordinary constitutional norms.129 
Liguori divides her proposed emergency powers into five sections, as outlined 
below. 
1. State of emergency 
Liguori proposes that: 
Egypt’s constitution should authorize the declaration of a state of emergency, in 
the event of a threat order that cannot be managed through the ordinary 
constitutional process, during which constitutional rights maybe temporarily 
restricted. However, it should categorically prohibit the restriction of rights 
deemed non-derogable under international law including the right to be free from 
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.130 
This thesis argues that Egypt has suffered from a longstanding state of emergency 
because emergency law is part of the problem and is not the solution for ending any 
threat to national security. Further, this thesis suggests that the Egyptian executive 
should use ordinary laws to tackle any threat to national interest and public order 
because emergency law is the main cause of human rights breaches in Egypt. 
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2. Extension and termination of the state of emergency 
Liguori proposes that the Egyptian president should be able to declare a state of 
emergency for three months, and then request a renewal for a further three months. 
She states that: 
The first renewal should be by a simple majority of the legislature, given that 
legislatures, in general, have relative competence in serving as a check on 
executive use of emergency powers. However, given Egypt’s institutional history, 
the second renewal should require approval by the Supreme Constitutional Court, 
which should be given jurisdiction to determine whether the factual conditions for 
a state of emergency continue to exist. The Supreme Constitutional Court, which, 
as noted, has a history of serving as a check on Egypt’s executive branch, will also 
serve as a counter-majoritarian check that will help to protect rights of minorities 
during emergencies. Also keeping in mind, the role of constitutional referenda in 
Egypt, the third and all subsequent extensions should require approval of the 
people in a referendum. While referenda may be costly, they are not novel in 
Egypt, and they would help to ensure that the president is accountable to the 
people in his or her use of emergency powers. The fact that the second extension 
requires the approval of the Supreme Constitutional Court also ensures that the 
people will have available to them a judicial determination that the state of 
emergency was appropriate before they are Called on to vote to extend it.131 
This thesis suggests that the state of emergency in Egypt and the exceptional laws 
should be abolished because Egypt has suffered from a continuous state of 
emergency for nearly 100 years. It also asserts that ending the continuous state of 
emergency was one of the main demands of the Egyptian people during the 2011 
revolution. 
3. Declaring the state of emergency 
Liguori’s model proposes that the president should have the authority to declare a 
state of emergency with the approval of the simple majority of the legislative branch 
within 14 days.132 
This thesis argues that the declaration of emergency law should not be placed in the 
hands of only the president. The legislative and judiciary branches should have the 
chance to decide whether the conditions for invoking a state of emergency exist. That 
is, emergency law should be the last resort, and there should be strict conditions for 
declaring a state of emergency. Only then should emergency law be conditionally 
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approved with care to ensure that civilians are protected from the abuse of power that 
might be exercised by the regime. 
4. Oversight of emergency actions 
Liguori proposes that the constitution and the supplementary legislation should 
provide the right to compensation for any action that violates the emergency powers. 
She states that: 
Such provisions would ensure that, while the president may authorize actions 
consistent with the extraordinary Powers granted in emergency legislation his or 
her actions are limited and can be challenged in a court of law. In addition, the 
Constitution should provide that, should the executive branch choose to try 
defendants in military or security courts, convicted defendants have a right to 
appeal their convictions in an ordinary civilian court. Such a provision (similar to 
the right of habeas corpus in the American Constitution) would balance preserving 
the president’s ability to use military or security courts, to the extent they may be 
necessary, with defendants’ internationally recognized human right to a fair trial 
before an impartial tribunal.133 
This thesis suggests that the constitution should prohibit trying civilians before 
military courts. Additionally, ordinary courts should have the ability to try civilians 
only with the right to compensation. Ordinary courts need to be neutral and 
impartial, and any political cases should be prohibited. 
5. Exceptional powers of the president 
Liguori proposes that the Egyptian president should have the right to issue decrees 
that have the force of law. These decrees should be submitted to the legislature with 
the right of a judicial review.134 
This thesis argues that granting the president the power to issue decrees violates the 
separation of powers. The legislative branch should be the only institution issuing 
laws because the constitution gives the president power to issue decrees. This results 
in expanding the president’s authority, which assists in enshrining authoritarian rule. 
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2.8.2 Failure of traditional emergency power theories 
This thesis criticises traditional emergency power theories and Liguori’s proposed 
model for the following reasons: 
1. Egypt has suffered from an extended and continuous state of emergency 
since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. This state lasted 
until 2012. Since then, a state of emergency has been declared several times, 
and it continues until the present day. 
2. The Egyptian regime’s justification of the long and extended use of a state of 
emergency is as follows: 
a. Egypt is not the only country in the world that has decided to extend the 
state of emergency. Other examples include Syria (1963), Algeria (1992) 
and Turkey (1971–2002). 
b. Declaring a state of emergency is important in fighting terrorist 
organisations that have threatened Egypt’s national security since the 
assassination of Sadat. Further, the Egyptian government claims that it is 
fighting against illegal smuggling in Sinai and at the Gaza border via 
hidden tunnels dug between the Egyptian border and the Gaza Strip. The 
history and development of emergency law in Egypt will be explored 
further in Chapter 4. 
3. Traditional emergency power theories do not explain how or why emergency 
law has been the main cause of human rights violations in Egypt (explored 
further in Chapter 5). Efforts should be focused on how to minimise the 
power given to the executive, especially given the scope of powers that have 
been expanded and enshrined by the constitution and the laws. 
4. Traditional emergency power theories have ignored the fact that emergency 
law has been used as a tool by the deep state authority to protect its political 
and economic interests. Further, traditional emergency power theories have 
ignored the military’s political interference, which has prevented any real 
democracy. Egypt has been ruled by the military for nearly 64 years. 
5. Any proposed model should define and specify the reasons for imposing 
special measures. 
6. Any proposed model should consider external political and external 
interventions from Western powers. 
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7. Traditional emergency power theories neglect the presence of contemporary 
imperialism and its organisations that create pressure on developing 
countries, including Egypt. 
2.8.3 Head’s criticism of the model of emergency power 
Head criticises traditional models of emergency power theories, stating that: 
A common problem with these works is that they take as their starting point the 
continuation or re-establishment of the existing political and legal order and 
discuss how to accommodate the resort to emergency rule. There is also little 
examination of the actual, often violent, measures adopted to restore order, why 
these extraordinary practices were employed, or the underlying implications for 
democracy. In particular, they lack an examination of the socio-economic 
foundations and class character of the relevant ruling elite.135 
Head believes that traditional emergency power theories are not applicable to either 
the developed or the developing world. He further indicates that the emergency 
powers theory model makes the following assumptions: 
• That the recourse to emergency or extra-legal powers is a temporary 
response to a particular perceived threat to the established order, rather 
than a more long-term and systemic tendency to turn to more authoritarian 
forms of rule. 
• That the existing Western states are democratic, and ultimately subject to 
the will of ordinary people, rather than increasingly plutocratic states, 
scarred by a widening gulf between the rich and poor, and ultimately 
dominated by the interests and power of a wealthy corporate elite. 
• That the state itself, and its apparatus of enforcement—police, 
intelligence, military and judicial agencies—is a neutral institution, 
dedicated to serving the needs of society as a whole, rather than an 
instrument of rule serving the interests of the most powerful class: the 
capitalist class. 
• That the judiciary, in particular, functions as an independent arbiter, 
bound by law, even if it does not always acquit itself steadfastly or 
courageously, rather than being part of the mechanism of governing 
society in the interests of the ruling elite. 
• That the executive too is a distinct legal entity, such as a president, prime 
minister or cabinet, with its own inherently institutional composition and 
interests; and that, while it may be susceptible to aggregation and abuse of 
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power, it is not also a vehicle for the financial and corporate interests that 
dominate the economic life of the planet. 
• That ‘national security’ is a concept that, although subject to misuse, is 
likewise an expression of the needs and interests of society as a whole, 
rather than those of the prevailing economic powers that be. 
• That the ‘rule of law’ is similarly a neutral phenomenon, rather than one 
that can not only accommodate and legitimise dictatorial measures, but 
also mask and magnify social inequality and the imbalance in power 
between those at the top and bottom of society.136 
Head provides solid evidence and arguments to refute any general applicability of 
these assumptions. The present thesis shows that Head’s criticisms of the orthodox 
explanatory and justificatory models are directly relevant to Egypt’s situation. These 
models show their weakness, and irrelevance, in radically failing to give any logical 
answers as to why Egypt has suffered from such a long and permanent state of 
emergency and how emergency powers have developed from temporary into 
permanent law and from an exceptional law into an ordinary one. 
It is important to examine history to uncover the sources of problems. To fully 
understand the underlying reasons, we must examine the period since the 
superpowers, including Britain, started to gain political and economic interest in 
Egypt. We must then examine the legal framework from the first declaration of 
emergency law in 1914 until the present day. 
2.9 Conclusion 
The succeeding chapters will show that the orthodox theories fail to explain or justify 
the long and permanent state of emergency in Egypt for the following reasons: 
1. Emergency power models have ignored the fact that one of Britain’s main 
roles in Egypt was to protect its economic and political interests. Britain 
used Egypt’s important strategic position to maintain its tight grip on African 
and Arabic countries. Britain also kept Egypt both as a source of raw 
materials and to control the Nile river upstream. 
2. Emergency models have ignored the fact that Egyptian emergency law has 
developed from an exceptional temporary law into a permanent norm that 
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was then enshrined by the constitution and expanded into different 
exceptional laws. 
3. Since the 1952 coup, successive Egyptian regimes have used elastic and 
vague concepts such as ‘national security’ and ‘fighting terrorism’ to justify 
imposing and extending the state of emergency to protect the country. 
4. Dominant models have ignored the numerous human rights breaches during 
the state of emergency and the real motivations behind declaring and 
extending the state of emergency. These exceptional laws did not have any 
safeguard measures to prohibit restrictions on non-derogable rights, and the 
right of compensation made the situation worse. 
5. Dominant models have ignored the use of the military and police. Instead of 
protecting the country’s borders and ensuring the safety of the nation, the 
military and police have used emergency law as a tool to protect the security 
of the regime and suppress its opponents. 
6. Emergency power theories have failed to examine the deep state’s political 
and economic interests. 
The next chapter will examine Britain’s occupation to show how Britain has used the 
concept of martial law to protect its interests in Egypt. 
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Chapter 3: British Imperialism in Egypt 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to conduct a detailed analytical and descriptive 
evaluation of British imperialism in Egypt from 1882 to 1952. The chapter also 
demonstrates how Britain employed martial law in Egypt to consolidate and protect 
its own political and economic interests. 
3.2 European Imperialist Powers 
Capitalist countries have used their military and economic powers to control most of 
the world. Latin America, Africa and Asia were victims of these powers. European 
powers seized these continents to use their raw materials and enslave their 
populations, and to prevent these continents from developing as industrial powers, 
thereby keeping them dependant on the colonisers. This chapter examines the origins 
of imperialism and explains how European powers have used the developing world 
to extract raw materials and generate profits. 
3.2.1 Origins of imperialism 
Most of the world is subject to the developed capitalist world because of the latter’s 
superiority in terms of economic, technological and military power.1 Capitalists 
search for ways to expand their markets and increase their profits by reducing costs 
and expanding their sales.2 
Europe started searching for minerals beyond its own borders in the sixteenth 
century. It discovered gold and silver in Potosi (Bolivia) between 1503 and 1660. In 
that time, 16 million kilograms of silver were shipped to Europe, while 185,000 
kilograms of gold arrived at Spanish ports. By 1880, a total of 100 million kilograms 
of silver had been taken from Latin America and sent to Spain and other European 
countries. Most of this silver was extracted at little to no cost through the use of force 
against indigenous people and some small exchanges of goods. Europe used the 
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silver and gold to build its military capacity, which in turn secured its political 
advantage. Europe also exported silver to India and China.3 
African and Latin American countries were used by Europe to source raw materials 
such as sugar and cotton, and they simultaneously became dependent on Europe’s 
manufactured goods.4 The gold, silver and slave trades5 enabled the European 
powers to develop their industrial production and sell their manufactured goods to 
the rest of the world.6 They used the Industrial Revolution to make new weapons, 
which in turn helped them to suppress any nationalist movements. Britain used the 
‘divide to rule’ strategy in the colonies in Africa because it worked well in India,.7 
This period of imperialism focused on gaining access to raw materials and flows of 
wealth such as gold and silver. It also focused on the slave trade for work in mines 
and plantations. Finally, it aimed at securing access to trade routes, as exemplified by 
France in Canada and the Dutch in South Africa. 
John Locke (29 August 1632–28 October 1704) was an English philosopher known 
as the father of classical liberalism. Locke claims that legitimate government is based 
on the idea of power separation (executive, legislative and judiciary). Locke 
describes legislative power as supreme power to enforce the law. Locke’s third 
power is called the ‘federative power’ and consists of the right to act according to the 
law of nature.8 
In the late 1600s, Locke wrote the Two Treatises of Government. In the labour theory 
of property, which is developed in Chapter V of the Second Treatise, Locke justifies 
the homestead principle, which is based on the effort and labour that individuals 
expend to produce goods or allow the land to produce goods. Locke argues that the 
labour theory of private property is a theory of natural law, which means that all men 
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have access to God’s earthly resources and that each person has a natural right and 
duty to survive and establish private property.9 
Locke’s treatise justifies the conquest of the land in the Americas on the basis that 
the indigenous population was not engaged in agricultural production; therefore, only 
settlers could rightfully farm the land. Locke adds that what really counts for 
ownership is not only farming, but the use of the English farming style to increase 
productivity and profits.10 
The colonisation of India began in 1600, led by the East India Company, which 
focused on controlling the trading routes east of the Cape of Good Hope. The 
company expanded by the 1800s and established direct administrative power over 
most of the subcontinent. It then handed the power to Britain, which forced the 
Indian people to adopt a new agricultural system and cultivate opium, indigo, cotton, 
wheat and rice for Britain’s export system. Additionally, Britain imposed a tax on the 
farmers, enclosed the forests and used them to build ships and railways. Common 
water rights were also auctioned and privatised.11 Britain also imposed a high tax on 
Egyptian farmers and forced them to grow cotton. A deeper analysis of the 
colonisation will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In the later part of the seventeenth century, Britain’s economy was developed and 
dominated by an elite group of bankers and shareholders who were shaping the 
manufacturing industries. This industrial capitalism arose in response to the rapid 
development of the industrial sector and the invention of machines as a result of the 
Industrial Revolution.12 London and South East England were important to the 
capitalist system because of their vital geographic and cultural position. The 
eighteenth-century elite, comprising wealthy Londoners and investors from Southern 
England, played a crucial rule in the growth of Britain’s colonies overseas. During 
the nineteenth century, London became the growing centre of service and financial 
institutions. Combined with the Industrial Revolution, this meant that Britain had a 
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strong presence overseas after 1850.13 Two-thirds of the £6 billion in London’s 
market between 1865 and 1912 was invested in other countries within the British 
Empire. Financial institutions made significant profits from investing their money in 
colonial endeavours. This money mostly came from lenders, investors, aristocrats, 
services and financial institutions.14 
During the 1870s and 1880s, at the time of the Great Depression, markets were 
depressed and the prices of goods were falling. At this time, British investors 
invested their money in foreign stocks with fixed interest. These stocks were mainly 
in the construction of railways, bridges, harbours and docks, which provided more 
profits than they did in Britain.15 To protect capitalist investments, Britain created 
military bases and used military forces to protect its investments outside Britain. By 
the end of the eighteenth century, investors and aristocrats occupied the main 
political and social seats in England, thereby controlling the policy-making.16 The 
capitalist system shows how the financial sector of bankers and investors combined 
with politics to form an elite group whose personal interests were intrinsically linked 
to the national interests.17 
Egypt was a victim of these Western European powers because of its strategic 
position, especially after the construction of the Suez Canal. Egypt was used as a 
source of raw materials—especially cotton—because of its agricultural wealth. 
Capitalist countries turned Egypt into an agricultural export economy, and from 
1860, agricultural exports provided Egypt with 70% of its earnings.18 The expansion 
of Egypt’s trade attracted British businesspeople and bankers to invest their money in 
Egypt. They also made profits through loans provided to Khedive Ismael for the 
purpose of modernising Egypt. When Egypt could not pay the interest on these loans, 
Britain used it as justification to occupy Egypt.19 
In 1876, around 10% of Africa was under European imperial occupation, and just 14 
years later, 90% of Africa was colonised by Britain, France, Belgium, Germany and 
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Italy.20 The advanced capitalist countries developed a new age of imperialism 
between 1880 and 1914. During this time, most developing countries outside the US 
and Europe were under a formal or informal rule, mainly by Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, the US and Japan.21 Britain expanded its 
presence in Africa and India to protect important maritime trade routes from any 
threat.22 
In conclusion, Europe used Africa as one of the major sources of raw materials for its 
industries and to create new, profitable markets for their products. Europe also used 
slaves to create more profits from its plantations and mining projects. The capitalist 
system played a crucial role in occupying most of the world. Europe produced more 
than it needed, but instead of reducing production and industry building, it simply 
exported its manufactured goods to the developing world. The success of the 
capitalist system in 1800 and 1900 in Latin America, India and Africa, led bankers 
and financial institutions to try to find new markets and new sources of raw materials 
to expand their investments and generate more profits. 
3.2.2 United States imperialism in Latin America 
From the 1800s onwards, the US started pushing towards Latin American countries. 
The main aim of this was to prevent Europe from recolonising Latin America, and to 
use the resources found in Latin America for its own benefits. 
In 1823, the US issued the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that any effort from 
European countries to recolonise Latin America would be considered an act of 
aggression against the US. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt issued the 
Roosevelt Corollary, which justified military intervention in any Latin American 
countries that declined to cooperate with the economic interests of the US. The 
Monroe Doctrine and the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary were issued to protect US 
interests and keep Latin America as a source of raw materials. They also ensured that 
new export markets would open up for US manufacturers.23 At the same time, these 
acts prevented any European countries from recolonising the US or colonising Latin 
American countries. The US adopted the same policies as Europe to keep Latin 
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American countries as sources of raw materials so it could then import manufactured 
goods back to those countries at higher prices. The Middle East became crucial for 
the US, particularly after discovering oil. This will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
3.3 European Imperialism in Egypt—Capitulation System 
One of the most dominant institutions that affected Egypt was the capitulation 
system, labelled by some as ‘a blatantly unequal legal regime’.24 The capitulation 
system consisted of a group of treaties signed between certain European powers and 
the Ottoman Empire. It came into existence in the fifteenth century under pressure 
from the European powers. 
The capitulation system treaty granted European powers the authority to protect 
religious minorities (i.e., Christians and Jewish people). It was then extended to 
protect foreigners living in the Ottoman Empire, providing them with an exemption 
from Ottoman laws, including civil, commercial and criminal laws, as well as all 
personal matters. The capitulation system gave jurisdiction in relation to foreigners 
to the consular tribunals of the respective European countries.25 It also granted 
foreigners living in the Ottoman Empire the freedom to publish, as well as the ability 
to export and import free of tax and certain custom liabilities.26 For example, 
Europeans living in Egypt were not subject to Egyptian laws but continued to be 
subject to the laws of their own country. They generally did not pay any tax in Egypt, 
but if they did, they paid very little.27 
The European powers used the capitulation system for their own benefit and enjoyed 
immunity from Egyptian law. The Egyptian government did not have the authority to 
arrest foreigners who committed crimes unless they received consent from their 
consul. They had to be tried in their own consular courts, and most of the time they 
were released without proper trial.28 In addition, the capitulation system prevented 
Egyptian authorities from searching ships belonging to foreign consuls and 
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companies. As a result, smuggling increased in Egypt,29 leading to an increase in 
crime and prohibited trading. Egyptian authorities were prevented from gaining any 
benefits or tax from these trades. 
3.4 British Strategies Towards Controlling Egypt 
Muhammad Ali, who assumed power in 1805–1848, ruled over Egypt through the 
Ottoman Empire’s sponsored industrialisation. During this period, factories were 
constructed for military productions, agricultural processing and textiles.30 Ali tried 
to make Egypt an independent power through modernisation31 and planned to 
increase tourism in Egypt by encouraging Europeans to visit Egypt to take advantage 
of its significant historical culture. 
In 1838, Britain and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Balta Liman. This 
commercial treaty focused on limiting the negative effects of Ottoman–Anglo trade 
caused by internal transit taxes on commerce within the Ottoman Empire.32 The 
Treaty of Balta Liman gave Britain privileges with the Ottoman Empire by lifting all 
trade barriers and dissolving all commercial monopolies.33 A 3% tariff was levied on 
British goods entering the Ottoman Empire, while Ottoman Empire exports were 
taxed at a rate of 60% upon entering the English market.34 
The Treaty of Balta Liman was a significant benefit to Britain. Local Egyptian 
industries were shut down because they could not compete with cheap British goods. 
Egypt became a supplier of raw materials and became dependent on Western-
manufactured goods.35 
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In the 1850s, trade between Egypt and Britain increased rapidly, especially in regard 
to Egyptian raw materials such as cotton.36 In response, Britain offered to build a 
railroad from Alexandria to Cairo, and the khedive agreed. The construction of the 
railroad began in 1851 and finished in 1854. It was later extended to Suez, which 
meant that goods could be loaded and unloaded easily from Egypt to India and 
Britain. This helped Britain move one step closer to the occupation of Egypt, but in a 
diplomatic way.37 
France also controlled Egypt through the famous strategic waterway connecting the 
East with the West. The main purpose was to bring Egypt even closer to Europe.38 
France received its chance when Said Pasha ruled from 1854 to 1863. He became the 
Ottoman viceroy of Egypt and signed an agreement with French engineer Ferdinand 
de Lesseps to construct the Suez Canal in 1854. The agreement was a joint enterprise 
with France to supply machinery and to build and operate the Suez Canal for 99 
years. Egypt supplied the land and received a custom exemption. It also supplied 
labourers for the project, although many of them were forced labourers.39 Britain 
initially opposed the construction of the Suez Canal because of its interests in 
Egyptian railways and ports. Fearing the increased influence and power of France, 
Britain started planning to seize the Suez Canal for itself. 
As a result of the Crimean War between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1853–
1856, the treasury of the Ottoman Empire was so exhausted that it was forced to take 
public loans from European bankers at an interest rate of 6% per annum. The 
Ottoman Empire needed £12 million per annum to service these loans,40 and because 
Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire, Egyptians could not pay the expenses 
required to continue constructing the Suez Canal.41 In response, the Suez Canal 
Company issued 400,000 shares. France bought 200,000 and Khedive Said bought 
64,000. To buy more shares in 1860, Said took loans with harsh terms from a French 
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financier.42 Egypt was forced to borrow money from European bankers to finish the 
Suez Canal project, and took three loans (in 1862, 1864 and 1866) to cover the 
expenses.43 The Suez Canal opened in 1869, with France owning 55% of the shares 
and the Egyptian government owning 45%. 
In 1873, Khedive Ismail, who ruled from 1863 to 1879, launched a program to create 
a strong, centralised state in Egypt. Within 12 years of his reign, many projects had 
been built, including the Suez Canal, railways, bridges, schools, telegraph lines, 
irrigation, harbours and docks.44 These grand developments increased taxation, debt 
and interest, as well as the use of forced labour. Egypt increasingly relied on foreign 
loans, which led to a collapse resulting from excessive loan-taking. Eventually, 
Egypt owed half as much again as it had been lent.45 
Egypt’s agricultural wealth (especially in cotton), along with its strategic position 
after the construction of the Suez Canal, attracted capitalists from Western powers. 
Businesspeople and bankers continued to extend credit to Khedive Ismail to help 
bring to fruition his plan to reconstruct Cairo along the lines of Napoleon III’s Paris. 
However, when the khedive could not pay the interest of the loans, the capitalists 
gained control of Egypt.46 Egypt was £90 million in debt after efforts to modernise it 
and build the Suez Canal. This opened the door for France and Britain to interfere in 
the Egyptian administration.47 
British capitalists suggested that the khedive sign new arrangements to allow 
contractors to continue carrying out their work, and they lent the khedive money to 
pay the contractors.48 In 1875, British creditors forced Khedive Ismail to sell his 
shares (around 176,602 shares) in the Suez Canal Company. British Prime Minister 
Benjamin Disraeli bought them for 4 million with the assistance of the London house 
of Rothschild and without parliamentary approval. This meant that England owned 
around 44% of the Suez Canal Company.49 The financial crisis forced Ismail Pasha 
to increase taxation to make the loan payments and to accept a commission on 
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Egyptian finances and public debt under dual control from British and French 
authorities. The commission had the power to confiscate revenue from Egyptian 
tobacco and railroads.50 
In 1876, Britain arranged a financial mission, headed by Stephen Cave, to assist in 
resolving the confusion. The mission found that Egypt needed additional European 
direction, so the country was forced to launch a new financial scheme called ‘Public 
Debt Commission’. Four commissioners were appointed to represent the 
bondholder’s countries (Britain, France, Italy and Austria), and two foreign 
controllers (Britain and France) were appointed by the khedive as a form of dual 
control to work for the Egyptian government.51 The British government used dual 
control as a tool to control the Egyptian treasury and diplomatic relations.52 Britain 
did not agree that the khedive should have the power to dismiss the debt 
commissioner and decided to negotiate a new arrangement with France. This 
arrangement took the power from the khedive to dismiss the debt commissioner53 
and increased the interest rate from 5% to 7%.54 
Britain forced Khedive Ismail to accept the new arrangement and to dismiss the 
Egyptian minister of finance, Ismail Sadiq, by ordering his arrest and exiling him to 
Sudan. Sadiq was dismissed because he rejected the new Anglo–French arrangement, 
which increased the level of interference in Egypt’s finances and placed pressure on 
Egypt’s revenue.55 Under this new arrangement, Britain controlled Egypt’s forces 
and the Ministry of Finance, and France controlled the public works ministry.56 
Ismail Pasha tried to replace the European ministers with Egyptian ministers, but in 
1879, Britain forced him to abdicate in favour of his son Tawfik, who ruled from 
1879 to 1892. 
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Sir Evelyn Baring was the first British consul-general who was the ruler of Egypt. 
Both Khedive Tawfik and the prime minister of Egypt had to follow his advice. Each 
Egyptian minister had a British adviser, and each provincial governor had a British 
inspector.57 Britain started hiring English people to assist in public service in Egypt 
at both the executive and administrative levels, with voting rights. In 1879, Britain 
forced the retirement, on half pay, of 1,600 Egyptian officers out of 2,600.58 By 
1880, Egypt was Britain’s most important client, with 80% of Egypt’s exports going 
to Britain and 44% of imports coming from Britain.59 In addition, Britain owned half 
of Egypt’s funded debt. For example, 37% of the personal investments of British 
Prime Minister Gladstone were in Egypt.60 Britain enjoyed unrivalled influence over 
Egypt because it remained Egypt’s principle creditor.61 
The British–African policy was designed to prevent other European countries, 
especially France, from gaining control of the Nile valley.62 Britain controlled the 
Nile upstream to control Egypt’s cotton farms, which exported to textile industries 
around the world. Egyptian cotton was in high demand because of its good quality; 
however, the main profits did not go to Egyptian peasants, but to foreign merchants, 
who understood the European market.63 Britain started placing too much pressure on 
the peasantry by increasing taxes to fulfil Egypt’s debt obligations.64 
Most of the time, Egyptian farmers just worked for food, and many farmers 
borrowed money from money lenders at high rates of around 20%. The lenders then 
seized their property for non-payment of their debts. Around this time, thousands of 
acres of Egyptian farmland were transferred to the British.65 This was one reason that 
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encouraged Egyptian farmers to support Egyptian nationalists to free their country 
from the foreigners.66 
3.4.1 Britain’s justification for colonising Egypt 
Egyptian nationalists soon became frustrated with Britain’s interference in Egypt’s 
finances and administration. The nationalist movement was led by an Egyptian 
officer named Ahmad Urabi. Colonel Urabi led a social political movement that 
expressed the dissatisfaction of army officials, the educated class and the peasantry 
against Britain’s interference in their country,67 and he called for the dismissal of the 
war ministry.68 
In May 1882, Britain and France sent three warships each to protect their financial 
and geopolitical interests in the region.69 They justified their actions on the grounds 
of safeguarding their own people. Britain forced the Egyptian khedive to dismiss the 
Egyptian nationalist ministry to banish Urabi. However, the nationalists and the 
police at Alexandria forced the khedive to return to the nationalist ministry. 
Political factors arose as a result of the competition between European powers to 
control African countries. In June 1882, a conference was held between France, 
England, Italy, Germany, Austria and Russia, all of whom had interests in Egypt. 
They met in Constantinople and signed an agreement that none of the countries, 
except Britain in case of a special emergency, could take isolated action in Egypt. 
They also agreed that the sultan of the Ottoman Empire should be asked to send his 
armies to restore the situation in Egypt.70 Britain wanted to keep Russia, Austria, 
Italy and Germany out of the Eastern Mediterranean. They maintained an alliance 
with France until 1882 to prevent Turkey from sending any troops into Egypt and 
staying there permanently. Britain found it difficult to control Egypt under the 1882 
treaty. Its solution was to create a special emergency before the Ottoman Empire 
could take any action. Britain used Urabi as justification to save the Egyptian people 
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and the Suez Canal from Egyptian nationalists,71 and accused Urabi of having plans 
to disrupt the Suez Canal.72 However, in reality, Urabi was one of the ultimate 
representatives of the Egyptian nationalists who refused to bow down to Britain’s 
interference in Egypt.73 Britain justified its actions in Egypt under the guise of 
protecting Europeans. In particular, this justification was based on Britain’s 
accusation of Egyptians killing 50 Europeans in Alexandria on 11 June 1882. Britain 
conveniently ignored the fact that 3,000 Egyptians were killed or injured in these 
clashes.74 
On 11 July 1882, a special emergency was created when British gunboats started 
attacking the Egyptian defence in Alexandria with the aim of destroying it. Britain 
had an army of 20,000 well-trained troops with strong weapons, while Urabi and his 
army were a force of 16,000 with poor training and a lack of modern arms and 
ammunition; thus, Britain defeated them easily.75 It was estimated that 2,000–10,000 
Egyptians died, while 57 British people died and 382 were seriously injured.76 
British troops defeated Urabi troops at Tel-el-Khber77 and then occupied Cairo on 15 
September 1882. Britain’s occupation of Egypt was a fait accompli.78 
The British government stated that its occupation of Egypt was only for a temporary 
period to restore order and was not an attempt to challenge the Ottoman Empire’s 
sovereignty over Egypt. Britain also claimed that it wanted to help Egypt and 
maintained that British forces would operate under the khedive.79 Given that 
Britain’s occupation of Egypt occurred without the consent of the rest of the powers, 
the Constantinople conference was suspended. Further, the dual control over Egypt 
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by France and Britain was abolished.80 Britain appointed a military governor to carry 
out British policy and protect British interests. The Egyptian constitution and 
assembly were replaced by councils with advisory.81 
3.4.2 Growth of Egypt’s opposition to Britain 
Egypt’s opposition to Britain’s occupation grew over time; however, one event in 
particular made Egypt more determined to end Britain’s occupation, namely the 
Dinshaway incident in 1906. Further, the 1919 revolution gave Egypt renewed hope 
with regard to its independence. 
3.4.2.1 Dinshaway incident in 1906 
Dinshaway is a small Egyptian village situated in the Nile Delta. On 27 June 1906, 
several British officers went hunting for pigeons in Dinshaway village. In the 
process, they wounded a local woman and set fire to a barn. The peasants asked the 
British officers to stop killing their pigeons, which they raised for their food, but the 
British officers refused. This led to clashes in which one soldier and several 
Egyptians died. British authorities arrested 52 men and set up a special martial court, 
trying them in 30 minutes.82 Four Egyptian peasants in Dinshaway were sentenced to 
death and hanged in the village, and the entire village was forced to watch the 
executions.83 Two Egyptian men were sentenced to hard labour for life, one was 
sentenced to 15 years in prison and six were sentenced to seven years in prison. Five 
people received 50 lashes each, and three villagers were sentenced to one-year 
imprisonment and 50 lashes.84 Dinshaway was also deprived of its headman and was 
attached to neighbouring villages.85 The harsh punishments enraged Egyptian 
nationalists and sparked an upsurge of anti-British sentiment among Egyptians 
against the occupation. The events in Dinshaway forced Britain to reconsider its 
oppressive policy and instead draw more attention to preparing the country for self-
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government.86 Lastly, these events hastened the resignation of Lord Cromer in 
1907.87 
Egyptians felt that they were second-class citizens for various reasons. First, 
Egyptian farmers suffered most as a result of the Egyptian financial crisis, having 
been humiliated, beaten and tortured. They also had to pay four times more tax than 
before and were forced to sell their crops for half or one-third of their actual worth. 
Britain created administrative institutions, such as the agriculture commission, and 
exercised judicial functions, such as having the authority to penalise peasants. For 
example, when the price of cotton rose, Egyptian peasants were penalised if they did 
not maintain the irrigation system or if they cultivated crops other than cotton. When 
the price of cotton decreased because of World War I, the commission penalised the 
peasants if they grew cotton.88 Second, Egyptian government officials and military 
officers were not paid for months.89 Further, journalists and newspapers were 
suspended or suppressed under the 1909 law, which required all newspapers to be 
licensed.90 This was implemented to prevent nationalists and anti-British protesters 
from criticising British policy in Egypt, and to prevent the spread of an uprising 
against Britain. Third, foreigners dominated in all key positions. For example, many 
Egyptians lost their jobs because most government jobs were occupied by European 
citizens. Even if Egyptians had a job, they often did not receive payment for it.91 The 
Egyptian government did not have any power in relation to anything relating to 
foreigners. 
In 1907, political parties were suppressed by British occupiers.92 Britain established 
a prisons department within the Ministry of Interior.93 The 1909 Law of Police 
Supervision, sometimes called the Relegation Law, gave the government the right to 
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detain or exile dangerous people without trying or convicting them. These forms of 
administrative detention could last for five years.94 This meant that if the government 
suspected someone of being a political threat, it could place them under surveillance, 
infiltrate their organisation and imprison them if necessary. The suspect would be 
accused of affiliating with nationalists or stirring up Egyptians against the rule of the 
khedive.95 In 1911, Britain created a special section for domestic surveillance and 
sent some officers to London, Paris and St Petersburg to gain more experience to 
improve and expand the role of the secret police apparatus as a tool to suppress 
Egyptian nationalists.96 
In 1913, Britain established the Egyptian State Security Investigations Service under 
the name Political Security Service. Its main duty was to spy on, and collect 
information about, any opposition, even judges, who were working against the 
British occupation.97 
This thesis argues that Egypt was under informal British martial law between 1882 
and 1914 for the following reasons: 
1. Britain used informal British martial law to appoint a British military 
governor. The sultan ruled in name only. 
2. Britain abolished the Egyptian constitution, suppressed journalists, censored 
the media, suppressed nationalists, opened new prisons and established the 
hidden police, while also appointing British citizens to key positions. 
One example that illustrates the state of Egypt under martial law is the 1906 
Dinshaway incident, in which the British tried Egyptian farmers before British 
military courts. 
Despite being in a de facto state of martial law, Britain did not want to declare 
formal British martial law because it wanted to show Egypt that its occupation aimed 
to protect Egyptians and European citizens until they could consolidate their power 
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in Egypt. Britain wanted to buy time to seize Egypt for itself, and received its chance 
when the Ottoman Empire stood with the central Europeans to declare martial law in 
1914. 
3.5 Martial Law of 1914 
On 5 August 1914, Britain issued a decree adopting defensive measures that made 
Egypt belligerent towards the British Empire.98 Britain forced the Egyptian 
government to sever its relations with all of Britain’s enemies. 
Between 18 and 20 October 1914, Britain issued two decrees that contained a 
number of emergency political measures. The first decree ordered the Egyptian 
government to postpone the Legislative Assembly for two months. The assembly did 
not gather once during the time of war. The second decree prohibited Egyptians from 
gathering. Four or more people who gathered without government authority could be 
punished.99 
On 28 October 1914, Turkey entered the war on the side of the central European 
powers. On 2 November 1914, Britain declared martial law in Egypt. On 18 
December 1914, Britain placed Egypt under the British protectorate, terminating 
Turkey’s suzerainty over Egypt and claiming that Britain would use all possible 
measures to defend Egypt.100 Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, the Ottoman viceroy who 
ruled from 1892 to 1914, was forced to abdicate in favour of his Uncle Hussein 
Kamel, who ruled from 1914 to 1917.101 
Britain declared a state of emergency for three reasons: 
1. to secure British and allied forces and ensure that all Egyptian ports were 
under British control 
2. to transfer the power from the existing government to a British military 
government 
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3. to counter Egyptian nationalists’ demands for independence.102 
The British forces’ commander-in-chief, Maxwell, assumed power from the 
Egyptian government and used autocratic military authority to close nationalist 
newspapers and confiscate the remaining newspapers. Thousands of Egyptian 
nationalists were jailed.103 Maxwell also deposed any remaining nationalists from the 
head of the government.104 Further, Britain exiled around 400 German and Austro-
Hungarian citizens, 49 Turks and 16 Egyptians to Malta.105 
Maxwell announced that Britain had agreed to take on the sole burden of the war and 
would not call upon local Egyptians for assistance. However, in practice, British 
authorities used the Egyptian army to assist in defending the Suez Canal from the 
Ottoman soldiers who arrived from Palestine.106 Every day, Britain used more 
Egyptian resources and labour corps for minimum wages. British recruiting agents 
then began conscripting Egyptian farmers,107 who were used to dig trenches and 
build fortifications and railways.108 
Egypt suffered from further economic crises because of World War I. The country 
was forced to supply camels and horses to serve British troops,109 and the cost of 
bread, clothes and fuel increased. Moreover, Britain forced farmers to grow wheat 
and rice to feed the army, which meant that the farmers sold their grain, rice and 
wheat at low prices and received delayed payments. Further, their donkeys, camels 
and horses were confiscated for use in the war. In addition, corrupt government 
collectors used Egyptians by taking some of their products as a tax at a low price and 
selling them at a high price.110 Britain introduced paper money and forced the 
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National Bank of Egypt to stop exchanging bank notes for gold and silver.111 It 
withdrew all gold and silver from circulation and gave them to the British treasury.112 
Not only did Egypt suffer from the declaration of martial law in November 1914, but 
British martial law also gave Britain the authority to confiscate German and Austrian 
assets and homes for use in military service. Britain dealt with them as enemies, and 
a number of foreigners, including Germans and Turks, were accused of spying.113 
Britain also prohibited German ships and goods from passing through Egyptian ports 
and permitted the arrest of German and Austrian ships.114 British martial law gave 
more power to the British military over German and Austrian citizens living in 
Egypt, and German and Austrian judges were given an extended leave of absence 
over the summer of 1914, and then until the end of their contracts.115 
Britain used martial law to end the capitulation system. On 19 December 1914, 
Britain informed the Egyptian sultan that the capitulation system was no longer in 
harmony with the development of Egypt. Thus, the system was postponed until the 
end of World War I.116 Britain used martial law to impose taxes on European 
foreigners, which was not allowed under the interpretation of the capitulation system, 
and it was ultimately legalised for possible implementation under the 1923 
constitution and the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936.117 
In 1915, martial law gave Egyptian police the authority to enter places where alcohol 
was sold, and in 1916, drug smuggling was included under martial law.118 Further, in 
September 1915, the commander-in-chief imposed new taxes on house properties. 
This tax was given to police officers. However, at the end of 1915, the military 
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authority confiscated land from the Egyptians and used it to construct a railway that 
was intended for military use.119 
On 24 March 1917, the Egyptian council of ministers authorised the appointment of 
a special commission to end the capitulation system. The commission consisted of 
three Egyptians (the minsters of justice, finance and instruction), three British 
representatives and two other foreigners.120 In March 1918, after 57 sessions, the 
commission proposed ending the capitulation system and establishing unified 
tribunals. The commission also took over the jurisdiction of native, mixed and 
consular tribunals on commercial, civil and criminal matters (apart from personal 
status). Marriage, divorce inheritance and guardianship were to stay in the hands of 
the consular tribunals as long as the tribunals were well maintained.121 The proposed 
system failed because of the Egyptian Revolution of 1919.122 
3.5.1 Revolution of 1919 
In 1918, Saad Zaghlul founded the Wafd Party (Delegation Party),123 which was a 
nationalist liberal political party that demanded Egypt’s independence. The Wafd 
Party requested that the British high commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, meet with 
the British government in London to represent the Wafd Party’s case and demand 
independence. However, Britain ignored the party’s demands.124 
The Egyptian Revolution of 1919 began when Britain arrested Zaghlul (the 
education minister), Ismail Sidqi (head of the Wafd Party) and Muhammad Mahmud 
and Hammad Albasil, who sought permission from the British commissioner to 
attend the Paris Peace Conference to discuss Egypt’s situation because they wanted 
to end Britain’s protectorate over the country. As a result, on 8 March 1919, Britain 
exiled Zaghlul to Malta.125 The 1919 revolution was started by peasants in rural areas 
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and lawyers, teachers and students in urban areas.126 Egyptian trade unions and 
labourers also demonstrated against Britain, calling for independence and 
freedom.127 
On 9 March 1919, anti-British nationalists started demonstrating throughout Egypt, 
calling for independence. Strikes that included lawyers, railway employees and 
postal workers spread across Egypt. The British army suppressed the uprising and 
restored order by patrolling communication, distributing propaganda, delivering 
mail, relieving garrisons and attacking demonstrators.128 The police used gunfire to 
kill six students and wound 22 people. General Balfi, the acting commander-in-chief, 
issued a warning that any further damage to the railways would lead to the nearest 
villages being burned in retaliation.129 
On 25 May 1919, Britain appointed a new high commissioner, General Allenby. The 
demonstration in Egypt continued until Allenby ordered the release of Zaghlul and 
the rest of the Wafd Party. He allowed Zaghlul to return and then allowed him to join 
the Paris conference to discuss Egypt’s aspirations for ending Britain’s 
occupation.130 In December 1919, Lord Milner was appointed as a commissioner in 
Egypt to frame recommendations for future policy in Egypt. He recommended that 
Britain end its protectorate over Egypt and recognise Egypt as an independent 
country. At the same time, he reinforced the need to protect Britain’s interests and 
foreign communities in Egypt.131 
Egyptian nationalists called for a stable treaty between Britain and Egypt to end 
Britain’s occupation and ensure that Egypt achieved full independence. However, 
Britain wanted to stall to avoid more problems with the Egyptian nationalists. It 
wanted to be ready for the external war against Italy and Germany and to protect its 
interests in the Suez Canal.132 Britain claimed that Egypt was incapable of governing 
itself and could not protect foreigners’ and Britain’s interests. 
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Egyptian nationalists had their own reasons for refusing Lord Milner’s 
recommendations. First, the recommendations used indefinite measures relating to 
ending Britain’s authority, especially the financial aspects, which gave the British 
commissioner wide authority on servicing the debt. Second, Britain retained the right 
to deploy its army in any area of Egypt for an indefinite period. Britain claimed that 
it was important for Egypt to keep the British army to provide security for Egyptians, 
arguing that Egypt did not have a strong army to protect itself from different foreign 
powers. Egypt refused the proposed recommendations, believing that they were an 
excuse for Britain to remain in, and control, Egypt. Given that the British had killed 
800 Egyptians and wounded 400 by the end of 1919, the nationalists were perhaps 
right to be suspicious.133 
In 1922, after years of demonstration and calling for freedom for Egypt, Britain 
agreed to end its protectorate and declared Egypt an independent country; however, 
it was still only partial independence. A unilateral British declaration was made on 
28 February 1922, ending Britain’s protectorate over Egypt. Martial law was 
withdrawn, and four matters were reserved for the discretion of the kingdom of Great 
Britain, including protecting foreigners’ interests in Egypt, protecting British 
communications, protecting Egypt from external enemies, the Sudan situation and 
the security of the British Empire, including defending Egypt from all foreign 
interference.134 
In Sudan, which was part of Egypt until 1898, when Britain conquered Sudan and 
declared joint rule between them and Egypt,135 Britain accused an Egyptian 
nationalist of the assassination of the British governor-general in Sudan, Sir Lee 
Stack. Britain used this event to justify expelling all Egyptian officials and troops 
from Sudan. Britain then kept Sudan for itself.136 
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On 15 March 1922, Britain changed the title for the leader of Egypt from sultan to 
king. King Fouad was the first king of Egypt and ruled from 1922 to 1936.137 
Although Britain transferred power over domestic affairs to Egypt, in reality, Britain 
continued ruling the country.138 This thesis argues that Egypt was under formal 
British martial law from 1914 to 1923. Britain appointed a British military governor 
and replaced Khedive Abbas Hilmi with Sultan Hussein Kamel for the following 
reasons: 
1. Britain used formal British martial law to give it extra exceptional power to 
expand its authority. 
2. Martial law was important for suppressing Egyptians because it prevented 
freedom of expression, closed nationalists’ newspapers and arrested, 
detained and exiled Egyptian nationalists. 
3. Britain used martial law to suppress German, Austrian and Turk citizens. 
4. Britain wanted to seize Egypt for itself to prevent other Europeans from 
having any kind of authority that could pose a danger to Britain’s interests in 
Egypt. 
5. Britain wanted to use Egypt as a source of raw materials. 
3.6 Egyptian Constitution of 1923 
The 1923 constitution was written after Britain declared Egypt an independent 
country. King Fouad established a committee consisting of a non-elected group of 
Egyptian legal scholars to write the 1923 constitution,139 which was heavily 
modelled on the Belgian Constitution.140 Article 32 states that: 
The throne of the Egyptian Kingdom is hereditary in the dynasty of Muhammad 
Ali. Succession to the throne shall be as per the Royal Decree issued on 15 the 
Shaaban 1340 AH Corresponding to 13 April 1922. 
Further, Article 33 states that ‘the King is the highest Head of State whose person 
shall be immune and inviolable’. In theory, the 1923 constitution was a liberal 
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constitution; however, in practice, it was not democratic because it granted the king 
wide power and enshrined martial law. 
Articles 38, 49 and 74 of the 1923 constitution provide examples of the powers 
granted to the king. Article 38 gives the king the right to dissolve the House of 
Representatives without specifying the reason for doing so. Article 49 grants the king 
the power to appoint and dismiss his ministers. Article 74 grants the king the 
authority to appoint up to two-fifths of the Senate, as well as the power to dissolve 
the parliament. Thus, Articles 38, 49 and 74 violate the separation of powers between 
the three branches of government because the king retains the executive and 
legislative power through his ability to appoint the prime minister and the Senate. 
Article 124 states that ‘judges shall be independent and shall be subject to no 
authority in their judgement other than the law. No governmental authority may 
intervene in judicial cases. 
In addition, Article 41 of the 1923 constitution grants the king the power to issue 
decrees that use the force of law in the case of an emergency that necessitates 
immediate measures to be taken during a parliamentary recess. However, Article 41 
adds that the decree should not violate the constitution, and the parliament should be 
called for an extraordinary session to determine whether to approve the decree. 
Article 45 of the 1923 constitution is concerned with martial law. It states that: 
The King shall declare martial law; the declaration of martial law must be 
immediately presented to the parliament to decide on the continuation or repeal 
thereof. Should martial law be declared at a time when parliament is not in 
session, the parliament must be called for convention quickly. 
The 1923 constitution gives the king the authority to declare martial law by himself, 
stating that the declaration should be presented to the parliament immediately. The 
constitution does not define ‘immediately’ in this context and does not specify the 
deadline (e.g., 24 hours, one week or one month) for submitting the declaration to the 
parliament. Further, the constitution does not discuss what should occur if the 
parliament is not in session, and it does not specify the time limit for implementing 
martial law, the justifiable reasons behind declaring a state of emergency or the time 
at which the state of emergency should end. 
Article 155 of the 1923 constitution states that: 
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No provision of this constitution may be suspended, except temporarily during the 
period of a war or during a state of siege according to the manner provided for in 
law. However, the convening of parliament cannot be suspended if the conditions 
provided for in this constitution for its convening are fulfilled. 
Article 155 allows the suspension of the provisions of the constitution in two cases: 
during a war and during a state of siege. It does not specify whether the war to which 
it refers is an external or internal war. Additionally, it uses the word ‘temporarily’, 
which is an elastic concept. Article 155 paved the way for establishing and 
enshrining the emergency rule in Egypt. As a result of the unlimited power given to 
the military without accountability, Articles 45 and 155 of the 1923 constitution 
enshrined the state of emergency and made it a normal law instead of an exceptional 
law. 
3.7 Military Rule Law No 15 of 1923 
On 26 June 1923, Act No 15 of 1923, concerning the state of siege, was issued with a 
French legal structure, while the spirit of the style power followed British martial 
law.141 Hassan argues that: 
Two main features characterized this Act. First, it followed the pattern of 
continental Europe, as established in France and Italy, which adopts the idea of a 
legally anticipated device to be used in times of emergency. Second, the above-
mentioned Act was closer to the military law than to the political state of siege as 
established in France. Britain had highly influenced the Act in this respect, 
motivated by her desire to protect her interests.142 
The present thesis argues that Military Rule Act No 15 of 1923 followed British 
martial law for the following reasons: 
1. Egypt was still a British protectorate, even though Britain claimed that Egypt 
was an independent country in 1922. 
2. The British military governor was the real ruler of Egypt, and the king and 
the Egyptian government were used as tools to show that Egypt was an 
independent country. 
3. Using its military presence in Egypt, Britain enforced martial law to protect 
its interests. 
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4. Britain did not trust Egypt’s national courts, so it continued trying Egyptian 
nationalists before British military courts. 
Article 1 of Law No 15 of 1923 gives the king the authority to declare martial law if 
security and public order was endangered as a result of national unrest or an armed 
attack from outside.143 Article 2 states that martial law must be declared by a royal 
decree, and that the decree should include the declaring body, the date of 
enforcement and the name of the person authorised to implement emergency 
measures.144 Article 2 also indicates that the prime minister, as a general military 
commander of Egypt, is responsible for exercising extraordinary powers granted by 
the king’s declaration of a state of siege.145 Article 3 gives the military governor the 
power to: 
• withdraw licenses and confiscate arms 
• search houses and persons and censor newspapers 
• impose curfews 
• control any means of transportation 
• take measures to safeguard public security 
• order the arrest of vagrants and suspects and keep them in custody in a safe 
place 
• prevent and disperse any assembly, club or meeting by force if necessary.146 
These restrictions of rights were justified as protecting the stability and national 
security of the state.147 After being pressured by Egyptian nationalists, Britain 
promised to end the state of martial law, but only after the enforcement of the peace 
treaty and issuing of the indemnity act to cover the measures taken during World 
War I.148 Britain wanted to protect its troops from any future prosecution or 
compensation. In March 1923, the Egyptian cabinet, after negotiating with the 
British government, agreed to issue the act of indemnity under the following 
declaration: 
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• Any measures taken under the martial law to control enemy property, and 
the application of certain provisions of the treaties of peace concerning 
such property, shall continue as in the past until full effect shall have been 
given to these measures under the control of the British. 
• With regard to all real estate requisitioned or occupied by the British 
military authorities, the settlement for these properties will be reserved for 
future negotiations.149 
Further, for persons condemned by the military courts, the British government 
instructed the minister of justice to issue a ministerial order requiring the vice 
president of the Native Court of Appeal and two Egyptian judges of the Native Court 
of Appeal to prepare proposals for the remission or commutations of sentences to be 
enacted with the recommendation of the minister of justice and a majority vote.150 
The indemnity act was issued in July, and on 5 July 1923, martial law was lifted.151 
In conclusion, martial law was enshrined in the 1923 constitution and in Act No 15 
of 1923. These documents granted the king the power to declare martial law and 
granted the prime minister the authority to exercise emergency rule. Through these 
documents, Britain enshrined martial law for future implementation. In 1930, the 
king abolished the 1923 constitution and issued a new constitution, which expanded 
his power and weakened the parliament’s power. In 1934, the king suspended the 
1930 constitution, but reinstituted the 1923 constitution after pressure from the 
Egyptian people and Britain. A new election was held and won by the Wafd Party. 
From November 1935 to January 1936, massive demonstrations were held to demand 
an end to autocratic rule and to pressure Britain to start negotiations that would lead 
to full independence.152 In addition to the 1923 constitution and Law No 15 of 1923, 
Britain wanted to enshrine martial law through the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936. 
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3.8 Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936 
In 1936, Britain and Egypt signed an agreement to give Britain locomotive freedom 
and the right to use rail and communication devices that belonged to Egyptians.153 
The agreement gave British civilians, soldiers and their families immunity from civil 
and criminal trials by Egyptian courts. The agreement formed between the two 
countries extended assistance in war and included the use of Egypt’s infrastructure, 
such as ports, for 20 years.154 
The Anglo–Egyptian Treaty, which was signed on 26 August 1936, terminated the 
occupation of Egypt and resulted in the withdrawal of British troops, except from the 
Suez Canal. Egypt was finally recognised as an independent country. Further, 
according to the 1936 agreement, if the two countries could not agree on extending 
the agreement 20 years after signing it, the matter could be presented to the League 
of Nations Council. 
In addition, the agreement gave Britain the authority, in times of peace, to base 
10,000 British troops, 400 pilots and various civilian support staff in Egypt, and this 
number could be increased in times of war.155 Britain justified having its troops 
garrisoned in Egypt to protect the Suez Canal and the Royal Navy. 
According to the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty, Egypt had to enact emergency measures 
and war censorship across the whole Egyptian territory if Britain became involved in 
war, was in imminent danger of war or apprehended an international emergency.156 
The important strategic position of Egypt, along with its significant natural and 
labour resources, explains the importance of the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936 for 
Britain, which required Egypt to offer assistance and use its resources to help Britain 
in times of war. 
The Anglo–Egyptian Treaty did not give full independence to Egypt because Britain 
was still responsible for defending Egypt and it still occupied the Suez Canal. 
However, the treaty allowed native Egyptians to join the Egyptian Military 
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Academy. The group of Free Officers who graduated in the late 1930s included 
Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar Al-Sadat.157 On 26 May 1937, Egypt joined the 
League of Nations;158 however, this did not mean that Egypt had achieved full 
independence. 
In August 1939, the British ambassador to Egypt warned the prime minister that war 
was imminent and that Egypt should be ready to declare martial law and take any 
necessary measures, including inspecting ships arriving into Egyptian ports.159 
On 3 September 1939, Egypt ended diplomatic relations with Germany and imposed 
martial law.160 The country was placed on alert, port facilities became military bases 
and censorship was imposed.161 Ali Maher was appointed as the military governor 
and prime minister and used his authority in different areas, including surveillance 
and censorship, to try thousands of people without giving them a chance to appeal.162 
Britain redefined political crimes to cover any expression of disrespect against the 
government, and detention of political prisoners used as systemic standards against 
opponents.163 The increase in the number of political prisoners forced Britain to build 
and expand prisons. For example, in the late 1930s, Britain expanded prisons and 
built detention camps in deserts and cities such as Tura and Abu Zaabal. Around 
4,000 political prisoners were held in these camps.164 The increase in the number of 
political prisoners and the expansion of the prison system show how much Britain 
feared Egyptian nationalists. Britain wanted to avoid internal disruptions while 
preparing for war against Germany and Italy. When Italy joined the war, Britain 
warned King Farouk that there had been insufficient support and a lack of 
cooperation from Prime Minister Ali Maher, who then resigned on 23 June 1940.165 
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In February 1942, Britain ordered King Farouk to appoint a pro-British prime 
minister, Al-Nahhas. After two days of failed negotiations to appoint Al-Nahhas, 
British ambassador Miles Lampson sent an ultimatum to King Farouk on 4 February 
1942, stating that: ‘unless I hear by 6:00 p.m. today that al-Nahhas has been asked to 
form a government, His Majesty … must accept the consequences’.166 
In case of King Farouk’s failure to return to the British by 6:00 pm, the British 
surrounded his palace and gave him two choices: abdicate or accept Britain’s 
proposal to appoint Al-Nahhas. Finally, King Farouk accepted and appointed Al-
Nahhas.167 This incident increased anger in Egypt, which once again called on 
Britain to free the country. On 4 October 1945, martial law was ended by a 
ministerial decree.168 In the spring of 1946, Egyptian nationalists, students and 
workers staged a strike against Britain’s occupation, resulting in 23 deaths (referred 
to as the ‘canal martyrs’).169 
In conclusion, the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and Military Rule Law No 15 of 
1923 were used to enshrine British martial law in Egypt. The 1936 treaty and 1923 
military rule law expanded the exceptional British martial law to protect Britain’s 
interests in Egypt up to the 1952 coup. Schewe argues that: 
This long-term exceptional use of state power by the Egyptian government 
allowed the shared British and Egyptian objective of public security and order to 
become a defining characteristic of Egyptian sovereignty in the final years of its 
nationalist’s movement for independence.170 
This thesis argues that using elastic and vague definitions helped Britain to expand 
its exceptional laws to protect its political and economic interests in Egypt. Further, 
in reality, the Egyptian executive, the legislature and the judiciary did not have any 
real power, because the main power remained in the hands of Britain. The next 
section will examine the war that was launched between Arabs and Israelis on 15 
May 1948.171 
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3.9 Martial Law in 1948—The Sykes–Picot and Balfour Declaration 
This section examines the origin of the 1948 war by discussing the Sykes–Picot 
Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, and it shows how the Egyptian regime used 
the 1948 Arab–Israeli War to justify its declaration of martial law. 
In 1916, Britain and France signed a secret agreement known as the Sykes–Picot 
Agreement. In theory, the agreement pledged to recognise an independent Arab state 
or a confederate state in Palestine;172 however, in reality, it aimed to divide the 
Arabic countries between European powers—mainly Britain and France. At the same 
time, Britain promised that it would help establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. 
Many Zionist leaders had established a good relationship with some of Britain’s most 
prominent political leaders, including Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, Herbert Samuel 
and Mark Sykes.173 In 1917, the Balfour Declaration was made, which clarified 
Britain’s support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine: 
His Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing 
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews 
in any other country.174 
Between 1917 and 1948, the Jewish people increased their landholdings in Palestine. 
In May 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared the birth of the state of Israel. On 15 May 
1948, the Arab–Israeli War began, and the Arab states lost 78% of Palestine.175 
Egyptian Prime Minister Fahmi al-Nuqrashi declared martial law on 31 May 1948 
throughout the entire kingdom of Egypt. It was based on Decree No 26, 13 May 
1948, which proclaimed the need to protect Egyptian troops in Palestine and secure 
their supplies and all means of communication.176 The declaration of martial law 
gave the military the power to administer property belonging to individuals and to 
place individuals under surveillance or in jail.177 Further, under the declaration of 
martial law, urgent measures could be applied to different categories of people in the 
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name of protecting the country from dangerous activities. In the first category, all 
persons of interest were placed under surveillance or jailed. In the second category, 
measures could be applied to any non-resident who might pose a danger.178 Under 
martial law, many communists were arrested and jailed for their criticism of 
capitalism and the decision to enter the war. Communist activities were prohibited.179 
After the assassination of Prime Minister Fahmi al-Nuqrashi on 28 December 1948, 
the Egyptian government dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been formed 
in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood was a revivalist 
Islamic movement whose ideology revolved around strengthening the Quran and 
Islamic teachings as a way of life, reviving the caliphate and ending colonial rule.180 
The Egyptian government arrested many of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders,181 froze 
their assets and seized their records.182 They were accused of demonstrations 
attempting to overthrow the Egyptian government. The activists blamed the 
government for the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The war ended on 7 January 1949 with 
UN Resolution 181, which recommended that the Jewish state be established over 
57% of Palestine.183 This recommendation was rejected by the Arabs. 
In 1950, martial law was lifted in Egypt, permitting the Muslim Brotherhood to 
function again, but as a religious body. Although Egypt was recognised as an 
independent country, Britain still occupied part of the country, and Egyptians carried 
out demonstrations calling for Britain to end its occupation. On 25 January 1952, 
British forces attacked the Egyptian auxiliary police in Ismailia, accused them of 
supporting guerrillas and killed 50 people.184 On 26 January 1952, hundreds of police 
joined with the Egyptian nationalists to start a demonstration in Cairo. As a result, 
Britain placed Egyptian villages in the Suez Canal Zone under martial law.185 
Egyptians felt that they were not free from imperialism and started more 
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demonstrations, setting fire to 400 buildings that symbolised foreign economic and 
cultural influence. More than 30 people died and hundreds were injured.186 
King Farouk called on the army to restore order and appointed Ali Maher as prime 
minister. They promised to create a national front and a strong national youth 
army.187 Ali Maher was dismissed because he refused to suspend the parliament. el-
Hilaly Pasha formed a new government, but parliament was dissolved on 23 March 
1952 and el-Hilaly resigned as well. Husayn Sirri was then appointed, but he 
resigned over the issue of exiling Muhammad Najuib, the president of the army 
officers. Alhillai returned and formed a new government.188 In 1952, the Egyptian 
Free Officers overthrew the monarchy and proclaimed Egypt as a republic. 
3.10 Conclusion 
Traditional emergency power theories have ignored and failed to examine the role of 
British imperialism in Egypt’s history of emergency law. It is important to 
understand how Britain introduced martial law in Egypt to protect its political and 
economic interests. The historical development of this reality can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. Traditional theories of emergency law have ignored and failed to discuss the 
history of the Egyptian emergency powers used during Britain’s colonial rule 
and how Britain enshrined martial law in the 1923 constitution, in Military 
Rule Law No 15 of 1923 and in the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936. 
2. Britain colonised Egypt for itself because of the country’s strategic position. 
The importance of the Suez Canal motivated Britain to ensure that the rest of 
the European powers, especially France, were restricted from seizing any 
power in Egypt again. Egypt was considered a key and strategic post in 
Africa because East Africa was a shortcut to India. 
3. Britain wanted to end the capitulation system, which had prevented it from 
implementing its rules and authority on the citizens of other European 
powers. Britain feared the influence of the European powers through the 
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capitulation system, and martial law gave Britain the best tool to abolish the 
system. 
4. Controlling the Nile river basin and its main resources gave Britain the 
power to control the rest of the African countries. 
5. Britain used Egypt as a base for its military in times of war and peace 
because of its strategic position, especially in relation to the Suez Canal. 
6. Britain used Egypt’s resources and raw materials to generate profits by 
buying Egyptian cotton at low prices and imposing heavy taxes on Egyptian 
farmers. Britain then exported manufactured products back to Egypt at high 
prices. 
7. Britain used martial law against Egyptian nationalists and activists who 
opposed British rule and occupation. Further, the British military and 
administrators enacted a number of repressive measures, such as declaring 
that five or more people gathering without prior authorisation was a penal 
offence. Britain also exiled hundreds of Egyptian nationalists and activists. 
8. The British military had the authority to run the country and appoint a British 
governor-general with full authority and actual power to control the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary. When Britain changed the title of 
the Egyptian ruler from khedive to sultan and then king, Egyptians still ruled 
in name only and did not have full power over their government. Britain used 
the Egyptian ruler (khedive, sultan, king) as a tool to serve its interests using 
particular policies: 
• Britain appointed a British adviser and consultant in each Egyptian 
ministry who retained full authority and decision-making powers. 
Egyptian ministers had no authority in their ministry, and if they refused to 
follow British advisers’ opinions and advice, they would be deposed from 
their position and replaced with another loyal Egyptian. 
• Britain argued that its military was only used to protect and defend Egypt 
from external enemies and internal rebellions (e.g., Egyptian nationalists). 
• Britain interfered in the Egyptian judiciary because of its lack of trust in 
Egyptian judges. Britain accused Egyptian judges of affiliations with 
Egyptian nationalists, and it created the military courts instead to try 
Egyptian nationalists. 
9. Britain forced the khedive to dismiss Egyptian ministers and appoint pro-
British ministers. For example, Britain forced Khedive Ismail to dismiss the 
finance minister because he rejected Britain and France’s financial 
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interference. Further, Britain forced King Farouk to appoint Al-Nahhas to 
form a new government. Egyptian ministers did not have any authority 
because Britain appointed British advisers in each ministry and a British 
inspector to each governor to carry out British policy. 
10. The Dinshaway incident and the 1919 revolution led to uprisings among 
Egyptians who felt that they were second-class citizens. They called for 
Egypt’s independence, an end to financial and political interference in their 
country and freedom from British occupation. 
11. Egypt obtained partial independence in 1922; however, the 1922 declaration 
did not end the occupation of Britain, which was still responsible for 
protecting Egypt from foreign powers. 
12. The 1923 constitution, Law No 15 of 1923 and the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty 
of 1936 enshrined martial law in Egypt for possible future use to protect the 
British deep state in Egypt. 
The next chapter critically examines the Egyptian emergency law legal framework 
from 1952 until the present day. 
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Chapter 4: Egyptian Legal Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to conduct a detailed discussion of Egyptian 
emergency law from 1952 to the present day. This chapter analyses the 1958 
emergency law and shows how the postcolonial regime used the notion of British 
martial law and changed the name to emergency law. Further, this chapter discusses 
how emergency law evolved from a temporary measure to a permanent one. In 
addition, it uncovers how emergency power theories have failed to examine the long 
and permanent state of emergency in Egypt. The chapter then focuses on the period 
from 1952 to the present day. 
4.2 Coup of 1952 
On 23 July 1952, the Egyptian Free Officers seized power. On 27 July 1952, they 
forced King Farouk to abdicate in favour of his son, Ahmad, asked Farouk to leave 
Egypt and gave him permission to seek exile in Italy.1 The Free Officers’ guiding 
principles were to: 
• end British occupation, feudalism and capitalism 
• establish social equality 
• build a strong army 
• establish a democratic state.2 
The Free Officers postponed elections in Egypt from October 1952 to February 
1953.3 They abolished the 1923 constitution and then abolished the monarchy in 
1953.4 The Free Officers issued Law No 179 of 1953 to prevent any political parties 
from challenging their power. In Nasser’s view, political parties were simply a tool 
in the hands of the capitalist democracy, used by bankers and pashas to serve their 
interests.5 In addition, the Free Officers believed that the pluralism of parties would 
undermine and disorientate Egyptian society and prevent the regime from achieving 
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its objective of gaining stability and national unity. Further, it would provide excuses 
for foreign interventions to delay national development.6 The Free Officers created 
the Revolutionary Command Council as a political instrument and depended on the 
military as the main basis for government jobs recruitment.7 
The Revolutionary Command Council was used to abolish student unions, eliminate 
all opposition parties and establish the legitimacy of, and support for, Nasserite 
ideas. This was one of the steps towards building a dictatorship in Egypt.8 
On 23 January 1953, Nasser announced the formation of a new Egyptian political 
organisation called the Liberation Rally, which had a motto of ‘unity, discipline and 
work’.9 According to Naguib, the Liberation Rally was a temporary one-party 
system,10 which he called a united front. The purpose of the Liberation Rally was to 
ensure that people prepared, on a national scale, to form new political parties within 
the coming three years to facilitate the complete withdrawal of British troops from 
Egypt without any conditions. The organisation also wanted self-determination for 
Sudan; a social and economic system that protected Egyptians and encouraged the 
fair distribution of wealth; a political system that granted the freedom of speech, 
assembly and press within the limitations of the law; an educational system that 
implemented social responsibility; the maintenance of good relationships with all 
Arab states and world powers; and an increase in the influence of the Arab league.11 
The Liberation Rally became the government’s party. Nasser argued that it was not a 
political party, but merely a body that organised people and forces and repaired the 
social system.12 However, others argued that the main purpose of the Liberation 
Rally was to prevent labour movements from organising demonstrations against the 
new regime.13 Such demonstrations could have prevented Nasser from gaining more 
power. 
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After two years, the Liberation Rally failed for several reasons. Nasser claimed that 
opponents such as the Muslim Brotherhood, leftists and rightists joined the 
organisation to subvert it.14 In addition, there was a lack of qualified units and a lack 
of legitimacy and commitment. Many believe that Nasser made the mistake of 
creating a party without the symbols, mythologies and understandings connected 
with the liberation movement.15 
4.2.1 Development of the military state 
Successive Egyptian regimes after 1952 prevented any meaningful efforts being 
made towards political change. If changes occurred, they were minor and mostly 
undertaken by the military.16 Egyptian regimes from Nasser to Mubarak used three 
different strategies for survival to rule over Egypt, as outlined below.17 
1. Containment: This is based on controlling and absorbing all opposition, 
maintaining a central power and establishing different institutions and parties 
to control the mobilisation of the population to gain more popularity and 
make it easy to pass policies and tactics without any disturbances.18 
2. Repression: This involves the use of force against political opponents using 
all available tools, including job dismissal, arrest, torture, detention for an 
unknown time, confiscation of possessions, monitoring people and 
preventing people from gathering.19 
3. External diversion: When regimes faced socioeconomic and political 
problems, they would buy time by redirecting people’s attention to an 
international affair to gain more legitimacy.20 
The next section discusses how successive regimes in Egypt used different political 
and economic strategies to consolidate their authority and protect the deep state 
empire. 
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4.2.1.1 Nasser’s containment of his potential opponents 
After the 1952 coup, Nasser was in charge of the Ministry of Interior for some time. 
His authority significantly helped his ambitious plan to be the president and to 
establish the rule of man. Nasser promised to end the secret police, which Britain had 
established to suppress Egyptian nationalists; however, he instead inherited the City 
Eye security regime from Britain and used it against his opponents. The main duty of 
the City Eye was to monitor people and collect information about any suspicious 
activities.21 The regime was used as a tool in domestic repression to monitor 
Egyptian civilians and the military.22 The secret police expanded the regime’s secret 
security measures, controlled Egyptians and suppressed the regime’s political 
opponents. Nasser used a vast network of intelligence agents and police forces to 
suppress reactionary feudal elements, communists and factory workers. On 12 
August 1952, at Kafr El Dawwar in Alexandria, a group of workers went on strike. 
In response, the regime, worried that the uprising would spread throughout the 
country, used military forces to control the situation,23 arresting 545 workers and 
killing 12. On 7 September 1952, the regime executed two of the strike leaders:24 
Mostafa Khamis (aged 18) and Hasan el Bakary (aged 19). These executions took 
place after a quick military court trial headed by members of the Free Officers.25 
In one of his speeches, Nasser stated that: 
We did not interfere in the judiciary since 1952 … however, if there is a political 
case, we create a political court, in which, we ourselves were the judges, hence, 
kept the judges away from politics and kept us away from the judiciary. This starts 
with the people’s court, where members of the revolutionary command council 
were the judges. This arrangement denoted to the public the political nature of the 
case, about which we have an opinion, therefore, we keep it away from judiciary, 
and we personally take responsibility for it.26 
Nasser’s intention, which was to try his opponents in exceptional courts, was mostly 
based on his personal political ambitions. He did not trust ordinary courts, so he used 
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biased courts formed by members of the Revolutionary Command Council to punish 
his opponents without giving them any right to appeal or compensation. After the 
1952 revolution, President Nasser created a number of exceptional courts, as outlined 
below: 
1. Court of Treason 
This court was established by Decree Law No 344 of 1952 to hear cases of 
corruption and abuse of power27 by the old regime, including prime ministers, 
ministers and high-ranking officers, for any offence committed since 1 September 
1939. The court was established to consolidate the power of the Free Officers 
Revolutionary Command Council and to silence opponents.28 
2. Court of the Revolution 
The Court of the Revolution was established in September 1953 to target anyone 
who was accused of acting against the country and the revolution, or who might 
harm the interests of the new regime. The court mostly targeted the Wafd Party and 
its leaders and aimed to harm their credibility and influence, thereby preventing them 
from playing any future political role in Egypt. On 14 July 1954, the Muslim 
Brotherhood was banned, and journalists who did not agree with Nasser’s new 
policies and strategies were jailed and banned.29 The Court of the Revolution 
targeted the Muslim Brotherhood after accusing the group of failed assassination 
attempts on Nasser. One of the Muslim Brotherhood fired six shots at Nasser on 26 
October 1954 while he was speaking in Alexandria. Nasser was not harmed, but two 
men next to him were injured. On 1 November 1954, the new regime created a 
special court because the Revolutionary Command Council did not trust the ordinary 
courts.30 The special court comprised three members of the Revolutionary Command 
Council (Gamal Salem, Sadat and Hussein Al-Shafi), who executed six people.31 
3. People’s Courts 
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The Revolutionary Command Council established people’s courts in November 1954 
to cover all jurisdictions and all crimes (even those committed before the 
establishment of the courts) committed against the country, the revolution, the 
regime or any cases transferred to them by the Revolutionary Command Council.32 
The main aim of these exceptional courts was to give the new regime revolutionary 
legitimacy based on a single respected narrative relating to Egypt’s long struggle for 
independence.33 Further, the regime used these courts to serve its interests and to 
destroy the voices of opponents who could harm its interests in controlling the 
country. The courts could rule on any cases, especially those related to anyone 
accused of acting against the revolution. People’s courts were given wide-ranging 
powers and had no appeal process, and they were composed of military judges and 
loyal supporters of the regime. Justice Hisham El-Bastawisi, a leading figure in the 
reform camp, stated that: 
The reason behind establishing any exceptional courts is the inability of the 
dictatorial state to control the judiciary; hence, it creates exceptional courts. Had it 
managed to control the judiciary and make it malleable to its will, it would not 
need to establish military judiciary. But because the judiciary in Egypt strives to 
keep its independence and does not yield to the executive branch attempts to 
manipulate it or contain it, the founding of exceptional judiciary was the solution 
that the government found free itself from the judicial rulings it does not like.34 
Opposition leaders were persecuted, jailed and tortured, while political parties, 
including the Wafd Party, were banned.35 In addition, at the beginning of 1955, 
Nasser ordered the trials of 867 members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the people’s 
tribunal. In October 1955, around 254 people were tried before military courts. In 
1965, 27,000 people were arrested. The justification for these arrests was to protect 
the gains of the revolution and to maintain national security and unity.36 Police 
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surveillance and arbitrary arrests were pervasive features of Nasser’s repressive 
regime.37 
Naguib was a potential opponent of Nasser, so Nasser removed him to consolidate 
his power and prevent any potential opponents from being on the Revolutionary 
Command Council. Clashes began between Nasser and Naguib over how to achieve 
the goals of the revolution. On 22 February 1954, Naguib submitted his resignation 
to the Revolutionary Command Council. Three days after Naguib’s resignation, 
Nasser accused him of being a Muslim Brotherhood supporter and aiming to 
overthrow the Revolutionary Command Council to increase his presidential power.38 
On 23 February 1954, Naguib’s supporters protested in the streets, calling for Naguib 
to be reinstated as the president. As a result, President Naguib became more of a 
figurehead who had many supporters among the Egyptian population.39 
Nasser’s strategy was to remove Naguib at any cost, and he received this opportunity 
on 5 March 1954, when Naguib called on the National Constituent Assembly to draft 
a new democratic constitution. Nasser organised a large protest in front of the 
parliament to show that Naguib no longer had the Egyptian people’s support, and 
that Naguib was a dictator.40 As a result, Naguib was removed from his presidency 
and, on 14 November 1954, he was placed under house arrest for 30 years, until he 
died in 1984.41 
While Naguib was under house arrest, he wrote that he wished he had not returned to 
public life: 
Everyone was in a state of bitterness because of defeat and occupation. All they 
talked of was pain and lack of hope at expelling the Israeli occupation. In addition 
to that there were the victims of the revolution, those who were just released from 
prisons and suffered torture. And even those who were not imprisoned felt fear 
and humiliation. I then realised how much of a crime the revolution committed 
against the Egyptian citizen, who lost his freedom, dignity, land, his troubles 
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doubled, sanitation was a mess, water was scarce, morals decayed, and the people 
were lost.42 
By the spring of 1954, Nasser was the unchallenged leader and had cultivated a 
strong support base among Egyptians.43 In April 1954, he dissolved the bar 
association and appointed a new one. He also changed the law of the bar association 
because it had supported Naguib and called for the military to be returned to its 
barracks.44 
In October 1954, Nasser introduced a new law to strengthen the military governors 
by transferring to them some of the authority previously held by the ministers and 
cabinet.45 On 19 October 1954, Egypt and Britain signed another treaty that 
terminated the 1936 agreement. The new agreement gave Britain the authority to stay 
in the Suez Canal and use it as a military base for 20 months until 18 June 1956. 
The new regime continued with these arbitrary procedures and dismissed dozens of 
judges46 in what became known as the massacre of the judiciary.47 Egyptian legal 
institutions were also restricted. For example, Abed El-Razzak El-Sanhuri, an 
Egyptian scholar and the architect of the Egyptian Civil Code, was forced to resign 
and was beaten by thugs.48 For four years, Egypt was without a constitution after the 
Free Officers abolished the 1923 constitution. To show Egyptians that Egypt was a 
democratic republic, Nasser issued a new constitution in 1956. 
4.3 Constitution of 1956 
The 1956 constitution, issued by Nasser, gave the president the authority to resume 
executive and legislative power, which affected the separation of powers. An 
example of a controversial article that strengthened the power of the president was 
Article 136, which gave the president the authority to issue ordinances that had the 
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force of law in cases of urgent measure while the assembly was not in session or had 
been dissolved. It was used by the president to consolidate his power and issue laws 
without the need for parliamentary attendance or approval. 
Another example was Article 144 of the 1956 constitution, which gave the president 
the power to declare a state of emergency. The declaration had to be submitted to the 
National Assembly within 15 days from the day of its announcement. However, if 
the National Assembly had been dissolved, the declaration had to be submitted to the 
first meeting of the new National Assembly. Article 144 did not state what should 
happen if the parliament was not in session. However, the 1956 constitution gave the 
president the authority to dissolve the assembly at any time. Thus, Nasser attempted 
to weaken the parliament to stabilise his regime and build a military state. 
The new changes in laws introduced a stronger president with a weaker parliament.49 
The 1956 constitution was the beginning of the authoritarian regime in Egypt, 
enshrined as the rule of man. Instead of establishing a real democracy, the regime 
abolished all parties that could challenge its rule. However, Nasser knew that he 
needed the Egyptian people to support his rule. For this reason, Nasser nationalised 
the Suez Canal, causing Egypt to go to war for the first time since the 1952 coup. 
4.4 War of 1956 
The crisis started when the US and Britain did not fulfil their promise to finance the 
construction of the high dam after Nasser declared that the Canal Zone would be 
nationalised. Nasser assumed that the $100 million annual income collected from the 
Suez Canal would construct the dam within five years. However, Britain, France and 
Israel all had interests in the Suez Canal, so Britain and France decided to launch a 
military action against Nasser to remove him as president and regain control over the 
Suez Canal. 
On 30 October 1956, Britain and France asked Egypt and Israel to withdraw from the 
Suez Canal, but Nasser refused the terms of their plan. On 31 October 1956, Britain 
destroyed the Egyptian Air Force, and French paratroopers descended into Port Said 
and Port Fuad and attacked Egypt. In the battle of Port Said, 2,700 Egyptian soldiers 
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and civilians were killed.50 The US refused to back Britain; Eisenhower opposed the 
use of force against Egypt, and he applied pressure on Britain and France to end their 
aggression.51 The US wanted to prevent the former Soviet Union from making 
inroads with Arabic countries.52 The Soviet Union threatened to respond to the attack 
on the side of the Egyptians, and the UN called for an end to the war. British and 
French troops were evacuated by 22 December 1956.53 
In Egyptian and Arabic eyes, Nasser was considered a saviour because he supported 
and elevated peasants and the rural and crushed societies. He gained popularity by 
marketing his ideas against capitalism and imperialism and looking towards Arab 
unity. After the 1956 Suez Canal war, Nasser was deemed to have finally ended 
Britain’s colonisation of Egypt. He was returned as the president after he won the 
first Egyptian election in 1956 with 99.9% of the votes, although it is important to 
note that he was the only one on the ballot.54 
In July 1958, the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company accepted $28 million in 
compensation. The instalments were paid in full by January 1963. The company 
changed its name to the Suez Financial Company and continues to work as an 
investment trust.55 
4.5 Nasser’s Institutions to Control Political Parties and 1958 
Emergency Law 
This section examines Nasser’s strategy for establishing different institutions and the 
1958 emergency law to control Egyptian mobilisation and prevent other political 
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parties from gaining power. Nasser struggled for a brief period before he assumed 
complete power in 1956.56 
Nasser’s strategy consisted of dissolving all political parties and national unions to 
prevent popular demands for participation in decision-making and building a 
corporatist Arab Socialist Union. In addition, Nasser used the armed forces to 
consolidate his power by placing loyal supporters as military officers in top 
positions.57 
4.5.1 United Arab Republic (1957–1961) 
To strengthen his power and weaken the Revolutionary Command Council, Nasser 
established a new political structure called the National Union. The main principles 
of the National Union were: 
1. to remove imperialists and their agents from political parties because they 
were divisive instruments 
2. to oblige Arabs to unite 
3. to give Egypt the responsibility for defending the Arab world from 
imperialism.58 
The National Union was established in May 1957. In February 1958, Nasser and 
Shukri al-Quwatli announced the establishment of the United Arab Republic between 
Syria and Egypt.59 A supreme executive committee was formed to prepare for the 
creation of a National Union organisation in both Syria and Egypt. In July 1959, an 
election was held to create popular provincial support for the National Union based 
on its anti-imperialism and social revolution principles.60 The National Union was 
divided into the southern region (Egypt) and the northern region (Syria), headed by 
Nasser.61 
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In 1958, a new constitution was issued because of the union between Syria and 
Egypt. It was similar to the 1956 constitution and lasted until 1961.62 To consolidate 
his power, Nasser asked Syria to dissolve all political parties, and for the Syrian 
army to withdraw from political life.63 Three and a half years later, unity between 
Syria and Egypt had failed for a number of reasons, including: 
1. Heavy-handed restrictions of Egyptians in Syria: The dictatorial procedures 
of the dominating power of the Egyptians created a large gap between 
Nasser and the Syrian Ba’athists.64 
2. There were clashes between Nasser socialists and Syrian economists, and 
Nasser used coercion to save the union.65 
Others have argued that unity failed for geopolitical reasons. For example, Egypt and 
Syria do not share a border, so there was physical distance between them. There were 
also clashes between the political parties. For example, the communists in Syria 
rejected unity with Egypt and refused Nasser’s social reforms against the Syrian 
bourgeoisie, while Nasser used propaganda and police measures to minimise the 
communists’ influence.66 
In conclusion, this thesis argues that unity succeeded in the beginning because the 
Arab people were sentimental about it. However, unity ultimately failed because 
Nasser attempted to consolidate and expand his power by depriving Syria from 
having any power. Unity benefited the Egyptian bourgeoisie because advantages 
were given to them. Namely, their businesses expanded and their profits increased. 
4.5.2 Emergency Law of 1958 
The new regime inherited Britain’s martial law and used it to gain more power.67 Act 
No 15 of 1923 was replaced by the State of Siege Act No 533 of 1954. This was then 
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replaced by Emergency Law No 162 of 1958.68 The Free Officers used martial law to 
control the executive and legislative branches. In this way, they established a form of 
authoritarian socialism.69 They also dissolved the multi-party system and introduced 
the one-party system.70 Emergency Law No 162 of 1958 was a comprehensive law 
under which the term ‘martial law’ was changed to ‘state of emergency’.71 
Emergency Law No 162 of 1958 was controversial because it imposed restrictions on 
fundamental rights. Further, it gave the president the authority to establish special 
courts, or state security courts, to refer civilians who had been accused of ordinary 
crimes or of violating emergency orders. Military judges were allowed to reside over 
these courts alongside judges of the ordinary judiciary. Further, Emergency Law No 
162 of 1958 established military courts to which the president could refer civilians 
for crimes such as demonstrating against the military. 
The emergency law declaration in 1958 was not submitted to the parliament until 
June 1964, which contradicted the legal requirement to notify the parliament in its 
next session.72 
The main difference between the 1923 martial law and 1958 emergency law was that 
the 1923 constitution was issued while Egypt was under Britain’s control. Egypt was 
declared an independent country, but in reality, Britain still ruled the country and the 
Egyptian government had no real control. Britain forced the Egyptian government to 
declare a state of emergency to protect Britain’s interests in Egypt. Act 162 of 1958 
was issued by the new Egyptian republic government and adopted the same features 
as British martial law to consolidate the government’s power under the justification 
of protecting the revolution and ending imperialism. 
According to the 1923 constitution, anyone who violated the king’s orders was given 
a sentence not exceeding eight years imprisonment. According to Emergency Law 
No 162 of 1958, the executive was granted the authority to punish people who 
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violated the president’s orders with up to 15 years imprisonment of hard labour or 
£4,000.73 
The law in 1958 used vague and ill-defined concepts to increase the president’s 
power to protect the public’s interests in the form of punishment lengths. The 
president assumed judicial authority to carry out the punishment of anyone who 
violated his orders. The president was granted the authority to establish new crimes 
in the name of protecting the public’s interests. This violated the rights and freedoms 
of citizens,74 as well as the separation of powers. 
Act No 162 of the 1958 law became a permanent fixture of the system in Egyptian 
law.75 It regulated the manner in which a state of emergency could be declared, the 
exceptional measures and the procedure for lodging complaints. For example, Article 
1 of the 1958 emergency law gave the president the power to declare a state of 
emergency ‘whenever security or public order in the territory of the republic or area 
is at risk, due to war or a state threatening the eruption of war, unrest at home, public 
disaster, or the spread of an epidemic’.76 Thus, when compared with Act No 15 of 
1923, Act No 162 of 1958 increased the cases for declaring a state of emergency by 
adding the threat of war.77 Many argue that the imminent threat of war should not be 
a reason for declaring a state of emergency because an ‘imminent’ war could take 
years to develop into a war, or it may never develop into a war. An example of this is 
the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. Thus, the term ‘threat of war’ is 
a vague and flexible concept.78 
The president had the power to declare a state of emergency as a result of an internal 
war, an overwhelming disaster or the spread of an epidemic. However, in the case of 
the threat of war or an overwhelming disaster such as a flood, earthquake, volcano or 
the spread of an epidemic, it is not necessary to declare a state of emergency. Instead, 
the regime could use normal laws and emergency management procedures. 
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The European Court of Human Rights defined the term ‘public emergency’ ‘as an 
exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population’.79 
Thus, a public emergency should meet the following criteria: 
1. It must be actual or imminent. 
2. Its effects must involve the whole nation. 
3. The continuance of the organised life of the community must be threatened. 
4. The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or 
restrictions permitted by the convention for the maintenance of public safety, 
health and order are plainly inadequate.80 
At the 61st Conference of the International Law Association held in Paris from 26 
August to 1 September 1984, the Committee on the Enforcement of Human Rights 
Law approved, by consensus, a set of standards regarding the declaration and 
administration of states of emergency that threaten the life of a nation. These 
standards are known as the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a 
State of Emergency and contain 16 articles that determine non-derogable rights and 
freedoms during states of emergency.81 
In Section (a), the Paris Minimum Standards provide details regarding the existence 
of a public emergency. The definition of a public emergency, and the procedure for 
declaring a state of emergency, is stated as follows: 
1. (a) The existence of a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, 
and which is officially proclaimed, will justify the declaration of a state of 
emergency. 
(b) The expression ‘public emergency’ means an exceptional situation of crisis 
or public danger, actual or imminent, which affects the whole population or 
the whole population of the area to which the declaration applies and 
constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of which the state is 
composed. 
2. The constitution of every state shall define the procedure for declaring a state 
of emergency; whenever the executive authority is competent to declare a state 
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of emergency, such official declaration shall always be subject to confirmation 
by the legislature, within the shortest possible time. 
3. (a) The declaration of a state of emergency shall never exceed the period 
strictly required to restore normal conditions. 
(b) The duration of emergency (save in the case of war or external aggression) 
shall be for a period of fixed term established by the constitution. 
(c) Every extension of the initial period of emergency shall be supported by a 
new declaration made before the expiration of each term for another period to 
be established by the constitution. 
(d) Every extension of the period of emergency shall be subject to the prior 
approval of the legislature.82 
The next section explores the declaration and the effects of the state of emergency in 
Egypt. 
4.5.3 Declaring a state of emergency 
Article 45 of the 1923 constitution gave the king the power to declare a state of 
emergency; however, the prime minister exercised this power because he was the 
general military commander.83 In contrast, Articles 144 and 148 of the 1971 
constitution gave the president the authority to declare a state of emergency and 
exercise the power. The president was the military general commander according to 
Article 2 of Act No 162 of 1958. This changed again when Article 148 of the banned 
2012 constitution gave the president the power to declare a state of emergency after 
consulting with the government. This was followed by Article 154 of the 2014 
constitution, which gave the president the power to declare a state of emergency after 
consulting with the cabinet. 
According to the 1958 emergency law, the declaration of a state of emergency can be 
either oral or written. It should always be only in writing to prevent the overuse of 
power and the misuse of authority. When a state declares a state of emergency, it 
affects the whole population. Thus, the declaration should be only in the written 
format to make it easy for the legislative and judiciary branches to check the 
executive’s actions. 
A statement declaring a state of emergency should first contain the reason for the 
declaration. In Egypt, emergency law can be declared because of war, threat of war, 
civil disturbance, public disaster or epidemic. For example, since the first martial law 
                                                          
82 Ibid. 
83 Hassan, above n 68, 51. 
 110 
was declared in 1914, a state of emergency has been declared six times because of 
war (World War I, World War II and the Arab–Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 
1973), once because of civil unrest (the Black Saturday uprising in 1952), once in 
2012 (in three cities) and once because of a coup (in 2013). Finally, a state of 
emergency was declared in 2017 and remains in place. Emergency laws have never 
been used in Egypt as a result of a disaster or the spread of an epidemic. Thus, up to 
May 1980, war was the main reason for declaring a state of emergency. After the 
assassination of President Sadat in October 1981, and until the present day, the main 
reasons for declaring and extending a state of emergency have been to fight 
terrorists, protect the country from thugs and drug traffickers, protect democracy and 
protect the gains made during the revolution. 
Second, the statement declaring a state of emergency must determine the area 
covered. In Egypt’s case, it is noted that: 
a. From 1914 to 2012, emergency law was declared to cover the entire Egyptian 
territory. In August 2013, following the ousting of civilian President Morsi, a 
state of emergency was declared for one month and then extended for two 
months, which affected all cities. In 2017, after the attack on Egyptian 
churches, a state of emergency was declared, which has remained in place 
until the present day. 
b. Emergency law is declared over some aspects of Egypt’s governance. In 
January 2013, emergency law was declared for one month in three cities (Port 
Said, Ismailia and Suez Canal) because of civil unrest. A state of emergency 
was then declared in the North Sinai Peninsula for three months and was 
extended in October 2014, April 2015 and April 2016. 
Third, the statement declaring a state of emergency must include the date of entry 
into force. However, in the case of Egypt, the date of terminating the state of 
emergency was not included in Article 2 of Emergency Law No 162 of 1958. This is 
one reason behind the continuous use of a permanent state of emergency. The 
Egyptian Constitution of 2012 and the current Constitution of 2014 state that 
emergency law can be declared for three months and extended after approval has 
been obtained from the parliament. 
4.5.4 Effects of the state of emergency 
A state of emergency has many side effects on civilians’ lives, including restrictions 
on the freedom of movement, arresting and searching people and places, and 
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establishing state security courts to try civilians. Article 3 of Emergency Law No 162 
of 1958 gave power to the president in the following areas: 
1. Set restrictions on the freedom of persons to meet, move, reside or pass in 
certain places or times, arrest the suspected persons or those representing 
danger to the security and the public order, detain them, permit the inspection 
of persons and places without abidance by the provisions of the procedural 
law as well as assigning any person to perform any task. 
2. Order monitoring letters whatever their type may be, monitoring newspapers, 
publications, editions, drawings and all means of expression, advertisement 
and announcement before dissemination and to control, expropriate them and 
close the places of printing them. 
3. Schedule opening and closure of the public shops as well as ordering the 
closure of all or some of these places. 
4. Seize any movable property, real estate, order imposing receivership on 
companies and corporations as well as postponement of payment of debts and 
due liabilities payable on the seized properties or those on which receivership 
is imposed. 
5. Withdraw permits of arms, ammunitions, explosives or fireworks of different 
types and order delivery and control of the same and closure of the arms 
stores. 
6. Evacuate or isolate certain areas, organise transport means, restrict and limit 
transport between different areas.84 
7. Control communications, newspapers, publications and all means of 
expression prior to publication, and seize and shut down places of printing. 
The Ministry of Culture has the authority to censorship books, films, music, 
theatres and arts; the Ministry of Interior has the authority to censorship any 
newspaper criticises Egyptian government, also the Ministry of Defence has 
the authority to censorship anything related to security.85 
8. Seize any property and impose security on companies and institutions and 
postpone debts and obligations for what is seized or imposed by the 
government.86 
9. Article 4 of Law No 162 of 1958 gave the power to the president to transfer 
the authority from civilian authority to military authority. The 1958 
emergency law established an exceptional court to try civilians called the 
courts of security in which it was given the authority to refer civilians accused 
of crimes that violated the ordinary laws.87 
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4.5.5 State security courts 
The state security courts, established by Law No 105 of 1980, later acquired a 
permanent status. The decisions of these courts were confirmed after the approval of 
the president, without any right for appeal.88 State security courts were responsible 
for hearing cases related to economic crimes, certain political crimes, terrorism, theft 
of public money, espionage and possession of explosives.89 Appeals made to the 
Egypt Court of Cassation could be classified as review or cassation (the Supreme 
Court of Egypt’s common court system).90 If an appeal by review was upheld, the 
Court of Cassation could nullify the verdict or order a retrial.91 If an appeal by 
cassation was upheld, the cassation court could order a retrial of the case, but with 
different judges following the same procedures.92 If the retrial resulted in a 
conviction with an appeal over the verdict, the Court of Cassation could rule on the 
substance of the case.93 
The state security courts’ procedures were different from those of the ordinary 
courts, and the legal procedures were different from the procedures for civil cases. 
The Egyptian president could keep the action before transferring someone to the state 
security courts or order a temporary release of the accused person who had been 
arrested before transferring their case to the state security courts. The president also 
had objection authority of the court’s decision to reduce sanctions, replace it with 
lesser sanctions, invalidate all sanctions or some of them, and suspend executions.94 
On 17 June 2008, the Egyptian parliament approved the abolishment of the state 
security courts.95 
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4.5.6 Emergency courts 
The president of the republic has the authority to transfer civilians to exceptional 
courts, where military court judges are officers appointed by the minister of 
defence.96 As established in Emergency Law No 162 of 1958, there are two levels in 
exceptional courts: 
• Level class courts, which are composed of a high court judge to whom the 
president can assign two military judges. 
• Higher-level emergency courts, which are composed of three appeal court 
judges. The president has the authority to replace two of them with military 
judges.97 
4.5.7 Military courts 
The Code of Military Justice Law No 25 of 1966, amended by Law No 138 of 2010, 
divided the military courts into three levels: 
• First level: The central military court has one judge. 
• Second level: The central military court with supreme authority has one 
judge, but in special cases it can have three judges. 
• Third level: The supreme military court has three judges, but in special cases 
it might increase to five officers.98 
Article 5 of the Code of Military Justice Law No 25 of 1966 gave the military courts 
the authority to try anyone who had committed crimes in camps, barracks and 
factories, as well as crimes on equipment in relation to supplies and weapons, and for 
revealing the secrets of the armed forces. Further, Article 6 gave the president the 
authority to try any civilians who had committed any crimes set forth in Sections I 
and II of the Penal Code—for example, terrorism or cooperating with a foreign state. 
Article 6 also gave authority to the president during a state of emergency to try 
civilians in military courts for any crimes punishable under any other law.99 Article 6 
violates the Egyptian constitution, ICCPR, the independence of the judiciary and the 
right of the accused to have civilian judges.100 Further, Article 48 of the Code of 
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Military Justice gave military judges the authority, according to their discretion, over 
any cases that came under their jurisdiction. This was criticised because it violated 
the guarantee of a fair trial.101 
Egypt’s constitutions came to enshrine the military courts. For instance, Article 183 
of the 1971 constitution stated that the law would organise the military courts and 
determine their competencies within the framework of the principles of the 
constitution. However, many argued that the military courts should deal with military 
issues only.102 Article 183 granted the military courts authority that affected the right 
to a fair trial. Article 183 of the 1971 constitution enshrined the military judiciary but 
did not identify it as an independent judiciary. 
In contrast, Article 204 of the 2012 constitution and the 2014 constitution made the 
military courts independent judicial bodies and granted them the authority to try 
civilians, giving the members of these courts immunity from dismissal. Enshrining 
military courts into Egypt’s constitution and granting wider authority to try civilians 
affected the character of natural justice and the right to a fair trial. The military 
courts did not have an appeal system. Expanding the authority of the military courts 
was one of the reasons behind the widespread practice of trying civilians. 
4.5.8 Arab Socialist Union (1962–1977) 
When the United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt collapsed, Nasser made 
another attempt to gain more support and power, without any sharing of the power, 
by creating an organisation.103 He aimed to become more popular and establish 
legitimacy through a corporatist organisation104 that he used as a tool to build a 
coalition of support to control the masses and prevent other parties from having any 
rule in political life.105 Nasser built solid political institutions to mobilise popular 
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support,106 and he created the Socialist Union to protect the gains of the 1952 
revolution and to construct a socialist economy in the new republic.107 
In a strategic emotional ploy, the new regime renamed the 1952 coup to the Egyptian 
Revolution to gain more support from the Egyptian people. The regime represented 
the Free Officers as the main guard of the Egyptians, and their duty was to encourage 
Egyptians to follow the regime.108 
The new ruling party had democratic, cooperative and socialist principles that 
mobilised all Egyptians to follow Nasser’s ideas and beliefs. In one of Nasser’s 
socialism speeches, he stated that: 
I want a society in which class distinctions are dissolved, through equality of 
opportunities to all citizens. I want a society in which the free individual can 
determine his position by himself, on the basis of efficiency, capacity and 
character.109 
Nasser meant that everyone should live in unity and harmony, and that class division 
should be performed without domination110 via the melting of class differences 
between Egyptians.111 In another speech, Nasser said: 
We are pledged to the establishment of a new socialist experience in our country, 
based on love and brotherhood and not on the domination of only one class, 
whatever name it may take … if we declare that we will not allow capitalism or 
feudalism to return, because they represent the rule of the minority, the rule of one 
class, we also declare that we will not allow the dictatorship of the proletariat, as 
envisaged by communism, because that too means the domination of a particular 
group over all … Our socialism, which rejects the rule of one class, shall not fall 
under the domination of any class … a small group of people cannot be allowed to 
monopolise the political scene, whether in the present or in the future: political 
action belongs to all people.112 
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Nasser planned to establish a social contract policy, which meant that the 
government would provide goods and services; in return, the Egyptian people were 
expected to support and follow the regime’s policies and strategies.113 
These policies aimed to control Egypt’s political and economic freedom and prevent 
opponents from sharing the power and creating autocratic rules. Nasser used the 
external threat of Israel and the internal threat of the Islamist and Muslim 
Brotherhood as justification for delaying democracy and suppressing his opponents. 
Democracy was not Nasser’s first priority.114 Ordinary Egyptians supported Nasser 
emotionally because he was a true Egyptian, a son of the Nile river and the first to 
rule Egypt in 2,000 years.115 Nasser used this emotional support to increase his 
power.116 
When Syria withdrew from the United Arab Republic in 1961, Nasser responded in 
1962 by banning the 1958 constitution and issuing a presidential constitutional 
declaration that gave the president significant authority.117 In 1964, he issued a new 
constitution that consolidated his executive power and reinforced the official 
commitment to Arab socialism.118 
From 1956 to 1967, Egypt received $1.5 billion from the Soviet Union to build and 
rebuild its military.119 On 16 May 1967, Egypt declared a state of emergency, 
demanding the withdrawal of UN emergency forces, and the blockade of the Straits 
of Tiran.120 On 5 June 1967, Israel destroyed the Egyptian Air Force. By 8 June, 
Israel occupied Sinai and the Gaza Strip. On 10 June 1967, fighting stopped; Israel 
had captured the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and 
East Jerusalem.121 The Egyptian government declared a state of emergency because 
of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War and the Israeli occupation of the Sinai. Declaring a 
state of emergency at this time was important for the Egyptian government to justify 
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its use of military rule and to suspend the rights of Egyptians, which had been 
granted by the 1964 constitution.122 
After deposing Naguib from the presidency, Nasser used the same policy with his 
best friend, Abdel Hakim Amer (1919–1967). Field Marshall Amer was the 
commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army. He was accused of negligence in Syria, 
dealing with Syrians as second-class citizens and using Syria as his own personal 
fiefdom.123 This accusation of mismanagement led to the breakup of the United Arab 
Republic in 1961. In addition, after the 1967 defeat, Nasser accused Amer of 
cowardice, although Amer refused to be held accountable for the 1967 defeat. Amer 
wanted Nasser to acknowledge his own involvement, and he also wanted to protect 
the honour of the Egyptian army after the defeat.124 Amer decided to withdraw the 
United Nation Emergency Force troops (UNEF) and replace them with Egyptian 
troops in the Sinai, and he ordered a blockade of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran.125 
Amer could not be held solely responsibility for the 1967 defeat. According to 
Heikal, one of Egypt’s most famous journalists, editors and commentators, Nasser 
made mistakes that led to the 1967 defeat. First, he did not dismiss Amer as the 
commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army after his poor performance in the 1956 
war. Second, Egypt could not undertake another war with Israel because it had 
become involved in the Yemen War (1962–1967). Third, Nasser did not listen to 
King Hussein of Jordan, who warned him of a conspiracy to draw Egypt into a war 
with Israel, and the Egyptian army was not ready for war.126 
Nasser attempted to remove Amer from his position, but he failed because Amer 
built up his own military political centrality and power with loyal officers.127 Thus, 
Amer was a potential opponent for Nasser, who then used security surveillance and 
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the vetting of officers to minimise Amer’s control over the officers.128 On 14 
September 1967, Amer died in mysterious circumstances. In 1970, Nasser died and 
Vice President Sadat assumed power. 
4.5.9 Sadat’s political strategies (1971–1981) 
Sadat used the same general strategy of containment as Nasser had done. Sadat had 
never been a centralised power and had never been a threat to Nasser.129 Sadat faced 
many challenges from the central power during Nasser’s era, including Ali Sabri as 
the vice president and former secretary general of the Arab Socialist Union, 
Muhammad Fawzi from the armed forces, Sami Sharaf as the minister of the state for 
ministerial affairs and Sha’rawi Gum’h as the minster of the interior and the head of 
intelligence.130 
Sadat ordered the arrest of Sabri131 and 90 of Nasser’s old guards who supported 
Sabri.132 After he accused them of leading a public mobilisation against the new 
president, on 14 May 1971, Sadat addressed Sabri’s plan to conduct a coup against 
him. He argued that the old guard was responsible for the Arab–Israeli defeat. This 
was the first step to abandoning Nasser’s inheritance.133 Sadat launched a corrective 
revolution to install his own loyal followers. He purged all key figures and their 
followers from important organisations and removed all leadership from the military, 
police and security forces.134 Sadat established a strong relationship with the military 
forces, security forces and the opposition to consolidate his power, especially after 
accusing Sabri and others of trying to overthrow his regime. Sadat abolished 
Nasser’s constitution and issued his own constitution in 1971. 
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4.5.9.1 Constitution of 1971 
The 1971 constitution consisted of some articles that enshrined the president’s 
authority and gave him the power to declare a state of emergency. 
Article 108 granted authority to the president to issue a decree having the force of 
law, but with three conditions. First, it could only be declared in cases of necessity or 
in exceptional circumstances. Second, the declaration had to have the approval of 
two-thirds of the parliament. Third, the authorisation could only be for a limited 
time. The article used vague and ill-defined concepts such as ‘necessity’, ‘exception’ 
and ‘limited time’. These needed to be further defined to minimise the abuse of 
power. Further, Article 108 used vague words such as ‘limited period’, so it was 
difficult to understand the time limit to end the president’s authority and who had the 
authority to end the authority to issue decrees if the president was not willing to do 
so. 
Article 108 of the 1971 constitution requested that decrees be submitted to the 
People’s Assembly at the first meeting after the end of the authorisation. If the 
declaration was not submitted, or if it was submitted but not approved by the 
assembly, it would cease to have the force of the law. Article 108 did not discuss 
cases in which the parliament had been dissolved. Further, it did not discuss the 
judicial review process and compensation in cases in which the decree was against 
the law or breached human rights. 
Article 148 of the 1971 constitution gave power to the president to declare a state of 
emergency for a limited time with parliamentary approval. Further, the key language 
for every extension should be in the manner prescribed by law, the declaration 
should be submitted to the assembly within 15 days and in cases in which the 
parliament had been dissolved, the matter should be submitted to the new assembly 
at its first meeting. Article 148 did not discuss what would occur if the assembly was 
not in session, and it did not require the president to call the parliament to discuss 
whether to declare a state of emergency. In addition, the declaration of emergency 
law requires the assembly’s approval without specifying whether the vote to extend 
the state of emergency needs to be approved by a simple or absolute majority of the 
assembly. In addition, Article 148 gave the president authority to extend the state of 
emergency as many times as he desired, without limitation. 
 120 
Further, Article 148 specified that the time of the declaration of emergency law 
should be for a limited period; however, the word ‘limited’ is flexible and elastic. 
Egypt was under a state of emergency from 1967 to May 1980, except for an 18-
month period from May 1980 to 6 October 1981. From 1981 to May 2012, Egypt 
was under a continuous, permanent state of emergency. 
Sadat restructured the Egyptian political sphere by allowing the opposition to speak 
with limitations. He argued that it was time for the democratic sphere and the end of 
arbitrary arrests. Sadat burned all surveillance tapes used by Nasser’s interior 
ministry against his opposition,135 and he abolished the police state to show that he 
respected civilians’ rights.136 
Sadat used another strategy to consolidate his power and to counterbalance his 
relationship with the left group. He considered himself a father of the Egyptian 
family137 and represented himself as a believer and a pious president. He employed 
religious expression in his political tactics for different reasons.138 First, it gave 
limited freedom to the people so that he appeared different to the late Nasser, who 
was accused of repressing his opponents. Second, Sadat wanted to counterbalance 
the Nasserites and communists. Third, Sadat’s regime believed that the more 
religious people were, the more obedient they would be. Fourth, Sadat’s regime 
aimed to control the Muslim Brotherhood and ensure that they did not engage in any 
anti-government activities. Sadat gave them the freedom of peaceful activity and 
released thousands of political prisoners between 1971 and 1975.139 
Sadat used the victory against Israel in 1973 to consolidate his power by 
pronouncing himself the ‘hero of the crossing’ when the Egyptian military destroyed 
the Bar Lev Line and pushed the Israeli troops back from the East Bank of the Suez 
Canal to the Sinai Peninsula. This was significant after the 1967 defeat during 
                                                          
135 Wolf, above n 131. 
136 Hibbard, above n 132, 67. 
137 Denis Joseph Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs the 
State (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 72. 
138 Anthony Gorman, Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century Egypt: Contesting the 
Nation (Routledge Curzon, 2003) 149. 
139 Hibbard, above n 132, 68. 
 121 
Nasser’s era.140 Sadat adopted a new political strategy based on the rule of law and 
the institutions.141 In March 1976, he declared three political organisations:142 
• National Progressive Unionist Party (left-wing) 
• Liberal Socialists Party (right-wing) 
• Arab Socialist Union (middle-wing). 
Sadat permitted opposing political parties, but they had to serve within the Arab 
Socialist Union, which was the government party. After 27 June 1977, political 
parties were authorised to function without being part of the Arab Socialist Union.143 
In 1976, Sadat established the National Democratic Party, which the regime used to 
exercise control over national politics, most of the elected assembly and the partially 
elected Shura (Consultative Council). The National Democratic Party remained the 
country’s dominant party until 2011, when the revolution began against Mubarak.144 
Sadat established an active Islamic legitimacy for Egypt, but without an active 
Islamic base for opponents.145 His strategy was to establish alliances with his 
opponents—especially the Muslim Brotherhood—to strengthen his political 
situation. Sadat released all members of the Muslim Brotherhood as a counterweight 
to the leftists and Nasserites.146 Mistrust arose between the opposition and Sadat 
when the economy started to decline, increasing the gap between the rich and the 
poor. Sadat’s opponent criticised him for visiting Jerusalem in November 1977. To 
tackle the criticism,147 Sadat called for a referendum and asked Egyptians to vote to 
ban atheist leftist communism (i.e., the Tagammu Party) from political life based on 
accusations of shameful conduct148 for inciting a bloodbath and class warfare.149 The 
government also froze the production of the Tagammu newspaper, Al-Ahali.150 
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The referendum was won by a majority of 98.2%, with the opposition describing it as 
a tool for punishing opposition to the government.151 The opposition argued that the 
shameful conduct would curtail the freedom of speech and expression of national 
interests, while simultaneously acting as a tool for repression instead of lifting the 
state of emergency.152 On 26 March 1979, Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty. The US expanded its military and economic 
aid to Egypt and helped to organise a peacekeeping mission and the Multinational 
Force and Observers along the border.153 After signing the peace treaty, the regime 
justified the extension of Egypt’s emergency law as being important in the fight 
against terrorism and drug trafficking; however, in reality, it was used to protect the 
regime’s political and economic interests and stifle its opponents. 
Sadat successfully obtained more support from Western countries, especially the US, 
which issued an economic policy to reverse the socialism policy from Nasser’s era. 
On 6 October 1981, Sadat was attending an annual victory parade when a military 
truck stopped and soldiers started shooting. Within minutes, Sadat was assassinated, 
eight others were killed and 27 were wounded.154 Vice President Mubarak escaped 
with only a minor hand injury.155 Mubarak assumed power in 1981 and stayed until 
2011. 
4.5.10 Mubarak’s political strategies 
Mubarak used emergency law to stabilise his rule, control the country and expand 
military and police powers.156 He maintained the same structure, used the same 
political and economic strategies for survival and relied on military authority to 
control the country. Mubarak also used the constitution to gain more power, and he 
depended on his National Democratic Party to win the majority of the seats in the 
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Egyptian assembly to prevent any opponents from sharing power. His aim was to 
avoid establishing a real democratic country. 
This section explores Mubarak’s political and economic strategies for survival and 
for stabilising his rule. It provides a better understanding of his bureaucratic system 
and how the regime used the single-party system and military rule to retain control 
over the country. 
4.5.10.1 Containment of potential opponents 
Mubarak used the policy of ‘divide and rule’ in combination with a balancing 
strategy. This means that, at the beginning of his rule, Mubarak used constrained 
democratic strategies by permitting his opponents to participate in the election and 
establish their party. However, at the same time, he prevented them from being a 
threat to his regime. This enabled Mubarak’s regime to reduce political pressure on 
the regime and control its opponents at the same time. The regime used this strategy 
to achieve the following goals: 
1. The regime wanted its opponents to show their policies and programs. 
2. This strategy gave the regime the opportunity to identify its opponents, as 
well as the supporters of those opponents, and their agenda. 
3. This strategy gave the regime legitimacy inside and outside Egypt. 
4. The approach divided opponents between moderates and extremists.157 
5. To control Egypt and consolidate his power, Mubarak’s regime used a 
number of direct and indirect strategies based on reserve and protective plans 
to build a virtual wall around the regime. The goal was to prevent freedom, 
or at least minimise it, and plant fear among Egyptians.158 
4.5.10.2 Direct strategies 
The National Democratic Party was the ruling party from 1976 to 2011. It was 
established by Sadat in 1976 and has dominated the political scene in Egypt since 
then. It has won all elections with a majority of 75–97% of the vote. This was one 
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reason behind the executive’s domination over parliament’s two chambers,159 the 
People’s Assembly (Majlis Al-Sha’b) and the Consultative Assembly (Majlis Al-
Shura). The centralised presidential system strengthened the National Democratic 
Party and falsified elections to gain the majority in the parliament. It gave the regime 
the power to pass any laws. The minor presence of the opposition was just a 
decoration in the Egyptian parliament.160 
Mubarak’s regime used emergency law to strengthen state security and give 
investigation services the ability to use sweeping powers to suppress its opponents 
and minimise interference in political life.161 The regime depended heavily on 
security forces and the military to stabilise it, using brutal and at times excessive 
force against opponents and arresting and detaining them for uncertain periods.162 
Mubarak said, ‘I refuse to allow human rights to become a slogan to protect 
terrorists’.163 Under the notion of fighting terrorism, many human rights were 
violated. The regime arrested and detained thousands of opponents because of their 
political opinions. 
4.5.10.3 Indirect strategies 
Mubarak also used external diversion strategies that involved turning Egyptians’ 
attention away from Egypt’s socioeconomic problems using the strategies outlined 
below: 
1. The regime spread corruption across all Egyptian sectors, with a lack of 
transparency. Mubarak’s regime used favouritism and corruption to 
monopolise power through his ruling party. All benefits flowed to a group of 
the regime’s elite and excluded most Egyptian people. For example, the 
Egyptian budget contained additional figures reflecting the government’s 
economic strategies, which were used as a source of corruption and money 
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wasting, benefiting a narrow group of people.164 This was one of the main 
causes of the 2011 revolution.165 
2. The regime kept Egyptians busy with socioeconomic problems and thinking 
of their personal problems rather than thinking about politics. 
3. The media was controlled through state ownership. Television, newspapers 
and the radio were used to influence people to adapt the regime’s opinions 
by spreading incorrect news and information. Large amounts of 
entertainment, especially soccer, were used to drive people’s attention away 
from important issues.166 
4. During the election campaign, the regime promised to create jobs for 
unemployed youth and build hospitals and schools. However, at the same 
time, it ignored any discussions regarding economic and free market 
policy.167 
5. The regime interfered in the recruitment of managers and staff, especially 
relating to syndicates, universities and newspapers. 
6. The regime amended constitution articles to consolidate its power. For 
example, in 2005, the regime allowed multiple candidates to run for the 
presidential election. The new changes made no real differences; Mubarak 
always won the presidency because there was no real competition. 
7. The regime falsified the election in 2010, and the opposition accused the 
regime of fraud, intimidation and buying votes. 
4.5.10.4 Mubarak and the continuous state of emergency 
In May 2000, the state of emergency was renewed for three years. This was criticised 
by opponents, non-governmental bodies and political parties. The government had 
promised several times to lift the law, but it failed to do so because it claimed it was 
important to the government in its fight against terrorism. Emergency law was 
renewed by temporary resolution No 560/1981. The law was due to expire in May 
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2003;168 however, as a result of political instability, the law was extended to 2006.169 
The government justified the extension on the grounds of protecting Egypt from 
future terror attacks. 
By 2005, the government had promised many times that it would not renew the 
emergency law but would replace it with new counterterrorism legislation.170 The 
judicial and parliamentary affairs minister promised to end the state of emergency 
even if the new terrorism laws had not been enforced. However, the emergency law 
was extended simply because the terrorism law had not been gazetted.171 During 
Mubarak’s election campaign, he promised to abandon the state of emergency law, 
but after winning the presidency, the government announced that it would only lift 
the emergency law upon the establishment of a committee to draft an anti-terrorism 
law.172 
On 30 April 2006, the Egyptian parliament voted by a large majority to renew the 
state of emergency law for a two-year period. The president was granted 
extraordinary powers to detain and arrest people, prohibit public gatherings173 and 
issue decrees with only minor accountability to the parliament. This created a rift 
between the government and the opposition. However, the government justified the 
extension of the state of emergency for two reasons. First, it claimed that terminating 
the state of emergency would lead to a legislative vacuum, which could pose a 
significant threat because the government needed at least 2–2½ years to draft a new 
anti-terrorism law. Second, extending the state of emergency law was necessary to 
support the army’s efforts in fighting terrorist cells and operations.174 
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4.5.10.5 2007 amendments to the 1971 constitution 
In 2007, 34 of the 211 articles of the 1971 constitution were amended. The regime’s 
justifications for these amendments were to strengthen the president’s emergency 
powers and expand the council of ministers’ cooperation with the president in 
exercising executive power.175 The regime claimed that it was an attempt to 
modernise the constitution and re-establish the separation of powers, but the main 
amendments were alleged to reinforce the dictatorial spirit of the regime.176 
Article 179 of the 2007 amendments gave power to the president to refer terrorism 
offences to military courts. The broad definition of terrorism opened the door for 
breaches to human rights. It gave the government the authority to issue a 
counterterrorism law that could suspend constitutional protections relating to arrests, 
detention, searching houses and people’s communications. This went beyond the 
limitations under international human rights law.177 
Article 179 gave the executive the authority to suspend the rights mentioned in 
Articles 41, 44 and 45 of the 1971 constitution. These articles guaranteed people the 
right of freedom and movement, regulated home searches and protected the lives and 
privacy of people. However, these rights were removed under the guise of fighting 
terrorism, which signals a totalitarian spirit.178 In addition, Article 179 violated the 
natural justice principles mentioned in Article 68 of the 1971 constitution.179 Article 
68 granted every citizen the right to submit their case to a competent judge. The state 
also guaranteed free access to the court. However, in the case of a military court, the 
citizen’s rights would be violated, and accused people would have fewer 
opportunities to lodge legal appeals, all in the name of fighting terrorism.180 
In conclusion, the new amendments constrained the opposition and made it weaker 
because it had no voice. At the same time, the amendments strengthened the power 
of the National Democratic Party, which remained the ruling party until 2011. By 
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May 2008, emergency law continued to serve an extension of another two years, 
although once again, the government promised to stop renewing it. The Egyptian 
government justified declaring a state of emergency to protect the public’s safety and 
national security, and to combat terrorism. However, in reality, the extension and the 
permanent state of emergency gave power to the regime to combat political violence 
and criminalise forms of non-violent opposition.181 In 2010, the government 
extended the emergency law for a further two years through Presidential Decree No 
193. This was mainly justified because of drug trafficking and terrorism. Meanwhile, 
the decree specified that only Article 3(1) and Article 3(2) could be applied.182 
However, these two articles were highly criticised because they entailed broader 
meanings of the word terrorism.183 It was also feared that these two sections of the 
emergency law would further restrict citizens from freedom of assembly and 
association. Emergency law provisions gave the government the authority to arrest 
people and keep them in administrative detention for long periods. In May 2010, the 
Egyptian parliament approved the extension of the state of emergency for two years, 
with the majority of members of parliament (MPs; 308 members) voting for the bill 
and 103 MPs voting against it (43 MPs were not available during the voting process). 
The total number of MPs was 454.184 
4.5.10.6 Collapse of Mubarak 
On 25 January 2011, the Egyptian revolution was launched, with the main aim of 
abolishing the state of emergency law and overthrowing President Mubarak. On 28 
January 2011, angry protesters against Mubarak and his regime set fire to the main 
headquarters of the National Democratic Party, which was viewed as a symbol of the 
regime’s control in Egypt, as well as the symbol of an autocratic regime. For 
example, the same building was used in 1966, during Nasser’s regime, as a house for 
the Arab Socialist Union. Sadat and Mubarak then used it as the National Democratic 
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Party building.185 Under Law No 144 of 2006, the building was deemed to have 
architectural heritage value; however, after many objections from the Ministry of 
Culture, the government decided in 2015 to demolish the building because the cost of 
repair would be greater than demolishing it.186 
On 11 February 2011, Mubarak resigned after 18 days of clashes between 
demonstrators and police, in which 850 people died and 6,500 were injured. 
Ultimately, the National Democratic Party was banned from political life in April 
2011.187 A state of emergency was declared, and the military forces assumed 
power.188 To control the country, the military issued a number of constitutional 
declarations to consolidate its power. Under pressure from angry Egyptians, the 
military agreed to form the first constitution after 2011. 
4.6 Constitutional Declarations of 2011–2013 and Constitution of 
2012 
It is important to examine the constitutional declarations from 2011 onwards to show 
how the military overrode the executive, the legislature and the judiciary and 
prevented the new president from performing his authority. 
4.6.1 Constitutional declaration of 30 March 2011 
When President Mubarak resigned, Vice President Omar Suliman transferred the 
power to the minister of the defence as the head of the SCAF. The military, as the 
main power in Egypt, granted itself massive power, suspending the 1971 constitution 
and appointing a legal expert committee to draft amendments to the 1971 
constitution.189 On 30 March 2011, the military issued a constitutional declaration190 
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that contained 63 articles. The most controversial articles were Articles 56 and 59, 
which extended the military’s authority and strengthened its position. 
Article 56 of the constitutional declaration gave authority to the SCAF to make 
legislation, appoint the People’s Assembly and appoint cabinet administers. It also 
had the ability to reduce or pardon punishment according to the law. In short, the 
SCAF retained all executive, legislative and judicial power. 
Article 59 gave authority to the future president to declare a state of emergency. 
Taking into consideration the opinions of the cabinet, the declaration of a state of 
emergency should be submitted to the assembly within seven days. If the assembly 
was not in its regular session, it should be called immediately to discuss the matter. If 
the assembly had been dissolved, the matter should be reviewed by the new assembly 
at its first meeting, whereby the assembly would need to vote, and the declaration 
would need approval from the majority of the People’s Assembly. Further, Article 59 
specified that the state of emergency should not exceed six months, and it could be 
extended only with a public referendum and the people’s agreement. 
Thus, Articles 56 and 59 of the constitutional declaration violated the 1971 
constitution in relation to the separation of powers and the independence of the 
judiciary. The main purpose of these articles was to weaken and minimise the power 
of future democratic presidents, weaken elected democratic parliaments and interfere 
with the judicial branch. 
4.6.2 Military expanded the scope of emergency 
The military, as the head of the country, expanded the scope of emergency law to 
maintain its tight grip and protect its interests, as follows: 
1. After resuming full power, the military promised to abandon emergency law; 
however, instead of doing so, it expanded the scope of emergency and added 
thuggery as a justification for retaining the state of emergency. The military 
amended the Egyptian Penal Code through its legislative power, defining 
‘thuggery’ as ‘displaying force or threatening to use force against victim 
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with the intention to intimidate or cause harm to him or his property’.191 
Many revolutionaries consider themselves victims not protected from the 
government.192 The military used vague and elastic definitions such as 
‘thuggery’ to crack down on peaceful civilians and constrain the opposition. 
2. In September 2011, the SCAF issued a constitutional declaration, No 193 of 
September 2011, and inserted other clauses into the law. Some of the clauses 
included aggression against freedom of work, offences for sabotaging 
factories and holding up transport, blocking roads, and spreading false 
news.193 Some of these strategies had been successful in paralysing the 
government during the 18-day uprising against Mubarak. For that reason, the 
military felt that there was a need to prohibit such offences. However, it 
made the situation worse, and the unrest continued.194 
3. On 4 June 2012, the minister of justice issued Decree No 4991, which gave 
authority to the military to arrest civilians. The decree stated that: 
without prejudice to the mandate set out in the code of military justice law 25 
of 1966, military police and military intelligence officers granted a law 
enforcement role by the minister of defence shall have judicial arresting 
authority for crimes committed by non-military personnel.195 
Decree No 4991 constituted the use of military courts to try civilians and 
perform the function of normal courts. It also granted the military amnesties 
to safeguard itself from accountability.196 
The Egyptian government justified its extraordinary measures that suspended normal 
rules, claiming that it was necessary to fight terrorism. However, in reality, the 
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measures were designed to give the executive the ability to tackle domestic 
problems.197 
The military used its legislative and judicial powers to control the country and 
protect its members from any actions against the law under the guise of fighting 
terrorism or thugs. This resulted in widespread breaches of human rights. In January 
2012, the military authority announced a partial lifting of the state of emergency law, 
except in cases of thuggery.198 The concept was highly criticised because of its vague 
and ill-defined notion. Many peaceful demonstrators and members of the opposition 
were dealt with as thugs during this period. In May 2012, the emergency law had 
expired and was expected to be nonoperational. Meanwhile, Law No 162 of 1958 
had not been abolished. In May 2012, the Egyptian assembly approved amendments 
to the Code of Military Justice, which ended the right of the president to refer 
civilians to military courts under a state of emergency but failed to end the military’s 
authority to try civilians.199 
4.6.3 Constitutional declaration of 17 June 2012 
The SCAF made a controversial declaration to remove a significant amount of power 
from the democratically elected president by limiting his power and expanding the 
role of the military. The 17 June constitutional declaration made the military 
unaccountable and wrenched back oversight of the political system.200 
The constitutional declaration granted the military a self-governing authority without 
any external oversight, and the military tried to control the country before the 
civilian-elected president resumed power. The constitutional declaration granted the 
military the authority to issue legislative bills, regulations and decisions. 
Articles 53 and 60 of the constitutional declaration of 17 June 2012 were 
controversial. Article 53 granted the military the responsibility for all issues related 
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to the armed forces. If the president wanted to declare a war, he first had to seek the 
SCAF’s approval.201 Article 60 granted power to the military authority to assign the 
Egyptian Constituent Assembly to write the next constitution if the current assembly 
failed to complete the current constitution.202 The constitutional declarations showed 
that the military would not give up any of its power to a civilian president who might 
pose a danger to the military’s political and economic empire. 
Although the parliament tried to prevent the violation of the right to a fair trial, it 
failed to limit the broad discretion of the military,203 and it failed to end the 
emergency state security courts.204 The military used its tight grip on legislative and 
judicial power to again minimise the rule of the democratic parliament. 
In June 2012, the Egyptian parliament (November 2011–January 2012) was 
dissolved by the administrative court, which decided that the election of 50 
parliamentarians and 50 non-parliamentarians violated the constitutional declaration 
issued by the SCAF in March 2011,205 which prohibited party candidates from 
running for individual seats.206 On 15 June 2012, the SCAF issued Decree No 350, 
which demanded that the Supreme Constitutional Court, in response to appeal No 
20/2012J/C, declare the parliament null and void as of Friday 15 June 2012.207 
On 30 June 2012, Morsi was elected as president, and on 8 July 2012, under Decree 
No 11 of 2012, he recalled the parliament. However, the Supreme Constitutional 
Court decided on 9 July 2012 that its decisions were final and not subject to 
appeal.208 Dissolving the Egyptian parliament was the first step towards the military 
regaining power after 2011, without any constraints. The aim was to prevent the 
                                                          
201 Zaid Al-Ali, Christopher Roberts and Amos Toh, The Egyptian Constitutional Declaration, 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (17 June 2012) 2–8. 
202 ‘SCAF Expands its Power with Constitutional Amendments’, Egypt Independent (online), 17 June 
2012 <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/scaf-expands-its-power-constitutional-amendments>. 
203 Human Rights Watch, Egypt: New Law Keeps Military Trials of Civilians (7 May 2012) 1 
<http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/conference/Egypt_New Law Keeps Military Trials of 
Civilians.pdf>. 
204 Anahita Ferasat and Marya Farah, ‘The Year in Review: An Annual Publication of the 
ABA/Section of International Law: Middle East and North Africa’ (2013) 47 SMU Dedman School of 
Law 647–648. 
205 Ibid 649. 
206 Daniel Pipes and Cynthia Farahat, ‘Egypt’s Real Ruler: Mohamed Tantawi’, The Washington 
Times (online), 11 July 2012 <http://www.danielpipes.org/11584/mohamed-tantawi>. 
207 Mohamed Kandil, ‘The Role of Parliament in the Egyptian Constitution’ (Paper presented at 
Global Partners and Associates) 19 <https://www.gpgovernance.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/Publication-1-Full-EN.pdf>. 
208 Australian Government Refugee Review Tribunal, Egypt Political Update (13 July 2012) 5–7. 
 134 
civilian president from practicing his full power. On 22 November 2012, Morsi 
issued a constitutional declaration in an attempt to minimise the power given to the 
military by assuming supreme power over the procedure of drafting a new 
constitution and assigning a new public prosecutor.209 
4.6.4 Constitutional declaration of 22 November 2012 
On 22 November 2012, Morsi issued a constitutional declaration to minimise the rule 
of the military and to build new legitimacy based on a constitution to promote the 
principles of legitimacy, freedom and justice.210 The declaration came in seven 
articles, as follows: 
Article I: Reopen the investigations and prosecutions in the cases of the murder, 
the attempted murder and the wounding of protesters as well as the crimes of 
terror committed against the revolutionaries by anyone who held a political or 
executive position under the former regime, according to the Law of the Protection 
of the Revolution and other laws.211 
Morsi established a committee to review all cases referred to the military courts 
between January 2011 and 30 June 2012 and ordered all political prisoners to be 
released.212 
Article II: Previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the 
president since he took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved 
and a new People’s Assembly [lower house of parliament] is elected, are final and 
binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity. Nor shall they be 
suspended or cancelled and all lawsuits related to them and brought before any 
judicial body against these decisions are annulled.213 
Article III: The prosecutor-general is to be appointed from among the members of 
the judiciary by the President of the Republic for a period of four years 
commencing from the date of office and is subject to the general conditions of 
being appointed as a judge and should not be under the age of 40. This provision 
applies to the one currently holding the position with immediate effect.214 
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Article IV: The text of the article on the formation of the Constituent Assembly in 
the 30 March 2011 Constitutional Declaration that reads, ‘it shall prepare a draft of 
a new constitution in a period of six months from the date it was formed’ is to be 
amended to ‘it shall prepare the draft of a new constitution for the country no later 
than eight months from the date of its formation’.215 
Article V: No judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council (upper house of 
parliament) or the Constituent Assembly.216 
Article VI: The President may take the necessary actions and measures to protect 
the country and the goals of the revolution.217 
Article VII: This Constitutional Declaration is valid from the date of its 
publication in the official gazette.218 
Morsi annulled the SCAF’s supplementary constitutional declaration, retired Field 
Marshal Tantawi, the defence minister and the army chief of staff Sami Anan. In 
addition, he deprived the courts of the right to dissolve the upper house of the 
assembly and the constitutional assembly, and made the Egyptian Constituent 
Assembly immune from judicial review.219 Morsi was granted the right to issue any 
decrees to protect the Egyptian revolution.220 His justification behind the new 
declaration was to protect the January 25 Revolution from the remnants and the 
thugs of the old regime, and to facilitate the retrial of Mubarak and his entire corrupt 
regime. 
The deep state opponents (including secular and liberal parties) and judicial bodies 
criticised Morsi’s declaration because it granted him absolute power and put him 
above the courts.221 Morsi’s opponents criticised the use of vague statements and 
standby emergency rules that used phrases such as ‘necessary procedures and 
measures’, ‘the life of the nation’, ‘national unity’, ‘safety of the nation’ and ‘a 
danger threatening the January 25 Revolution, 2011’ to grant himself absolute 
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power.222 On 8 December 2012, Morsi withdrew his declaration but kept the 
referendum on the new constitution.223 
4.6.5 Egyptian Constitution of 2012 
Morsi signed a new constitution on 26 December 2012. It was approved by the 
Constituent Assembly on 30 November 2012 and passed by a referendum held on 
15–22 December 2012, with 68.3% of the population voting yes. This constitution 
was controversial because it granted the military the right to try civilians for any 
offence that harmed the military. Further, it stated that the defence minister should be 
from a military background, which showed that the military was still in control. The 
constitution also granted workers and farmers at least 50% of the seats in parliament. 
In terms of emergency law, Article 148 of the 2012 constitution gave authority to the 
president to declare a state of emergency after consulting with the cabinet. The 
declaration had to be submitted to the House of Representatives within seven days. If 
the House of Representatives was not in session, it should be called back to session 
immediately, and if it had been dissolved, the declaration had to be submitted to the 
Shura Council within seven days. The declaration should be approved by the 
majority of the members of the House of Representatives.224 
Article 148 specified that the time limit for the state of emergency should not exceed 
six months. It could be extended for a longer period at the end of those six months, 
but only with the approval of a public referendum. Article 148 did not specify 
whether a simple majority or a majority vote was needed to approve the extension of 
the state of emergency by public referendum. Article 148 protected the House of 
Representatives from being dissolved during a state of emergency. 
In January 2013, a state of emergency was declared by Morsi for one month in three 
cities—Port Said, Suez and Ismailia—with a curfew between 9 pm until 6 am.225 
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Morsi took this step after four days of clashes between police and protesters, who 
were protesting against Morsi and police brutality. The clashes started in Port Said 
after a court handed down death sentences to 21 local soccer players. Most of the 30 
people who died in the protests were shot by police using live ammunition and tear 
gas.226 The state of emergency declaration gave the police the authority to detain 
civilians for up to 30 days without having the right to a trial and judicial review. 
Moreover, the law also gave the police the authority to transfer civilians to military 
courts.227 On 3 July 2013, the military resumed power after successfully 
overthrowing Morsi. 
4.6.6 Constitutional declaration of 8 July 2013 
On 3 July 2013, the Egyptian military deposed Morsi and suspended the 2012 
constitution.228 The military issued a constitutional declaration that set out the 
process of drafting a new constitution and structured the authority of the country 
during the interim period.229 The military appointed interim President Adly Mansour 
to administrate the transition period, starting from the day of issuing the 
constitutional declaration until the presidential election.230 
The most controversial articles in the 2013 constitutional declaration were Articles 9, 
22 and 27. Article 9 allowed for civilians to be tried before military courts.231 Article 
22 enshrined the military forces’ authority, giving them exclusive authority in any 
cases relating to state security. This article established the National Defence Council 
to control all aspects of state security, seizing both legislative and judicial power. 
Article 27 of the 2013 constitutional declaration gave power to the president of the 
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republic to declare a state of emergency after obtaining approval from the cabinet 
rather than the National Defence Council. Article 27 did not require the approval of 
the assembly for a state of emergency because it had already been dissolved. In 
addition, Article 27 did not require the president to submit the emergency declaration 
to the newly elected parliament. Further, Article 27 specified a state of emergency 
period not exceeding three months, and the second extension could be approved by a 
public referendum. In summary, Article 27 gave the president the authority to declare 
a state of emergency with the approval of the executive branch, but without the need 
for parliamentary approval. The president resumed executive and legislative 
authority without any real authority for the judiciary branch to check on his actions. 
This violated the checks and balances and the separation of powers. 
After the 2013 coup and the overthrow of Morsi, interim President Mansour declared 
a state of emergency in August 2013 for one month. He then extended it for two 
months and granted power to the security officers for use against anti-coup 
supporters.232 
4.6.7 Egyptian Constitution of 2014 
After overthrowing Morsi, the new regime suspended the 2012 constitution and 
introduced the 2014 constitution, which is still in place today. 
Article 154 of the 2014 constitution gave authority to the president to declare a state 
of emergency after consulting with the cabinet. The declaration must be presented to 
the House of Representatives within seven days. If the House of Representatives is 
not in session, it must be called immediately to discuss the declaration. The 
declaration must be approved by the majority of the House of Representatives, with a 
specified time limit not to exceed three months to declare a state of emergency. 
A state of emergency can be extended once, but only after obtaining approval from 
two-thirds of the house members. If the House of Representatives has not been 
elected, the cabinet has the authority to approve it until a new House of 
Representatives is elected. The declaration should be submitted to the newly elected 
House of Representatives in its first session. In addition, while the state of 
emergency is in place, the House of Representatives may not be dissolved. 
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Article 156 of the 2014 constitution gives authority to the president to issue decrees 
that have the full force of law if the House of Representatives is not elected and 
whenever the House of Representatives is not in session. Article 101 of the 2014 
constitution states that the House of Representatives is a legislative authority that 
approves general policy, general economic and social development, and the state 
budget. Its main function is to oversee and monitor the executive authority’s actions. 
According to Article 102 of the 2014 constitution, the House of Representatives 
should be composed of 450 members who are elected directly via a secret public 
ballot for a period of five years. However, the executive branch has found ways to 
weaken the Legislative Assembly by interfering in its work and reducing the checks 
and balance. The most controversial component of Article 102 grants the president 
the authority to appoint 5% of the House of Representatives, which means that the 
president can interfere in the legislative body, which is supposed to be an 
independent branch. Appointing some of the House of Representatives should be 
prohibited because the checks and balances on government actions will be violated. 
On 25 October 2014, the National Defence Council declared a state of emergency in 
North Sinai for three months, including a curfew from 5 pm to 7 am, giving the 
prime minister and law enforcers the necessary power to protect civilians.233 On 26 
April 2015, President El-Sisi declared a state of emergency in North Sinai for three 
months following an attack on the Egyptian army in the province.234 However, the 
new declaration did not extend the previous declaration of the state of emergency in 
October in North Sinai. It was a separate decision that encompassed different areas in 
the state (El-Arish, Rafah and Sheikh Zuwied).235 In April 2017, President El-Sisi 
declared a state of emergency to cover the entire country for a period of three months 
after a meeting with the National Defence Council following an attack on Coptic 
churches in Alexandria and Tanta on 9 April 2017. The president also created the 
Supreme Council to counter terrorism and extremism and to fight the growing 
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numbers of militant insurgencies in Egypt.236 On 13 October 2017, the president 
extended the state of emergency to cover the entire country for another three months 
to combat acts of terrorism. 
4.7 Legal Framework for Combating Terrorism and the State of 
Emergency in Egypt 
Countering terrorism has been one of the government’s regular justifications for 
extending a state of emergency. Egypt has been governed by a continuous renewal of 
successive states of emergency, effectively making it a permanent state. Authorities 
have issued a number of orders giving power to the police to arrest and detain 
anyone who has evidence of, or who is suspected of, subversive activity. Vague 
concepts such as ‘securing the public security’, ‘public order’, ‘threatening the 
national unity’ and ‘social stability’ are commonly used to justify the actions of the 
police. In reality, regimes in Egypt have used emergency laws to heavily suppress 
peaceful civilian opponents. Such laws have granted regimes the power to arrest and 
detain people and impose heavy sentences, including the death penalty. 
To expand and enshrine its authority, the government amended the Penal Code and 
the Code of Criminal Procedure and introduced terrorism as a crime via Law No 97 
of 1992.237 This anti-terrorism law has been used to arrest peaceful political 
opponents and detain people without referral to the Public Prosecution Office.238 A 
broad definition of terrorism has been used to detain suspects under indefinite 
surveillance without a judicial review or a court order.239 In 2006, President Mubarak 
promised to establish a committee to prepare anti-terrorism legislation and replace 
emergency laws with anti-terrorism laws. However, the committee did not produce a 
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separate anti-terrorism legislation,240 and emergency law was renewed several times 
after that.241 
In 2013, the interim government introduced a new anti-terrorism law and new 
amendments to the Egyptian Penal Code, which were approved by the Cabinet of 
Egypt. However, they were not ratified by interim President Mansour and were sent 
back to the Ministry of Justice. This drafted law was heavily criticised by human 
rights organisations and non-governmental organisations because of its broad 
definition of terrorism, which gave the regime the power to establish a special 
terrorist crimes prosecution unit and a separate criminal court for any crimes related 
to terrorism.242 
The military authority’s power continues to be enshrined in the 2014 constitution 
under the concept of fighting terrorism. Article 237 states that: 
The state commits to fighting all types and forms of terrorism and tracking its 
sources of funding within a specific time frame in light of the threat it represents 
to the nation and citizens, with guarantees for public rights and freedoms. The law 
organises the provisions and procedures of fighting terrorism, and fair 
compensation for the damages resulting from it and because of it.243 
Article 237 gives power to the government to fight all types of terrorism and track its 
resources without defining terrorism or the scope of power given to the 
government.244 In addition, Article 86 in the Egyptian Penal Code provides a vague 
and broad definition of terrorism: 
terrorism, in applying the provisions of this law, shall mean all use of force, 
violence, threatening, or frightening, to which a felon resorts in execution of an 
individual or collective criminal scheme, with the aim of disturbing public order, 
or exposing the safety and security of society to danger, if this is liable to harm the 
persons, or throw horror among them, expose their life, freedom or security to 
danger, damage the environment, causes detriments to communications, transport, 
property and funds, buildings, public or private properties, occupying or taking 
possession of them, preventing or obstructing the work of public authorities, 
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worship houses, or educational institutions, or interrupting the application of the 
constitution, laws, or statutes.245 
Article 86A of the Egyptian Penal Code provides that for anyone caught supplying 
terrorist groups with weapons, ammunitions, explosives or information, the penalty 
will be execution or life imprisonment with hard labour. Article 86 bis A provides 
for harsh punishments, including the death penalty or permanent hard labour, for any 
group, association, corporation, organisation or band using terrorism as one of its 
methods. The abovementioned punishments can be applied to any persons involved 
in providing these groups with arms, ammunitions, explosives, materials, machines, 
funds, property or information while being aware of their purpose. 
Human rights organisations have criticised Article 86 because the definition of 
terrorism is ambiguous and contains a variety of different punishable acts. The article 
also violates the ICCPR by increasing the number of crimes punishable with capital 
sentences. It prohibits the ability to punish an act with the death penalty after the 
signature of the covenants.246 The expansion of the acts punishable in the name of 
fighting terrorism affects peaceful opponents and their freedom of expression, 
including peaceful activities and protesting. This expansion means that the 
government will now deem any peaceful political activities to be a threat and a 
disturbance to the peace and safety of society. Therefore, any peaceful protest, strike 
or demonstration will be considered a terrorist act, regardless of whether violence is 
used.247 Article 86 increases the duration of detention before the defendant is 
transferred to court to six months for misdemeanours, 18 months for felonies and two 
years for felonies punishable by the death sentence.248 
The extension of emergency law will not end acts of terrorism. Thus, to protect the 
country from any terrorist acts, there should be a balance between respecting 
civilians’ rights and protecting public order by offering neutral courts. 
On 24 February 2015, President El-Sisi issued a new decision concerning Law No 8 
of 2015, on the organisation of terrorist entities. The law consists of 10 articles with 
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vague definitions of terrorist entities and terrorist persons.249 The law applies to 
anyone who threatens public order by any means, giving the authorities the power to 
freeze their property and prevent them from travelling. The process involves 
obtaining approval from a panel of judges without a real trial.250 Article 1 of Law No 
8 defines a terrorist entity as: 
Any group practicing or intending to advocate by any means to disturb public 
order or endanger the safety of the community and its interests or risk its security 
or harm national unity … Groups and individuals can appeal their listing through 
the Court of Cassation within 60 days of being listed.251 
This law has been criticised because of the violation of constitutional rights affecting 
the right of the defendant to appeal. It also uses vague and elastic concepts, which 
makes it difficult to differentiate between terrorist and non-terrorist groups.252 
According to Amnesty International, the new law will be yet another tool for the 
regime to crush all forms of opposition.253 It enshrines the permanent state of 
emergency, but in an unofficial way.254 Thus, under the terrorism law, journalists, 
bloggers, human rights activists and peaceful demonstrators can be arrested and 
detained.255 Nadim Houry, the director of the terrorism and counterterrorism 
programs of Human Rights Watch, stated that: 
With this sweeping new decree, Egypt’s President has taken a big step toward 
enshrining a permanent state of emergency as the law of the land. The government 
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has equipped itself with even greater powers to continue stamping out its critics 
and opponents under its vague and ever-expanding war on terrorism.256 
The law makes it a crime to publish any news related to terrorism if it is against the 
statement issued by the defence ministry official. This allows the court to forbid 
journalists from performing their job.257 Journalists need to take statements from 
different impartial resources; therefore, taking statements from one side only disrupts 
the freedom of expression. In conclusion, anti-terrorism and emergency laws have 
expanded the scope of crimes through exceptional laws that are used to crush the 
regime’s opponents and by being enshrined in a permanent state of emergency. 
4.8 Unconstitutional Emergency Law 
Some Egyptian courts have ruled in some cases that the use of emergency law, or the 
extension of the state of emergency, is unconstitutional. Examples of these rulings 
are as follows: 
1. The high state security court of Alexandria ruled that Law No 162 of 1958 
was unconstitutional because it was approved by a presidential decree and 
not submitted to the National Assembly at its first meeting as required by 
law, thereby violating Article 53 of the 1956 constitution, under which the 
law was issued.258 
2. In addition, the same court ruled that the extension of the state of emergency 
from 1988 to 31 May 1991 was unconstitutional because some assembly 
members had an invalid membership. These members did not enjoy the 
parliamentary capacity; therefore, the extension of the state of emergency 
violated Article 148 of the 1971 constitution.259 
3. On 4 November 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court decided that Article 
99 of the Police Law No 109 of 1971, which gave authority to the military 
court to try non-officer members of the police in military courts, was 
unconstitutional.260 
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4. The Supreme Constitutional Court prohibited the president from using 
emergency law to assert the government’s control over private property in 
non-emergency situations, and it admonished the prime minister for applying 
it in a way that ignored the constitutional rights of Egyptians.261 
Successive regimes have ignored these court rulings, which violates the 
independency of the judiciary branch and enshrines executive interference in the 
judiciary. 
4.9 Conclusion 
Egypt has suffered from a long and extended permanent state of emergency since 
1914. and traditional emergency power theories have failed to examine the long 
history of Egypt under a state of emergency. Further, traditional emergency power 
theories have ignored successive regimes’ justifications for extending the state of 
emergency. 
In 1952, the Free Officers seized power, abolished the monarchy, declared Egypt a 
republic and abolished political parties. Nasser used different political and economic 
strategies to consolidate his power, and he used exceptional laws to create 
exceptional courts to try his opponents. These courts were not impartial because they 
were created for political reasons. Nasser effectively installed British martial law, 
changing the name from martial law to emergency law. Emergency law was 
enshrined in the 1956 Egyptian constitution. In 1958, Nasser issued Act No 162 of 
1958 regarding emergency law. This law gave the regime the power to arrest, detain, 
search and try civilians in exceptional courts. 
Sadat depended on the military to stabilise his regime, and he justified the continuous 
use of a state of emergency because of the war against Israel. Sadat introduced an 
open-door policy and relied on the US for support. However, the open-door policy 
failed because it increased poverty and the gap between the rich and the poor. 
The 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars between the Arabs and the Israelis were the main 
reason for declaring a state of emergency, except for the period 1980–1981. A state 
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of emergency was declared in 1981, without disruption, after the assassination of 
Sadat. 
Mubarak’s regime depended on the military and extended the state of emergency 
every 2–3 years using the justification of combating terrorism. Mubarak’s regime 
introduced the neoliberal economy to increase privatisation. The regime relied on aid 
from the US to stabilise the regime and to increase and consolidate the military’s 
control over Egypt. 
A revolution was launched on 25 January 2011, calling for the abolition of the 
continuous state of emergency. The military assumed power and promised to abolish 
the state of emergency, but instead expanded its authority and made many 
constitutional declarations to consolidate its power. The state of emergency gave 
power to the military and police to use force against their opponents. The regime 
benefited from the continuous extensions of the state of emergency because the state 
of emergency enabled them to: 
• suppress the opposition and commit numerous human violations to ensure the 
population lived in fear of the regime 
• stabilise the regime’s political and economic interests by using different 
political and economic strategies to maintain its power over the country and 
depend on military power to safeguard its interests 
• prevent any future civilian democratic presidents from assuming power 
• maintain the military as the main and unchallengeable power to protect its 
economic and military powers. 
The next chapter examines human rights violations during the state of emergency. 
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Chapter 5: Human Rights Violations During the State of 
Emergency 
5.1 Introduction 
Ending the state of emergency in Egypt was one of the main demands of Egyptian 
activists, civil society and human rights organisations. Extending a state of 
emergency violates the basic rights guaranteed in the Egyptian constitution and 
international covenants. This chapter examines the major human rights breaches 
caused by the extended use of emergency law. It examines these violations in light of 
the ICCPR, conventions against torture and other cruelty and the US, European and 
African conventions on human rights, along with the Arab Charter on Human Rights. 
This chapter shows that the international covenants include some exemptions to 
restrict some freedoms. They often use elastic and vague concepts such as ‘respect 
democratic society’, ‘national security’ and ‘public order’. These terms give 
autocratic regimes loopholes to justify their arbitrary measures. In addition, this 
chapter shows how traditional emergency power theories have failed to explain that 
the use of emergency law is the main cause of human rights violations in Egypt. 
5.2 Background 
On 14 January 1982, Egypt signed the UN’s ICCPR (Articles 18 and 19 of the UN 
Covenant), which emphasises freedom of opinion and expression.1 On 25 January 
1986, Egypt ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and on 14 January 1982, Egypt ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On 6 July 1990, 
Egypt ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Finally, on 25 January 
1986, Egypt ratified the inquiry procedure under the Convention against Torture.2 
However, despite being a signatory to all of these covenants and conventions, 
successive Egyptian regimes have committed numerous violations against human 
rights and have ignored the demand for social justice and freedom. Many 
                                                          
1 The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, Laws and the Freedom of Expression in Egypt 
(Annual Report, 2007) <http://old.openarab.net/en/node/277>. 
2 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=54&Lang=EN>. 
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demonstrators have been violently dispersed using rubber bullets and shotguns, and 
approximately 12,000 opponents have been tried in military courts without any legal 
rights for appeal.3 In the name of ensuring security and democracy, civilians have 
suffered from arbitrary arrests, been detained without trial for long periods, suffered 
forced disappearance and torture, and been denied medical assistance.4 Political 
activists, journalists and peaceful civilians have suffered inhumane treatment, 
intimidation and harassment from police authorities,5 and security forces have been 
granted immunity for using lethal force against civilians. 
5.3 Restrictions on People’s Movements and Freedom of Gatherings 
The freedom of peaceful assembly serves as a vehicle for the exercise of civil, 
cultural, economic and political views and is an essential component of democracy.6 
Successive regimes in Egypt have used protests and demonstrations as an excuse to 
use lethal force against activists, arrest and torture them, and try them before military 
courts. The regimes have preserved their right to use force against civilians to punish 
unwanted political parties.7 
The Egyptian regime continued to use the illegal Assembly Law 10/1914 during 
gatherings to prevent and limit the public from gathering. They charged 
demonstrators using vague definitions such as ‘disturbing public order and the 
peace’. The use of such ill-defined concepts violates the rights of protesters and 
                                                          
3 Amnesty International, Egypt: President Must Go Beyond Decree and Carry Out Greater Human 
Rights Reform (18 October 2012) <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/egypt-president-must-
go-beyond-decree-and-carry-out-greater-human-rights-reform>. 
4 Middle East Monitor, Egypt’s Prison Death Trap: 71 Detainees Have Died in Custody Since 
January (5 August 2015) <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/20241-egypts-prison-
death-trap-71-detainees-have-died-in-custody-since-january>. 
5 Mohamed Lotfy, ‘Egypt’s Courageous Few Fighting for Human Rights’, Amnesty International (22 
January 2016) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/egypts-courageous-few-fighting-for-
human-rights/>. 
6 United Nations General Assembly, Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of 
Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai (21 May 2012) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-
27_en.pdf>. 
7 Jessica L Glover, The Role of Protest in Egyptian Politics (The George Washington University, 
2010) 4. 
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restricts their ability to assemble and demonstrate.8 The regime has also used Public 
Assembly Act No 14 of 1923 to restrict and allow the police to ban any protests.9 
Freedom of movement and freedom of gathering have been guaranteed in all 
Egyptian constitutions, but with some restrictions. Article 20 of the 1923 constitution 
stated that Egyptians had the right to gather in calmness and serenity, and police did 
not need to be informed. But in cases of public gatherings, the law required that they 
be subject to the provisions of laws that protect social order. Ill-defined phrases such 
as ‘social order’ were used by the 1923 constitution to prevent public gatherings and 
restrict people’s movements. Article 54 of the 1971 constitution allowed the right to 
peaceful assembly in private meetings without the approval of the security authority, 
as long as it was an unarmed assembly. Public meetings were allowed, but only 
within the limits of the law. 
After the Egyptian revolution in 2011, the SCAF resumed control in Egypt and 
issued a constitutional declaration (Article 16 of the 2011 constitutional declaration) 
that gave citizens the right to conduct a private assembly without the need to give 
prior notice to the security authority. Security forces were not allowed to attend these 
meetings. Public meetings continued to be permitted only within the confines of the 
law. Article 50 of the 2012 constitution guaranteed the right to private assembly but, 
in the case of a public gathering, people needed a notification as stipulated by the 
law. While Article 10 of the 8 July 2013 constitutional declaration permitted the right 
to private assembly, public assembly was restricted and regulated by law. Article 74 
of the 2014 constitution guaranteed the right to public meetings, marches, 
demonstrations and all forms of peaceful protest, as long as the citizens did not carry 
weapons and as long as notification had been given as regulated by the law. 
Therefore, all articles from the 1923 constitution to the 2014 constitution granted the 
right to private assembly, but restricted public assembly and demonstrations without 
prior notification to the law and without carrying weapons. 
                                                          
8 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, The Right to Freedom of Assembly in Egypt, 20th Session 
of the UPR (October–November 2014) <http://afteegypt.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/UPR-Joint-
report-on-freedom-of-Assembly-AFTE-EIPR-CIHRS.EN_.pdf>. 
9 Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Draft Law Would Effectively Ban Protests—Amend Repressive Draft 
Assembly Law (30 October 2013) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/30/egypt-draft-law-would-
effectively-ban-protests>. 
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The 2014 constitution used terms such as ‘prior notification’ to give the regime an 
instrument to prevent people from gathering and protesting. Protesters became a 
target for the armed forces, which used excessive force to suppress the opposition. In 
addition to using tear gas and rubber bullets, they allowed thugs to attack protesters 
using sticks and swords. Police and military forces used excessive force and torture 
on peaceful protesters, bloggers and journalists.10 
5.3.1 Protest law 
On 24 November 2013, interim President Mansour issued Law No 107 on the right 
to public meetings, processions and peaceful demonstrations. The 8 July 2013 
constitutional declaration gave the president the authority to issue such decrees.11 
Law No 107 of 2013, which became known as the Protest Law, was controversial 
because it was used as an exceptional law to prevent civilians from protesting and 
conducting peaceful gatherings. The Protest Law limited a citizen’s ability to protest, 
either by restricting freedom of assembly or via broad definitions of ‘terrorism’, 
‘sabotage’ and ‘inciting of violence’. The Protest Law gave the Ministry of Interior 
wide-ranging powers against protesters, as outlined below: 
1. It gave security forces a legal framework to use excessive force to disperse 
peaceful protests. The Ministry of Interior was granted wide-ranging powers 
to ban any protests under the justification of protecting security, peace and 
public order. 
2. The law prohibits protests and public gatherings in places of worship, such 
as mosques and churches. 
3. It prohibits demonstrations in public places such as parliament, ministries, 
diplomatic missions, court buildings, hospitals, prisons, military zones and 
presidential palaces.12 
                                                          
10 Human Rights Watch, The Road Ahead: A Human Rights Agenda for Egypt’s New Parliament (16 
January 2012) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/01/16/road-ahead/human-rights-agenda-egypts-
new-parliament>. 
11 Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Deeply Restrictive New Assembly Law—Will Enable Further 
Crackdown, Stifle Electoral Campaigning (26 November 2013) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law>. 
12 Amnesty International, Egypt: New Protest Law Gives Security Forces Free Rein (25 November 
2013) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/11/egypt-new-protest-law-gives-security-
forces-free-rein/>. 
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4. The law gives the interior minister the right to ban any meeting of a public 
nature involving more than 10 people by requiring the attendees to give three 
days’ prior notification. 
In addition, Article 22 of the Protest Law gave authority to the court to confiscate 
any materials, tools and money used in any crimes. Thus, any civilians who wanted 
to exercise their right to conduct a peaceful protest could be defined as criminals.13 
Under pressure from the regime, Egyptian universities dissolved elected students’ 
unions and clubs. The universities were given the power to annul any student’s 
election and to oust any student for engaging in any political activity or insulting the 
president. They also had the power to force the student and the student’s family to 
write a statement pledging not to participate in any protest. The lecturer at a 
university could be sacked without any judicial review if they participated or 
engaged in any protest. 
This thesis criticises the Protest Law of 2013 for many reasons, namely: 
1. It was used as another exceptional law to suppress opponents of the regime. 
2. The law included vague concepts such as disturbing public interests or 
general security or public order. The use of ill-defined notions increased the 
crimes punished by law and caused the widespread arrest and detention of 
civilians. 
3. The law gave the police and military forces immense prosecutorial 
discretion14 and authority to ban any public meetings and use excessive 
force. 
4. Harsh punishments were imposed to prevent civilians from exercising their 
freedom to protest. The law increased the number of civilian arrests. Anyone 
violating Article 7 of the Protest Law faced being imprisoned for 2–5 years. 
For example, on 7 April 2014, the courts rejected an appeal from the 6 April 
                                                          
13 Article 22 of Law No 107 of 2013 (Presidential Decree issued on 8 July 2013 for organizing the 
right to peaceful public meetings, processions and protests) 
<http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/protest_law_issued_nov_24.pdf>. 
14 Nathan J Brown and Katie Bentivoglio, ‘Egypt’s Resurgent Authoritarianism: It’s a Way of Life’, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (9 October 2014) 
<http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/09/egypt-s-resurgent-authoritarianism-it-s-way-of-life>; 
Amnesty International, above n 12; Human Rights Watch, above n 11. 
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youth movement against several activists who broke the Protest Law and 
were charged with three years’ imprisonment.15 
5. Prior notification requirements were unreasonable. Such requirements should 
only apply to large gatherings of more than 1,000 people to protect 
demonstrators from thugs or anyone who wanted to interrupt a peaceful 
assembly. For example, it is excessive to expect people who are celebrating 
their wedding, birthday or graduation to notify the police if they invite more 
than 10 people, or face a fine or jail if they do not notify the police. 
6. Article 8 of the Protest Law requires, in writing, the names of individuals 
who are attending protests or meetings. The article gives power to the police 
and military forces to arrest civilians because they could pose a danger to 
public order. 
7. Article 10 of the Protest Law gives the Ministry of Interior the power to ban, 
cancel or modify the route of a protest if they receive information that the 
protest could threaten national peace or security. On 3 December 2013, the 
Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that Article 10 is unconstitutional 
because it violates Article 73 of the 2014 constitution, which grants 
individuals the right to protest without interference.16 
Prohibiting people from exercising their freedom to protest violates Article 21 of the 
ICCPR, which gives people the freedom of peaceful assembly. However, the article 
includes several exemptions on peaceful assembly; namely, any peaceful assembly 
should respect the democratic society, national security, public safety and order, 
protection of health and morals, and rights and freedoms of others.17 Article 21 uses 
vague and ill-defined concepts such as ‘national security’ and ‘public safety’, which 
can be interpreted by any state to prevent any peaceful assembly. This highlights a 
major flaw of international covenants and shows how such flaws can be used against 
civilians accused of violating the freedom of peaceful assembly. This thesis believes 
that these exemptions should be removed from Article 21 to protect the freedom of 
                                                          
15 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015: Egypt—Events of 2014 <https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2015/country-chapters/egypt>. 
16 Sara El-Sheikh, ‘Constitutional Court Annuls Interior Ministry’s Right to Ban Protests’, Daily 
Egypt News (online), 3 December 2016 <https://dailynewsegypt.com/2016/12/03/constitutional-court-
annuls-interior-ministrys-right-ban-protests/>. 
17 Ibid. 
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peaceful protesting and prevent any state from using these exemptions to legalise its 
actions. 
5.3.2 Restrictions on striking and sit-ins 
The regime has criminalised striking and sit-ins on the grounds that the country is 
experiencing a critical time in its history and needs to protect its security and 
economy from conspiracy. However, the real purpose of these laws is to re-introduce 
exceptional laws used by successive Egyptian regimes to control the country.18 The 
law prevents workers from protesting for better pay, terms and conditions of 
employment. 
The Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court issued a ruling on 28 April 2015 
criminalising and penalising striking by public workers. This forced some workers to 
retire and others to postpone their promotion for a period of two years.19 This verdict 
was based on legislative Decree No 34/2011, which was issued by the SCAF to 
criminalise strikes and sit-ins, as well as any individuals who obstructed work in a 
private or public facility.20 Any workers who violated the anti-striking law could 
receive a prison sentence and a fine of £20,000–£50,000.21 
Restrictions on labour strikes violated Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,22 which Egypt signed on 10 December 1948 to provide freedom of 
association. The Protest Law also violated Article 8 of the International Covenant for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which provided the right to free formation and 
the functioning of trade unions and various International Labour Organization (ILO) 
conventions,23 including ILO Convention 87, which was ratified by Egypt in 1957. 
Article 3 stated that: ‘Workers’ and employers’ organisations shall have the right to 
                                                          
18 Mohamed Elansary and Mohamed Ahmed Zaree, Summary of the Report Criminalizing the 
Egyptian Revolution (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 24 April 2014) 14. 
19 Rami Galal, ‘Egypt Outlaws Workers’ Right to Strike’, Al-Monitor (online), 12 May 2015 
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22 Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the United Nations General 
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signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976)  
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draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to 
organise their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes’.24 
5.3.3 Freedom of the press 
Emergency laws have been heavily used to restrict and ban publications in Egypt. 
The government has justified these restrictions for the protection of national security 
and public order. Article 15 of the 1923 constitution guaranteed the freedom of the 
press but used the phrase ‘within the limits of law’. It also prohibited the censorship 
of newspapers, including warnings, suspensions and cancellations of papers via 
administrative means. The government used phrases such as ‘protecting the social 
order’ to justify its censorship of the press. The regime used this type of unclear 
definition to expand its authority to control the public by limiting the freedom of the 
press. 
Article 48 of the 1971 constitution guaranteed the freedom of the press, including 
printing, publication and mass media, and it prohibited the censorship of newspapers. 
However, under a state of emergency, the regime could apply limited censorship to 
newspapers, publications and mass media to protect public safety or for the purpose 
of national security. The terms ‘national security’ and ‘public safety’ were widely 
used to limit and restrict the freedom of the press. 
Article 13 of the March 2011 constitutional declaration also granted freedom of the 
press, including printing, publication and media. However, it also gave authority to 
the executive to restrict the freedom of the press. The declaration allowed limited 
censorship on matters related to general safety, for the purposes of national security, 
in times of national emergency or in times of war. It used vague terms without 
clarification, leaving it to the discretion of the executive to decide which matters 
could harm national security and general safety. A state of emergency can be 
declared in the case of war or the threat of war; thus, to declare a state of emergency, 
the war should be imminent or actually occurring. However, this article classified the 
                                                          
24 Article 3 of the International Labour Organization, Convention concerning Freedom of Association 
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national emergency and war as two separate entities. This enabled a doubling-up 
effect of the regime’s ability to confiscate or stop publications.25 
Article 48 of the 2012 constitution guaranteed the freedom of the press, journalism, 
the publishing industry, broadcasting and other media. However, several restrictions 
were included that used vague definitions, as follows: 
1. The framework included essential elements regarding the state and society 
and the requirements of national security. The requirement of national 
security is vague and difficult to define. 
2. A court warrant should be issued to institute censorship of the media. 
3. In the case of war or public mobilisation, the regime was allowed to censor 
the media without the need for a court warrant. The executive was granted 
authority to terminate and confiscate all media publications. 
Morsi’s opponents claimed that Article 48 prevented freedom of the press because it 
contained elastic and vague concepts that could be used to violate human rights and 
prevent freedom of expression. The opposition protested, calling for a new 
constitution and a new election. 
After suspending the 2012 constitution and ousting President Morsi, the armed forces 
issued a constitutional declaration on 3 July 2013 that guaranteed the press freedom 
from censorship, except in case of emergency or in a time of war. Censorship would 
then be limited to matters related to national security; however, the article used 
undefined words and could be used by the executive to censor any publications to 
constrain opponents to the regime under the guise of protecting national security. 
Lastly, in the current Egyptian constitution, issued in 2014, Article 70 grants the 
freedom of the press and printing, and permits Egyptians to issue and own 
newspapers regulated by law. Further, Article 71 of the 2014 constitution prohibits 
censoring, confiscating, suspending and shutting down Egyptian newspapers and 
media outlets, and allows limited censorship ‘in the time of war and general 
mobilization’, but it does not use national emergencies as an exemption to allow 
                                                          
25 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press: Egypt (2013) <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2013/egypt#.VeJQZ33xFc4>. 
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censorship. The 2014 constitution did not discuss publishing or confiscating foreign 
newspapers operating inside Egypt during times of war or general mobilisation. 
5.3.3.1 Restrictions on the freedom of the press 
Successive Egyptian regimes have used many laws to restrict and control the 
freedom of the press. For example, Imprints Law No 20/1936 gave authority to the 
ministerial council to ban any publication from being sold inside or outside the 
country.26 The regime also used the restrictions in the Penal Code law to restrict the 
freedom of the press.27 Penal Code Law No 58 of 1937 (amended by Law No 95 of 
2003) in Article 102 bis punished whoever intentionally broadcast news or released 
false news that would disturb the public order, intimidate people or damage the 
public interest. Offences were punishable with imprisonment and a fine of £50–
£200.28 
In 1975, the government created the Supreme Press Council,29 which owned 49% of 
the shares in major publishing houses.30 The Supreme Press Council was responsible 
for press affairs, permitting licenses and drawing up a code of ethics. Successive 
regimes used the council as a tool to prevent opponents from receiving permission to 
obtain a licence to open a newspaper. 
Law No 148 of 1980 recognised the press as an independent authority but 
simultaneously prohibited any news that could harm Egypt’s reputation. Journalists 
who reported and published such news could face exile or restrictions upon leaving 
Egypt.31 President Mubarak also issued Decree No 4/1982, which authorised the 
interior minister to take any necessary measures under Law No 162 of 1958 to 
                                                          
26 The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, above n 1. 
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(Routledge, 2012) 35. 
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restrict freedom of expression.32 Article 3 para 2 of Law No 162 of 1958 gave the 
president the right to supervise, confiscate newspapers, publications, newsletters, 
drawings and all means of expression,33 thereby censoring newspapers, publications 
and advertisements before they were published, and the right to confiscate media 
premises and close them down was permitted by law.34 Further, Article 4 of the Press 
Law No 96 of 1996 gave authority to the regime to impose limited control on the 
press in case of emergency or in times of war to protect the public’s safety and 
national security. Journalists could be jailed for one year under Article 22 for 
violating Articles 20 and 21 of the above law—for example, by attacking the private 
life or religious faith of citizens.35 
After the 2011 revolution, the SCAF issued a warning to journalists and editors 
regarding publishing news, complaints, topics, advertisements or pictures before 
consulting with the Department of Morale Affairs and the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence and Information Gathering.36 The military used these mechanisms to 
violate journalists’ rights to freely express their ideas. 
All Egyptian constitutions granted freedom of expression while expanding the scope 
of crimes using vague terms such as ‘incitement’, ‘defamation’ and ‘rumour’ to 
silence and suppress any journalists writing about torture and the rule of the 
military.37 Military topics are taboo topics, and self-censorship has become deeply 
entrenched in the media.38 Many human rights activists and journalists who protested 
against police cruelty and the draconian protest laws were accused of violating the 
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Protest Law, damaging public property and attacking the police, and many of them 
were sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment.39 
Successive Egyptian regimes have used emergency law in Egypt and the global war 
on terrorism to suppress their opponents and deal with them as traitors.40 Emergency 
law has increased the number of journalists and bloggers in prison. They were 
accused of criticising the military forces for using lethal force against peaceful 
protesters. Foreign and local journalists were targeted by the police, had their 
cameras broken or seized and photographs confiscated, and several journalists were 
killed.41 Newspapers were confiscated because they contained materials that were 
considered politically sensitive and a threat to national security.42 
The Egyptian public prosecutor stated that 20 journalists have been accused of 
joining terrorist groups or spreading false news and sentenced to 3–15 years in jail.43 
For example, Al Jazeera journalists have been sentenced to up to 10 years in prison 
for defaming the country and supporting the blacklisted Muslim Brotherhood.44 In 
addition, foreign and Egyptian media have been targeted for being affiliated with the 
opposition. In the second half of 2013, five journalists were killed and 80 were 
detained.45 Reporters Without Borders claimed that plainclothes police officers 
raided the offices of Al Jazeera Live, detained a journalist for a few hours and 
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confiscated material without a warrant.46 Many cases have been reported of threats 
against journalists, censored articles and the removal of print copies of newspapers.47 
Other press-related acts that are punishable with imprisonment include spreading 
false news, data, rumours and fabricated or forged papers, undermining public order, 
frightening people or causing harm and damaging public interests. Those who are 
accused can face imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year and a fine of 
£5,000–£20,000. Any one of these penalties can be the penalty on whoever publishes 
with ‘ill will’, the legislature again using broad and vague provisions.48 
Restrictions on freedom of expression violated Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, as well as 
Article 9 clauses 1 and 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. All of these conventions granted freedom of 
protection for the press and freedom of expression. It is one of a group of non-
derogable rights that cannot be violated even during a state of emergency. Any state 
should respect these non-derogable rights. 
5.4 Emergency Law and Non-Derogable Rights 
Countries prioritise national security at all times, followed by individuals’ rights. To 
minimise the abuse of power by the executive during a state of emergency, the 
following limitations should be put in place: 
• The reason for declaring the state of emergency needs to be genuine. 
• The regime should be transparent by informing the public or at least the 
parliament. 
• The state should only derogate from certain rights, which must be necessary 
to counter the threat.49 
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Non-derogable rights means that certain rights cannot be suspended even during a 
state of emergency. Article 4 of the ICCPR states that any state can derogate from a 
number of rights when there is a public emergency that threatens the life of the 
nation. To do this, the state should fulfil some legal requirements50 as outlined 
below. 
5.4.1 Existence of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
The ICCPR gives authority to the state to derogate from numbers of rights if a public 
emergency threatens the life of the nation. The American Convention on Human 
Rights uses the phrase ‘public danger, or any other emergency that threatens the 
independence or the security of the state’ as justification to derogate from its 
obligations, while the European Convention on Human Rights uses the phrase ‘the 
case of war and public emergency’ to allow derogation from obligation. 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights allows the state to breach 
the civil rights and the rule of law and simultaneously protect human rights.51 Article 
15 is subject to judicial scrutiny and needs to be justified in cases involving the 
detention of suspects without trials.52 Head argues that: 
the listed civil and legal rights are mostly subject to far-reaching exemptions or 
derogations, including for ‘national security’, ‘public safety’ and ‘public 
emergency’. This leaves considerable leeway for draconian measures, including 
seemingly permanent ones such as detention without trial and other provisions 
imposed in the name of fighting the endless ‘war on terrorism.53 
The term ‘public emergency’ is a vague notion that could be used by any state for 
different reasons, resulting in human rights violations. Therefore, the state can use it 
as a tool at any time, such as during internal disturbances, terrorism activities, 
economic crises, natural disasters or peaceful strikes and assembly. The UN Human 
Rights Committee, in its General Comment No 29, emphasised that not every 
disturbance, catastrophe or armed conflict can be dealt with as a threat to the nation’s 
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life.54 Further, not all emergencies could be considered a threat to national security 
because an emergency could be fabricated or misused to protect the security of the 
regime. Head argues that: 
The international law reserves to the national state the power to override the most 
basic legal and democratic rights in alleged emergencies or dire challenges to the 
stability of the state … under the European Convention, however, even the right to 
life is carefully circumscribed to permit killing by state forces in order to make 
arrests, prevent escapes from detention and quell riots and insurrections (Article 
2). As with the ICCPR, governments can derogate from most obligations under the 
European convention in times of war or other public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation (Article 15). Particularly since the declaration of the ‘war on 
terrorism’ in 2001, courts have tended to give executive governments much 
leeway to use these provisions.55 
The UK House of Lords granted the executive leeway to allow indefinite detention 
without trial in 2004 in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2004] 
UKHL 56), which concerned counterterrorism legislation. The British government 
derogated from Article 5 of the European Convention, which provides the right to 
liberty and security of person. The British government invoked Article 15 of the 
European Convention, which allowed derogation in times of war or other public 
emergencies threatening the life of the nation after the 9/11 attacks in the US.56 
The majority eventually declared particular circumstances to be discriminatory and 
inconsistent with the exigencies of the public emergency. However, the 8–1 majority 
view was that the courts had to defer heavily to the executive assessment of national 
security.57 According to the Baroness Hale: ‘Assessing the strength of a general 
threat to the life of the nation is, or should be, within the expertise of the Government 
and its advisers’.58 
The Arab Charter on Human Rights gives authority to the state to derogate from its 
obligation in case of public emergency to protect national security and the economy, 
public order, health and morals, or the rights and freedom of others, and to prevent 
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any measure that violates non-derogable rights.59 In the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, there is no explicit provision that means that African countries 
have to protect human rights at all times without any exceptions.60 
5.4.2 Official declaration of a state of emergency 
Respecting human rights should be unconditional. International law provides some 
exceptions for the state to derogate from its obligations, except for non-derogable 
rights, with the provision of several rules and regulations that need to be followed by 
all member states of the UN. However, in many cases, declaring a state of 
emergency has obviously been used for the sake of preserving authoritarian 
regimes.61 
In autocratic regimes with a weak society, the ratification of any treaties will have no 
effect, and in many cases will be associated with more human rights breaches.62 The 
view of human rights in autocratic regimes is highly inspirational, but the probability 
of political action ending in accomplishment is remote.63 
Authoritarian regimes have used the Global War on Terror to justify their violation 
of the law and to support their rule. They have placed many obstacles in their 
opponents’ way to limit the need to share power. When a public emergency threatens 
the life of the nation, the state should declare that it exists, with the prior notification 
designed to force derogating states to perform explicitly. This is essential for the 
maintenance of the rule of law and to minimise the violation of human rights. Any 
state that wishes to derogate from its obligations should respect the fact that the 
derogation should be limited in scope and temporary in application.64 
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5.4.3 Duty of notification via the secretary general 
Articles 4(2), 7, 8(1, 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 list some non-derogable rights. Further, 
Article 4/3 of ICCPR requires that any state wishing to derogate from its obligations 
should immediately inform, via the secretary general, the other states that are party to 
the agreement, and the notification should include a clear explanation of the full 
measures that will be taken and the reasons behind the derogation. Limits to 
derogation measures under Article 4 of the ICCPR are outlined below. 
1. Non-derogable rights:65 
A. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. [Article 
6] 
B. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruelty, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without 
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation. [Article 7] 
C. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade in all their 
forms shall be prohibited. [Article 8(1)] No one shall be held in 
servitude. [Article 8(2)] 
D. No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a 
contractual obligation. [Article 11] 
E. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act 
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time it is committed. [Article 15] 
F. Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person 
before the law. [Article 16] 
G. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. [Article 18] 
2. Proportionality. 
3. Compatibility with other obligations under Article 4 of the ICCPR. 
4. Prohibition of discriminatory measures. 
The general principles of the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a 
State of Emergency in Section B (Emergency Powers and the Protection of 
Individuals) gave authority to the state during a public emergency to take measures 
to derogate from its obligations. However, some non-derogable, or non-suspendable, 
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rights cannot be derogated at any time, during a public emergency.66 Thus, for a state 
to derogate from its obligations, it should follow these principles: 
1. Every state should comply with the principles of notification. 
2. Such measures must be strictly impartial. 
3. Such measures must not be inconsistent with other obligations of the state 
under international law. 
4. No discrimination measures can be based on race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, nationality or social origin. 
The state can derogate from its obligations under international law treaties when it 
faces a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation under the following 
conditions: 
1. Where it affects the whole of the population and either the whole or part of 
the state. 
2. Where it threatens the physical integrity of the population. 
3. Any internal disturbance or unrest in the state should be a grave and 
imminent threat to the life of the nation. If it is not grave or imminent, the 
state cannot derogate from its obligations. 
4. The state cannot derogate from its obligations based on economic 
justifications.67 
However, international law treaties have used vague concepts such as ‘physical 
integrity of the population’, which regimes can use to derogate from their 
international commitments. Andrej Zwitter, in his research on the state of emergency 
mapping database, concluded that Egypt did not report its declaration of the state of 
emergency. This indicates that either Egypt did not want the international community 
to know that it wished to derogate from its human rights obligations, or that Egypt 
did not intend to derogate from human rights during the declaration of the state of 
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emergency.68 Either way, Egypt did not fulfil its obligation according to Article 4(3), 
which states that: 
Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation 
shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through 
the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions 
from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further 
communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on 
which it terminates such derogation.69 
5.5 Common Human Rights Violations in Egypt During a State of 
Emergency 
Successive regimes in Egypt have used emergency powers to consolidate their rule 
and suppress their opponents. Their justification has consistently been to maintain 
national security and protect democracy. The long and permanent state of emergency 
has led to many cases of human rights breaches, including police brutality, mass 
arrests, administrative detention, forced disappearance, torture, military trials and the 
death penalty. This section examines the common human rights breaches that occur 
during a state of emergency in Egypt. This is important to show how successive 
regimes have used emergency law to violate human rights. 
5.5.1 Police brutality 
The Egyptian population has long suffered from police brutality, which was one of 
the reasons behind the 2011 revolution. Egyptian regimes have relied heavily on the 
police to consolidate their power through the use of excessive force against 
opponents. 
The Central Security Forces was established in 1977 during Sadat’s era. One of the 
tasks of these paramilitary forces was to assist the Egyptian National Police to secure 
the state sites and embassies. However, its main duty was to maintain crowd control 
at demonstrations and issue arrests where required. During the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution, the Central Security Forces was blamed for using tear gas and live 
ammunition, which led to the deaths and injuries of many Egyptians.70 The Egyptian 
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Ministry of Interior controlled the Central Security Forces,71 which operated with 
impunity provided via emergency law. The Egyptian constitution granted Egyptians 
protection; however, the laws on paper were different to what occurred in practice.72 
After the 2011 Egyptian revolution, human rights organisations and Egyptian 
activists called for the police force to be held accountable for the deaths of 
approximately 846 Egyptians who were killed during the revolution. A total of 172 
police officers faced trial for killing 83 demonstrators; however, most of them were 
released without punishment, and only six faced court. On 22 February 2014, these 
six police officers were also released, with no charges being laid.73 The 
government’s justification for using such force was that the demonstrators used 
weapons, but in reality, the government simply wanted to prevent any further 
uprisings against it.74 Egyptian police made a concentrated effort to remove the 
Egyptian activists, with thousands placed in prisons and hundreds being killed.75 
On 29 July 2013, the interior minister used secret police to undertake state security 
investigations, which resulted in the arrest of many innocent civilians.76 Security 
forces used excessive force on different occasions.77 For example, Egyptian police 
used birdshot and tear gas against peaceful demonstrators, resulting in many 
casualties.78 In one case, around 800 demonstrators were shot in the head and chest 
and died during clashes between Morsi’s supporters and the police during a sit-in in 
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Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda Squares in Cairo. No members of the Central 
Security Forces were held accountable for the deaths,79 and the government justified 
the use of lethal force because it deemed the protesters to be a threat to national 
security.80 On 18 August 2013, approximately 37 prisoners died in a police van 
outside the Abu Zaabal prison. The only repercussions from these deaths were that 
one police captain was sentenced to 10 years in prison and three officers were given 
one-year suspended sentences for using tear gas causing suffocation.81 
According to a Human Rights Watch report and Amnesty International, police have 
used force and firearms on numerous occasions, resulting in the deaths of many 
protesters between July 2013 and January 2014, as follows:82 
• 46 people were killed in Port Said in January 2013 
• 54 people were killed across Egypt between 30 June and 5 July 201383 
• 61 demonstrators were killed in the Republican Guard Headquarters on 8 July 
2013 
• 82 people were killed at the Manassa Memorial on 27 July 2013 
• 121 demonstrators were killed at Ramses Square on 16 August 2013 
• 57 Morsi supporter protesters were killed in Egypt on 6 October 2013 
• at least 64 demonstrators died on 25 January 2014. 
Using lethal force is against basic human rights to life. In addition, the UN’s Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials prohibits 
the use of lethal force to minimise the risk of endangering the life of civilians. It 
states that: 
1. Whenever the lawful use of force and fire arms is unavoidable, law 
enforcement officials shall: 
(a) exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of 
the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved 
(b) minimise damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life 
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(c) ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or 
affected persons at the earliest possible moment 
(d) ensure that relatives or close friends of the injured or affected person 
are notified at the earliest possible moment.84 
2. Where injury or death is caused by the use of force and firearms by law 
enforcement officials, they shall report the incident promptly to their 
superiors, in accordance with principle 22. 
3. Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms 
by law enforcement officials is punished as a criminal offence under their law. 
4. Exceptional circumstances, such as internal political instability or any other 
public emergency may not be invoked to justify any departure from these 
basic principles. 
Thus, lethal force is not allowed, even under the public emergency law or in 
circumstances of internal political instability. All law enforcement officials are 
bound by this, including all officers who are appointed or elected and who have the 
authority to arrest or detain, as well as military authorities (whether uniformed or 
not) and the state security forces.85 
Law enforcement officers should not use excessive force except in limited cases, 
such as for self-defence or to protect others, in which case it can be used as a last 
resort. However, Article 6 of the 2015 Egyptian Counter Terrorism Law86 gave law 
enforcement officers immunity from being charged over using excessive force when 
carrying out their duties. This violates the right to life and the security of the person 
under Articles 6 and 9 of the ICCPR.87 
In conclusion, the regime failed to conduct a fair and independent investigation into 
the use of lethal force against students, peaceful protesters and opponents. Instead, 
the public prosecutors focused on what the regime called ‘abuse by opponents.88 
Emergency law gave the military forces and police significant power and established 
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immunity for security personnel via loopholes that permitted police to act with 
protection under the guise of self-defence, fighting terrorism and protecting national 
security.89 The broad definition of terrorism resulted in criminalising the rights of the 
freedom of assembly and expression in Egypt. In reality, police should respect 
human rights at all times to comply with the international human rights law 
standards.90 Police should be trained to respect human rights, and they should be 
suspended without pay or terminated if any misconduct occurs, with the possibility 
of being sent to court if the seriousness of the misconduct deems it appropriate.91 
Misusing lethal force should be prohibited, and the right to compensation for victims 
should be considered. Emergency laws in Egypt gave the police authority to arrest 
and detain anyone who could be considered a threat to national security or public 
order. 
5.5.2 Mass arrests 
The persistence of emergency legislation established the right for police to be able to 
arrest and detain anyone believed to be a threat to national security and public order. 
As a result, Egyptian prisons became full of political prisoners. According to the 
Ministry of Interior and Wiki Thawra (an independent Egyptian website), 
approximately 22,000 people were arrested after President Morsi was ousted. Of this 
number, approximately 16,387 were arrested under political circumstances—1,431 
for violating curfews, 89 for committing terrorist acts and 80 for sectarian violence—
and approximately 740 were referred to military courts.92 
The Human Rights Council of Australia has indicated that approximately 41,000 
people have been arrested and sentenced in Egypt, with thousands more charged with 
violating Egypt’s Protest Law of 2013.93 Many activists who assisted in the 2011 
revolution were arrested. For example, two of the founders of the April 6 Revolution 
were arrested for violating Law No 107 of 2013 because they organised peaceful 
public meetings, processions and protests. Several peaceful civilians who 
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demonstrated were arrested and dealt with as thugs and accused of assaulting police 
officers.94 Many civilians have been detained for possessing flyers with anti-military 
slogans or displaying signs remembering the Rabaa dispersal.95 Many of those who 
were arrested suffered from harsh and inhuman conditions in the prisons and 
detention centres. Arbitrary arrest and humiliation violate Article 9(1,2) of the 
ICCPR, which provides that: 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law. 
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons 
for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.96 
Administrative detention was also used by successive regimes to detain civilians for 
an unlimited time without the right to a proper trial. 
5.5.3 Prison and detention centre conditions and administrative detention 
Categories of Egyptian prisoners include sentenced prisoners, prisoners under 
investigation, prisoners charged with offences, detainees awaiting trial or in trial 
proceedings, and detainees without charge being held because of the state of 
emergency law.97 A large number of detainees suffered from medical negligence, 
which resulted in death and the spread of dangerous diseases. There were poor 
conditions at detention centres, with most detainees subjected to cruel beatings and 
forced to sign false confessions for terrorism offences or committing crimes against 
public security. 
Prison administrators used torture against activists and political prisoners, including 
electric shock treatment on sensitive areas, hanging them by their limbs or tying their 
hands behind their backs while beating them, and preventing prisoners from having 
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food or warm clothes, especially in winter.98 A number of detainees were sexually 
harassed and threatened with rape.99 In some cases, the families of the victims filed 
complaints against the police officers, saying that the torture caused the death of the 
detainee, and the prosecutor-general ordered an investigation. For example, when 
two prisoners died in police stations, the Ministry of Interior stated that their deaths 
resulted from health issues. However, the families did not agree with the findings, so 
the prosecutor-general ordered an autopsy to find the real reasons for their deaths.100 
Some detainees paid the officers to stop torturing them on every visit, but when the 
money ran out, the torture continued. Other detainees were forced to drink mixtures 
of water, oil, salt, washing powder, milk and tobacco, which caused the death of 
some detainees as a result of vomiting101 and loss of fluid combined with medical 
negligence. Some detainees were beaten badly and were not allowed to access toilets 
or enough food.102 Other detainees who had health issues such as cancer, heart 
problems, diabetes and high blood pressure were held in overcrowded police cells 
and denied medical treatment. 
In 2014, at least 90 detainees died in custody over a period of 10 ½ months.103 The 
overcrowded conditions, with 27–30 prisoners in a space of 5 x 6 metres, meant that 
the prisoners slept on top of each other. Further, they shared one bathroom and had 
limited access to water, which affected their cleanliness.104 The lack of proper 
sanitation and ventilation led to many diseases.105 
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In addition, most detainees did not have the opportunity to engage in work and 
educational activities.106 Families only received half an hour every week for 
visitation purposes, although the prison director had discretionary power to increase 
the length of visits. However, in many cases, families were not allowed to visit or 
bring food or medication unless they paid the security officers; even then, the food 
did not go to the prisoners most of the time.107 
5.5.3.1 Administrative detention 
Administrative detention is a temporary exceptional measure used under a state of 
emergency to detain any person who is considered or suspected to be a threat to 
public security and public order. Article 3(1) of Law No 162 of 1958 gave the 
president or his deputies (mainly the interior minister) the authority to detain 
civilians without judicial review.108 Judicial review gives people the power to 
challenge the executive decision if they believe that their rights have been infringed. 
It means that the individual’s rights are protected not only by the constitution, but 
also in practice. 
Further, any person arrested under Article 3(1) of the emergency law is supposed to 
be notified in writing of the reason for their arrest and given the right to contact 
anyone or seek legal advice. In practice, the Ministry of Interior informed the 
detainee verbally, which violated the law and human rights. The ministry’s excuse 
was that it was not important for the detainee to be informed in writing.109 Under the 
state of emergency law, a person under administrative detention has no right to 
access a court for the first 30 days, which violates the right to a fair trial.110 After 30 
days, the detainee can request a court to review the detention order and can resubmit 
another request to see the court after another month has passed.111 
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Under Article 3, Law No 162 of 1958 gave the president the right to arrest and 
detain, for uncertain detention without charge or trial, whoever they believed was 
suspicious or might pose a danger to security and public order.112 The president 
could do this without a judicial order. Thus, the judicial review system needs to be 
maintained to ensure the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. 
The emergency measures affected the judicial review system because it gave 
authority to the military and police to use lethal force, arrest and detain, and search 
without a judicial warrant. The extensive emergency powers restrained the judicial 
review process and made it powerless, causing a breach of human rights. 
Article 75 of the 2012 Egyptian constitution stated that: 
The right to litigation is inalienable and guaranteed for all. The state commits to 
make judicial institutions accessible to encourage a rapid decision-making process. 
It is prohibited to isolate any act or administrative decision from judicial oversight. 
No person can be tried except before his natural judge, and exceptional courts are 
prohibited.113 
This article was banned by the regime. In reality, thousands of Egyptians have been 
detained in jail for a period exceeding the legal limit while awaiting their trial. 
Article 143 of the Egyptian criminal code specified that pre-trial detention can be 
from 18 months to two years in criminal cases. Many detainees suffered because 
their extended detention exceeded the limit. This procedure was used as a political 
instrument and as punishment for activists and opponents of the regime, placing the 
regime in violation of the right to a trial and defence.114 
There is a set of pre-trial detention conditions that were not followed by judges or 
prosecutors under the regime. These conditions were set as preventive actions and 
include whether the person poses a high risk, whether there is any risk of the 
evidence being tampered with and whether there has been a comprised 
investigation.115 Several of Egypt’s courts ignored the right to a fair trial. For 
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example, when former President Mubarak ended his detention time limit, the court 
ordered his release, but it ignored the requests of other detainees’ lawyers to release 
their clients.116 These double standards should not exist in courts because every 
person has the right to be tried before an impartial court based on evidence rather 
than political beliefs. In addition, on 2 June 2013, the Egyptian Supreme 
Constitutional Court ruled that paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Egyptian emergency 
law, which gave the president the power to arrest, detain and search people without 
following the provisions of the criminal code, was unconstitutional117 because it 
turns the president into a dictator.118 Although Article 143 of the criminal code is 
clear on setting the maximum limit of detention, some courts hold detainees beyond 
the limit because they relied on Article 380 of the criminal code, which did not 
specify a time limit. The constitution gave the Supreme Constitutional Court the 
right to interpret any disputed laws. However, only certain petitions are considered—
namely, those from people such as the prime minister, the speaker of the Egyptian 
parliament and the president of the judicial body council.119 
Emergency law includes vague concepts that are used by the executive to expand the 
terms of the definition. For example, President Sadat used Law No 110 of 1980 to 
increase the crimes punishable under Law No 98 of 1945 in an effort to consolidate 
the exceptional authority of the president after lifting the state of emergency.120 In 
Law No 98 of 1945, on ‘vagrants and suspects’, Article 5: 
identifies a suspect as one who has been subject to irrevocable conviction for one 
or more of a number of crimes set forth by that law, or who has a reputation for 
habitually committing such crimes even if he or she has not been so convicted.121 
In 1993, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that Article 5 of Law No 98 of 1945 
was unconstitutional.122 
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In conclusion, administrative detention has been used by regimes as another tool in 
the criminal justice system to impose additional punishments on detainees along with 
the court sentence. Further, administrative detention has been used as a tool to 
suppress political opponents and activists and, in the process, it has violated human 
rights.123 It has been widely used by successive regimes for political reasons and has 
prevented people from having the right to a fair trial. Many detainees have also 
suffered from forced disappearance in secret prisons without having the right to be 
referred to ordinary courts, or at least to have access to seek legal advice. 
5.5.4 Forced disappearance 
Even in times of emergency law, international law prohibits the forced disappearance 
of citizens. However, according to Amnesty International, some detainees have been 
held in a secret prison called Azouly within the Al-Galaa Military Camp. Some were 
held for 90 days and tortured by military intelligence and the National Security 
Agency.124 Many detainees have suffered from unofficial detention in centres 
belonging to the National Security Agency, located in military and police stations. 
They have been kept there to obtain confessions or to accuse others.125 Of the 16,000 
political prisoners, hundreds were forcibly disappeared into a secret military prison 
without judicial oversight.126 According to Amnesty International, more than 1,000 
people have been forcibly disappeared since the 2011 Egyptian revolution. A number 
of detainees have been held in secret prisons without charge and have been prevented 
from having access to their family, lawyers or the court.127 Between April and June 
2015, the National Council of Human Rights received approximately 50 cases of 
forced disappearances. Another organisation called Freedom for the Brave 
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documented 163 of cases of forced disappearance in Egypt.128 Two of these people 
were found dead.129 
Human Rights Watch describes forced disappearances in Egypt as a systemic policy 
and a crime that violates human rights.130 Some children have also been forcibly 
disappeared and tortured. For example, three teenagers aged 16–17 were accused of 
vandalism and joining a banned group. They disappeared for a few days and were 
tortured by police security,131 and their arrest records were faked to cover it up. 
Authorities have ignored these reports of abuse and refused to investigate.132 
According to Article 1 of the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance:133 
1. No one should be subjected to enforced disappearance. 
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a 
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, 
may be invoked as a justification for enforced disappearance. 
Article 1 stipulates that forced disappearances are non-derogable rights violations 
that cannot be justified at any time, even during a state of emergency or other 
exceptional circumstances.134 Article 5 of the convention states that forced 
disappearance is a crime against humanity and on par with murder, rape and 
torture.135 In conclusion, forced disappearance is prohibited by law, but successive 
Egyptian regimes have systematically used it, thereby breaching human rights. 
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Torture has also been widely used by successive regimes in Egypt to suppress their 
opponents. 
5.5.5 Torture 
The Egyptian government has been criticised for the widespread use of torture, 
including prohibition torture and degrading treatment and punishment, against its 
opponents. These forms of torture are part of the non-derogable rights that cannot be 
violated at any time.136 They have been specifically mentioned in Articles 51 and 52 
of the 2014 Egyptian constitution, as well as Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention 
against Torture and Cruelty.137 
The state of emergency in Egypt unofficially facilitates the widespread use of torture 
because of the power given to the military and police to arrest and detain civilians. In 
addition, the criminal law restricts the ability of victims and their families to 
investigate or pursue any litigation of torture. The general prosecution has the power 
to investigate any unlawful torture.138 
Torture has been carried out by the Egyptian military and police and the National 
Security Agency for many years to obtain confessions or force detainees to accuse 
others.139 Many detainees have been forced to film their confessions under torture, 
and their family members have consistently claimed that these confessions are 
fabricated.140 Many detainees who have been subjected to torture have gone on 
hunger strikes to criticise the inhumane treatment they received while in prison.141 
Torture has become a routine police procedure in Egypt and is most commonly used 
against political enemies. The use of torture spread throughout Egypt for various 
reasons. First, the police were given impunity and were not held accountable. 
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Second, the continuous state of emergency gave the police sweeping powers to 
terrorise opponents and neutralise dissent.142 
Detainees in Egypt have suffered from brutal physical torture in prisons and police 
stations,143 where police and military authorities continue to use torture during 
investigations. Human Rights Watch stated that police torture has led to at least 11 
deaths in custody as a result of torture and beatings during arrests.144 Human Rights 
Watch described torture in Egypt as an epidemic145 in which police and armed forces 
use excessive force against civilians, including the use of rubber bullets.146 Some 
victims have been tortured with knives, while others have been taken to the second 
floor of the custody building and raped by security officers because they denied that 
they were linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.147 To obtain confessions at any cost 
from detainees, security forces use the grill method for torture, which begins with 
handcuffing the detainee’s hands and legs to an iron bar and placing the iron bar 
between two opposite chairs until the person legs are distressed. They then begin 
torturing the detainee using electric shocks in his legs.148 In addition, after 
handcuffing the detainee and beating his face, chest and sensitive parts with a whip, 
the security forces would place two wires on his left and right fingers and apply 
electric shocks.149 
According to government statistics, most torture cases never reach court, with only 
six police officers sentenced between 2006 and 2009.150 One example of police 
brutality was the case of 28-year-old Khalid Said, who was beaten and tortured while 
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in police custody in 2010. Two police officers were accused and sentenced for up to 
seven years, but after a retrial was ordered, their sentences were increased to 10 
years.151 In this case, Khalid was sitting at an internet café when two plainclothes 
police officers entered and began beating him. Khalid was dragged outside and 
beaten for 20 minutes, which resulted in his jaw and nose being broken, his head 
being opened up and bruises all over his body. The two officers prevented anyone 
from saving his life, and he soon passed away. The torture of Khalid revealed the full 
extent of police brutality, injustice and cruelty. The case became public and led to 
protests that culminated in the 2011 revolution.152 Local authorities tried to cover up 
the incident and reported it as being drug-related.153 After Khalid died, his family 
were told that their son had died after choking on a packet of drugs. The case became 
a sign of routine police cruelty against civilians.154 
Even underaged civilians have been tortured by security forces. For example, 
Amnesty International reported that security forces arrested a 14-year-old boy, who 
was blindfolded and raped with a wooden stick and then tortured and beaten to 
obtain a fabricated confession.155 The duty of the government is to protect the lives 
and physical integrity of all citizens,156 and torture is prohibited in the Egyptian 
constitution and international conventions. Any physical and moral harm used to 
obtain confessions render such confessions invalid. For example, Article 4 of the 
1923 constitution granted personal freedom, including freedom from torture, and the 
right to be treated with dignity and respect. Further, Article 42 of the 1971 
constitution prohibited physical and moral harm to any person arrested or detained, 
and it prevented their freedom from being restricted. All people should be dealt with 
in a way that preserves their dignity. Any confession obtained using physical or 
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moral harm would be considered invalid. Article 9 of the March 2011 constitutional 
declaration stated that any citizen arrested or detained must be dealt with while 
preserving their human dignity. The article prohibited the abuse of body and mind 
and stated that any confession taken from a citizen under duress or threat would not 
be counted and would be deemed unreliable. 
Article 36 of the banned 2012 constitution mentioned the word ‘tortured’ for the first 
time. In addition, the constitution considered that any violation of the instructions 
would be a crime and that any confession would be null and void. Articles 51, 52 and 
55 of the current 2014 constitution are similar to the 2012 constitution, but they use 
the word ‘terrorised’ in addition to ‘tortured’, and also give the person the right to be 
silent. In addition to being specifically named in the Egyptian constitution, torture 
has been prohibited in international covenants, including Article 5(2) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, Article 5 of the African Charter on Human 
Rights, Article 13 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights and Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. All of these conventions prohibit torture 
and degrading treatments and punishments of humans. 
In conclusion, the Egyptian constitution and international covenants prohibit torture, 
and any confessions that are coerced by physical or mental harm will be considered 
illegitimate. However, in practice, torture is a widespread practice in Egypt, and 
there is no right to compensation for the person who has been tortured. Emergency 
laws and the Egyptian constitution have enshrined military trials, leading to many 
cases of human rights violations. Unfortunately, international treaties use vague and 
elastic concepts that create loopholes that have been used by different political 
regimes to justify breaching human rights under the guise of protecting national 
security and public order. 
5.5.6 Military trials 
Military trials have been one of the major causes of human rights violations in Egypt. 
With no legal representation or access to case files to examine evidence, any 
civilians can be arrested, transferred to a military court and sent to jail or given the 
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death penalty. Egyptian military courts have been the most efficient instrument for 
depriving thousands of Egyptian civilians of their rights.157 
Article 7 of Emergency Law No 162 of 1958 allowed the establishment of 
exceptional courts to try civilians, including state security courts and the Supreme 
State Security Emergency Court, which might include a military judge. These courts 
do not have the right of appeal, and decisions become final after they are ratified by 
the president. In addition, Article 9 of the emergency law gave power to the president 
to refer civilians accused of ordinary criminal offences to military courts, which 
violates the Egyptian constitution’s requirements for a fair trial. 
Egyptian authorities used the Global War on Terror to justify arresting thousands of 
civilians and trying them before military courts, which violated their human rights 
and civil liberties.158 The regime used military trials to try political civilians, thereby 
guaranteeing a quick guilty verdict.159 Civilians received harsh sentences, including 
the death penalty and life imprisonment.160 Military courts continued to try civilians, 
without integrity or transparency,161 which raised several concerns. Some experts 
believe that the harsh punishments are politically motivated and aim to place 
pressure on the regime’s opponents to make them accept some form of 
reconciliation.162 Article 198 of the 2012 banned constitution stated that the military 
judiciary is an independent judiciary that deals with all crimes related to armed 
forces, its officers and personnel in relation to crimes belonging to the military 
service that occur within military facilities and crimes relating to armed forces’ 
facilities, equipment and secrets. Therefore, civilians could be tried for any crimes 
considered to harm the armed forces. The word ‘harm’ is elastic and vague in 
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definition because harm can be physical or written. Further, journalists could be tried 
before military courts, because any statement written about the army could be 
considered harmful. Article 148 of the 2012 constitution gave military judges 
immunity from being dismissed. Military judges have the same rights and duties that 
are stipulated for members of other ordinary judiciaries. Article 204 of the 2014 
constitution stated that: 
The Military Judiciary is an independent judiciary that adjudicates exclusively in 
all crimes related to the armed forces, its officers, personnel, and their equals, and 
in the crimes committed by general intelligence personnel during and because of 
the service. Civilians cannot stand trial before military courts except for crimes 
that represent a direct assault against military facilities, military barracks, or 
whatever falls under their authority; stipulated military or border zones; its 
equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, military secrets, public 
funds or military factories; crimes related to conscription; or crimes that represent 
a direct assault against its officers or personnel because of the performance of their 
duties. The law defines such crimes and determines the other competencies of the 
Military Judiciary. Members of the Military Judiciary are autonomous and cannot 
be dismissed. They share the securities, rights and duties stipulated for members 
of other judiciaries.163 
Thus, military courts could try civilians for any crimes related to the armed forces, its 
officers, personnel and their equals, including crimes committed by general 
intelligence personnel. Further, it expanded the scope of military trials to include any 
crimes that represented a direct assault against military facilities, military barracks 
and whatever falls under their authority, including a military or border zone, its 
equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, military secrets, public 
funds and military factories. It also includes any crimes related to conscription and 
crimes that represent a direct assault against officers or personnel because of the 
performance of their duties. The scope of the military courts has regularly been 
expanded to cover the military and border zones. These areas of jurisdiction can 
include 72% of Egypt.164 It even includes jurisdiction over students in military 
schools, wedding receptions and any accidents that befall civilians within the 
jurisdiction of a military court.165 
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On 27 October 2014, President Al-Sisi issued Decree No 136 after an attack in the 
Sinai Peninsula that killed dozens of soldiers. The decree stated that the military 
forces ‘shall offer assistance to the police and fully coordinate with them in securing 
and protecting public and vital facilities, and that included the electricity stations, gas 
pipelines, railroads, bridges, roads’.166 The decree further increased the use of 
military justice by expanding the scope of the crimes to include attacking public 
bodies and a wide range of facilities.167 Based on this decree, many more civilians 
were tried before military courts for engaging in peaceful protests, and any direct 
state prosecutors could refer any crimes that occurred at the abovementioned places 
to military courts, including student demonstrations. For example, five students from 
Al-Azhar University were sent by a Cairo criminal court to the military court for 
setting fire to part of the engineering faculty at the university.168 
Since October 2014, the military courts have tried approximately 7,420 civilians. The 
reason for this large number is the continual expansion of the military courts’ 
jurisdiction as a parallel system.169 The government’s justification was that Egypt 
was facing a large amount of violence and terrorism that needed to be confronted by 
the military judiciary. This showed a lack of confidence in ordinary Egyptian courts. 
Additionally, some jurists argued that Decree No 136 of 2014 was unconstitutional 
because of the expanding authority given to the military judiciary. They suggested 
that this violates Article 204 of the 2014 constitution, which gave authority to the 
military judiciary to try civilians only in cases when military facilities were 
attacked.170 
Human Rights Watch stated that increasing military authority over law 
implementation enables the possibility of constant misuse from an unaccountable 
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military.171 The use of military courts represents a parallel legal system that is used 
to criminalise non-violent political opposition.172 Trying civilians in military courts 
violates Article 14 clause 1 of the ICCPR, which states that: 
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of 
any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, 
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law. 
The military courts in Egypt do not conform to this definition. In conclusion, the 
right to a fair trial is a standard of international human rights to protect people from 
arbitrary and unlawful curtailment.173 The right to a fair trial should be protected at 
all times from state abuses. Detainees have the right to be tried before competent, 
independent and impartial courts by ensuring judicial independence and impartial 
judges who operate without any control or pressure from the government.174 
Further, detainees have the right to appeal and to receive compensation for wrongful 
detention.175 Detainees should have the opportunity to present their case, as well as 
the right to a public hearing. Civilians who are forced to wait to be tried before a 
military court are deprived of their right to be informed of their charges. They are 
also commonly denied access to their lawyer or family members, thereby violating 
the constitutional principles and the Code of Criminal Procedure.176 It also violates 
Article 9 of the ICCPR, which states that everyone arrested has the right to be 
informed of the reasons for their arrest and should be informed of any charges 
against them. The expanded crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the military 
courts have resulted in thousands of harsh sentences, including the death penalty. 
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5.5.7 Harsh sentences including the death penalty 
Since the military coup in July 2013, thousands of academics, liberal and secular 
protesters, and journalists (both Egyptian citizens and foreigners) have been arrested 
and detained.177 Thousands of Egyptians have been arrested and detained, with some 
facing life imprisonment and hundreds waiting on death row to be executed, with the 
majority being Morsi supporters. One court in El-Minya, Upper Egypt, ruled that 683 
Egyptians should be sentenced to death, and later confirmed death sentences for 37 
people and condemned 491 people to life imprisonment.178 Some of these detainees 
were convicted after just two court sessions, while some were absent from 
proceedings and others did not have a proper defence. In 2013, a total of 109 
Egyptians were sentenced to the death penalty. In 2014, the number of people 
sentenced to the death penalty increased to 509.179 
On 16 June 2015, an Egyptian court confirmed a death sentence for ousted President 
Morsi as punishment for escaping from Wadi al-Natrun prison on 30 January 2011. 
Five leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood also faced the death penalty for their 
participation.180 The opposition described the sentences as null and void. In another 
case, Morsi faced imprisonment for 25 years for conspiring with foreign groups.181 
After a judge sentences someone to the death penalty, the judge is required by law to 
seek the opinion of the Grand Mufti to determine whether the death penalty is 
compliant with sharia law, even though the Grand Mufti’s opinion is non-binding.182 
Most death penalty sentences are implemented for political reasons, and mainly 
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against opponents who demonstrated against the military’s tight grip after it ousted 
Morsi. 
Implementing the death penalty for political offences violates Article 6 of the 
ICCPR, which states that: 
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by 
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life, and in countries which have 
not abolished the death penalty, the sentence of death may be imposed only for the 
most serious crimes.183 
The definition of ‘serious crimes’ is a vague concept and is defined in different ways 
by countries according to their national values, religion and political perspective. 
The widespread use of the death penalty in Egypt also violates the American 
Convention on Human Rights. Article 4(1) states that ‘every person has the right to 
have his life respected.’184 Article 4(4) states that in no case should capital 
punishment be inflicted for political offences or related common crimes. Further, 
Egypt’s overuse of the death penalty violates the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. Article 4 states that ‘human beings are inviolable, and every human 
being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one 
may be arbitrarily deprived of this right’.185 Article 10 of the African charter states 
that the death penalty shall under no circumstances be imposed for a political 
right.186 In addition, the expansive use of the death penalty in Egypt violates Article 
2(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that the life of 
everyone is protected by the law. However, Article 2(2) provides an exemption for 
the deprivation of life in three absolute cases: 
1. in defence of any person from unlawful violence 
2. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained in action 
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3. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or 
insurrection.187 
Article 1 of protocol 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights states that 
‘The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or 
executed’.188 The death penalty is now abolished in most European countries by 
virtue of this protocol. 
In conclusion, harsh sentences such as the death penalty have been widely used 
against civilians, especially since the coup of 3 July 2013. Most harsh sentences have 
been imposed for political views rather than genuine legal transgressions. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The climate of free expression in Egypt has gradually worsened because of 
restrictions that violate media freedom. Journalists have been brutally beaten by the 
police and armed forces, which use excessive force to prevent them from reporting 
on certain topics. The state of emergency has allowed the regime to police and 
censor political activities and political expression. The regime has also been 
empowered to arrest people under suspicion of political crimes and prevent them 
from gathering or distributing any political brochures without prior permission. 
Police brutality was the main reason behind the 2011 revolution. Military and police 
forces are supposed to defend the country from external enemies and ensure the 
safety of its people; however, the regime has used the military to serve its own 
interests. Military and police forces have used emergency laws to justify using 
coercive force against their own people, thereby breaching human rights laws. The 
regime has used exceptional laws, such as the Protest Law and the terrorist law, to 
stifle its opponents and consolidate its power. Mass arrests, torture, forced 
disappearances and detention of people for an unlimited time are widespread 
practices in Egypt because the use of emergency law unofficially allows it to occur. 
Military trials have become enshrined in the Egyptian constitution as a parallel 
system, without the right to appeal. The law has expanded the military’s authority 
and increased the number of crimes considered harmful to the military, thereby 
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causing more human rights breaches. In particular, military courts have sentenced 
hundreds of Egyptians to life imprisonment or death. 
This chapter shows how traditional emergency power theories have failed to explain 
the use of emergency law and exceptional laws. Emergency law has been the main 
cause of human rights violations in Egypt. Emergency law gives security forces the 
right to arrest, detain and refer civilians to military courts to face harsh sentences. 
Traditional emergency power theories have ignored the fact that emergency law is 
used to suppress regimes’ opponents. In theory, the Egyptian constitution protects 
freedom of expression and the right to life. However, in practice, different political 
regimes have used vague and elastic concepts under the guise of fighting terrorism 
and protecting the gains of the revolution to justify the use of force and mass arrests. 
Exemptions found in international human rights treaties have helped different 
political regimes to justify their actions under the guise of protecting national 
security and public order, thereby causing more human rights violations. 
The next chapter examines contemporary imperialism, which has also played a 
crucial role in the situation in Egypt and the ongoing abuse of power. 
 
 189 
Chapter 6: Contemporary Imperialism 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the driving forces behind emergency rule in the post-
independence period, when the country was no longer directly or indirectly in the 
grip of British rule. Although Egypt gained formal independence after World War II, 
the pressures of Western domination continued in new forms, and this is a key to 
understanding the inability of each successive Egyptian regime to provide basic 
democratic rights. For a period, Nasser’s administration could exploit the Cold War 
between the US and the USSR to balance somewhat between them and gain a degree 
of freedom from the pressures of the global financial markets. However, 
increasingly, and especially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, those 
pressures were re-asserted and intensified, requiring each government to impose on 
the population the austerity measures dictated by financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and the IMF. 
Britain has long used Egypt’s debt to control its economy. When Egypt failed to pay 
its debt, Britain took military action and occupied Egypt in 1882. In 1914, Britain 
declared martial law and enshrined martial law in the 1923 constitution. The 1923 
Military Rule Law No 15 and the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936 were introduced to 
protect Britain’s political and economic interests in Egypt. When World War II 
began, Britain forced the Egyptian regime to declare martial law to use its resources 
for the benefit of Britain. 
As a result of Egypt’s important strategic position, it remained under increasing 
pressure from global powers and capitalists after 1952. After the victories of the US 
in World War II, the US replaced Britain and became one of the major powers in the 
world and, in particular, the Middle East because of its oil. 
The neo-colonial IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO) have used 
debt to force some countries to privatise their private sectors, encourage foreign 
investment and decrease state rule in health and education. These programs have 
placed pressure on low-income citizens and affected their lives. They have also 
prevented democracy by consolidating authoritarian regimes, which have in turn 
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used a continuous state of emergency to protect their own interests and control the 
majority of low-income citizens. Egypt is not the only country in the world that has 
suffered from contemporary imperialism. Other countries have lost their sovereignty 
because of debt pressure from the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, US aid has 
been used as another tool to place pressure on Egypt. Traditional emergency power 
theories have neglected to examine the role of contemporary imperialist 
organisations that use debt pressure to justify interfering in the developing world. 
Structural programs enforced by these organisations have resulted in an increase in 
poverty and benefited a minority of people. 
The important question that needs to be asked is: Why has Egypt never been able to 
escape the domination of external powers? This chapter is divided into two parts. 
The first part presents the historical background of the establishment of 
contemporary imperialism around the world. It shows that the goals of contemporary 
imperialist organisations—which were supposed to help poor countries—changed so 
that they became tools to control developing countries. The second part examines the 
effects of contemporary imperialism and its organisations—the IMF and the World 
Bank—from postcolonial Egypt until the present day. 
6.2 Establishment of Contemporary Imperialism 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The Great Depression began in 1929, when Wall Street (the biggest financial centre 
in the world) collapsed because of toxic debt. This occurred because stockbrokers 
allowed investors to buy stocks with little payment during the economic boom of the 
1920s. As investors bought more stocks, prices increased until the economy 
collapsed and confidence in the market dropped.1 
The Great Depression continued throughout the 1930s. One reason for this was that 
capitalists wanted to increase their profits and decrease the cost of production by 
lowering wages. Goods lost their value because no one could afford to buy them. 
British economist John Maynard Keynes argued that instead of decreasing wages and 
cutting spending, the government needed to increase spending and encourage higher 
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wages so people could afford to buy goods.2 The positive aspect of Keynesian 
thought was implemented in the US in 1933 during the presidential term of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt through large government-funded projects, higher wages for the 
poor and higher taxes for the rich.3 Eventually, in the post-World War II period, 
Keynesian views spread throughout Western countries, which resulted in a decrease 
in poverty, high growth and increased wages and state welfare. 
In Germany, which was particularly badly hit by the financial crisis, overseas 
investment funds were rapidly withdrawn and big businesses—particularly iron and 
steel corporations—financed Hitler’s rise to power, promising state intervention to 
destroy the forces of organised labour and fund a new militarisation as a basis for 
imperial expansion. Hitler’s program can be considered a negative kind of 
Keynesianism. The Nazi party launched a militarisation of the state, which in turn 
drove militarisation in other states, including Russia, the US and the UK. The Nazis 
invaded other countries to obtain more resources to solve their financial crisis and 
build up their expanded military. World War II began when Germany invaded 
Poland, and France and Britain declared war on Germany in response. In 1945, 
Germany lost the war.4 
When World War II ended, countries began thinking about peace and cooperation 
and respecting human rights. As a result, Western countries created the UN after the 
League of Nations failed to achieve peace. Next, they created economic 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, which were supposed to help 
countries develop their economies; however, instead, these organisations played a 
major role in placing pressure on developing countries. 
In much of the developing world, the postcolonial period involved a mixture of 
nationalisation, modernisation and increasing hostility towards the developing world. 
Variations of Keynesian planning were applied with capital and trade controls, 
import substituting industrialisation with protection for infant industries, agricultural 
supports and subsidies. During the 1950s and 1960s, the former colonial powers 
were unhappy with the new policies and strategies of nationalist governments, such 
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as nationalisation, land reform and capital controls. These strategies threatened the 
interests of Western powers by threatening their access to cheap raw materials and 
labour and markets for their manufactured goods. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Western countries had a chance to regain control of the 
developing world. The debt crisis of 1973 enabled the developed world to use this 
debt as an excuse to use neo-colonialist organisations to regain control of the 
developing world and implement policies that served their own interests. The next 
section examines the rise of contemporary imperialism after World War II, the 
Golden Age, the Cold War, postcolonialism, the end of Keynesian thought and the 
rise of neoliberalism.5 
6.2.2 World War II 
When Germany lost World War I, the victorious countries imposed a number of 
articles to restrain Germany. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles (the War Guilt 
Clause) blamed Germany for World War I and forced Germany to pay reparations. 
The US helped Germany pay the reparations through loans. When the Great 
Depression struck Wall Street, the US asked Germany to repay its loans, which sent 
Germany into a financial crisis and increased the country’s poverty and 
unemployment. The financial crisis and the Treaty of Versailles paved the way for 
the Nazi party to gain popularity and take power from the liberal democratic regime. 
In 1933, Hitler became the chancellor of Germany. With the financial support of iron 
and steel magnates, Hitler used propaganda about the Treaty of Versailles to gain 
power and blame Britain and France for Germany’s financial difficulties. Instead of 
building a welfare state, Hitler launched a militarisation project. He planned to 
invade other countries to take control of their raw materials, industries and labour 
forces, and to obtain revenge on those he saw as enemies. 
On 31 August 1939, Germany invaded Poland. In response, Britain and France 
declared war on Germany. World War II was fought between the Axis powers—
Germany, Italy and Japan—and the Allies—France, Britain, the Soviet Union and 
the US. Between 40,000,000 and 50,000,000 people died during World War II. After 
their victory over Germany and Japan, the US, Britain and France established a new 
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organisation, the UN, in May 1945 in San Francisco. The main organs of the UN 
(General Assembly, Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social 
Council, International Court of Justice and Secretariat) pledged a commitment to 
peace and cooperation. The countries claimed that this new organisation would be 
different to the League of the Nations, which was founded after 1918 as part of the 
Treaty of Versailles and failed to stop World War II. Britain, France, the US and 
Russia controlled and dominated the Security Council of the UN.6 
6.2.3 Golden Age 
After the end of World War II, worldwide capitalism experienced an unprecedented 
boom, at least in part because of the application of Keynesian economic policies. In 
the early 1950s, unemployment decreased to 3% in the US and 1.5% in Britain. By 
1960, unemployment had decreased to 1% in West Germany. Wages increased, 
living standards improved and the working week decreased from five and a half to 
five days per week. States transformed into welfare states, intent on improving health 
and education.7 Life expectancy increased as a result of improvements in medical 
research and nutrition. 
The Golden Age, as it is commonly known, saw the application of Keynesian 
ideology and the involvement of governments in the economy through: 
• regulation of basic industries 
• regulation of the financial sector 
• strong anti-trust enforcement 
• the welfare state 
• progressive income tax 
• regulation of occupational health and safety and consumer products.8 
6.2.4 Cold War 
The notion of the Cold War began in the summer of 1948 and continued throughout 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Although it never escalated into a world war, the period 
was known for a number of conflicts and standoffs that saw the capitalist ‘West’ 
pitted against the communist ‘East’. 
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At the end of World War II, Germany was divided into four occupied zones. Britain, 
France and the US made Berlin the capital and introduced a new currency, which 
affected the Russian zone. Russia responded by imposing a blockade on the 
movement of food and goods by rail and road to West Berlin. The US and Britain 
kept supplies flowing to West Berlin.9 
During this period, Anglo–US propaganda against communists and the left-wing 
called for the ‘defence of freedom’. The US purged communist officials in trade 
unions, as well as teachers and writers. Britain’s major union banned communists 
from holding office. Stalinist thought was imposed in Eastern Europe. People who 
opposed these ideologies were sent to prison or labour camps.10 
The Russian bloc organised the Warsaw Pact, and the US established the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Pact. Military expenditure reached 20% of the US’ 
national output. In contrast, Russia spent 40% of its output on the military. Russia 
built secret cities to develop an atom bomb, and the US developed the hydrogen 
bomb, which was 100 times more destructive than the atom bombs used on Japan at 
the end of World War II. In June 1950, the Korean War began between North Korea 
(headed by Kim Il Sung) and South Korea (headed by Syngman Rhee). North Korea 
was supported by China and the Soviet Union, and South Korea was supported by 
the US. The war ended after three years, resulting in 500,000 Western casualties and 
2,000,000 Korean civilian deaths.11 
The Cold War was used by the US and its allies as an excuse to interfere with, and 
destroy, developing world regimes that had managed to overthrow authoritarian 
predecessors installed by colonial powers and end colonial interference in their 
countries. These indigenous regimes began a number of modernisations, including 
nationalisation projects, which were deemed to be a threat to the interests of the 
former colonial powers. 
For example, when Salvador Allende was democratically elected in Chile in 1970, he 
launched socialist reforms (e.g., raising wages), land reforms and nationalised US 
and Chilean firms that threatened US interests in Chile. In 1973, a military coup 
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backed by the US overthrew Salvador Allende and installed a pro-US regime that 
reversed Salvador’s policies.12 
6.2.5 Nationalisation 
When the colonial powers withdrew from Africa and Asia, a democratic movement 
began that called for fairer political systems and economic independence. This 
movement adapted state-led development by increasing social spending, granting fair 
wages to workers and, most importantly, building national economies for their own 
benefit rather than the benefit of the European powers. This was called the era of 
developmentalism.13 
Latin America is an example of a success story. In 1948, Latin America established 
the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, which was 
based in Chile and headed by the Argentinean economist Raul Prebisch. Prebisch 
helped create the theory of dependency and equality. He argued that the European 
powers organised the world system, which limited developing countries to exporting 
primary commodities and prohibited them from developing their own industries. 
Latin America’s attempt to establish a program of industrialisation limited its 
dependence on Western powers. For example, Juan Peron (the president of Argentina 
from 1945 to 1955) nationalised oil companies, encouraged heavy industry and 
increased state investment in education, healthcare, social security and housing.14 
Developmentalist strategies succeeded at first in reducing the gap between the rich 
and the poor. Life expectancy and literacy increased, and national economies were 
built.15 The newly independent countries established a new movement to build 
economies through collaboration. One of the main examples of this collaboration 
was the Non-Aligned Movement. 
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6.2.5.1 Non-Aligned Movement 
In 1955, a group of newly independent countries met in Bandung, Indonesia, to form 
a coalition committed to building economies through cooperation and by resisting 
the colonialism and neo-colonialism of Western powers. They established a third 
way to defend their interests from the US and the Soviet Union, and they refused to 
take a side in the Cold War. In 1961, President Nasser of Egypt, President Tito of 
Yugoslavia, President Nehru of India and President Nkrumah of Ghana met in 
Belgrade to establish the Non-Aligned Movement, which aimed to achieve peace, 
non-intervention, sovereignty, anti-racism and economic justice. Further, they 
established the UN Conference on Trade and Development to strengthen the 
principles of a fairer world economy.16 
The developing world worked together to improve the price of goods. OPEC was 
formed in 1960 by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela and Iran as another 
mechanism for developing nations to protect their natural resources and prevent them 
from being exploited by imperialist powers.17 
On 15 June 1964, the developing countries formed a coalition called the Group of 77 
(G77), which proposed to make the rules of the international economy fair for most 
of the world. The G77 established the New International Economic Order, which was 
passed by the UN General Assembly in 1973. The main aims of this neo-coalition 
were to give the developing world the right to nationalise foreign investment, impose 
tariffs to protect their economies and regulate multinational companies, and protect 
them from interference by Western powers.18 
6.2.6 Counter-revolutionary measures 
The Western powers were unhappy with the policies established by the newly 
independent countries because they posed the following threats to their own 
interests: 
1. The policies introduced new strategies such as nationalisation, land reform 
and capital controls. 
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2. The strategies threatened the access of Western countries to raw materials 
and cheap labour and prevented them from exporting manufactured goods. 
3. Nationalist governments prevented products from Western countries from 
entering their country by setting high tariffs to protect local products. 
Thus, Western countries decided to use counter-revolutionary measures to protect 
their interests. They used the legacy of the Cold War and the spread of communist 
ideas to justify their interference. A powerful example of this behaviour is the case of 
Ghana. Nkrumah became the first elected president of Ghana after the country 
regained its independence in 1957. Nkrumah strengthened a number of policies, 
including decreasing Ghana’s dependence on European imports, nationalising mines, 
regulating foreign companies and introducing free healthcare and free education. 
Nkrumah became the leading voice for liberation in Africa and called for a Pan-
African vision and united political and economic cooperation between African 
countries. These actions made Nkrumah a target for Britain and the US, which 
backed a coup in 1966 and installed a military junta to reverse Nkrumah’s policies. 
Further, they brought in the IMF and the World Bank, privatised Ghana’s assets and 
forced Ghana to become a source of raw materials again. Nkrumah spent his life in 
exile in Guinea.19 
After years of military interventions, coups and ousted national democratic regimes, 
Western countries ultimately used the debt crisis to control developing countries by 
pressuring them to adopt certain programs to pay their debts. The debt crisis ended 
the Golden Age and Keynesian thought and established the neoliberal economy. 
6.2.7 Debt crisis 
In the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, the Arabs used an oil embargo to pressure the US. 
OPEC increased the price of petrol by 70% and imposed a total embargo on petrol 
shipments to the US and a partial embargo on petrol shipments to Europe. By the end 
of March 1974, the price of oil had increased from $3 to $12 per barrel.20 
OPEC made more than $450 billion as a result of the 1973 embargo. The US forced 
OPEC countries to invest this money in Wall Street banks. The US banks then 
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invested this money in southern countries whose economies had suffered financial 
hardship from the rising oil prices. The banks offered loans to Latin America to 
cover the rising price of petrol rather than to fund productive projects.21 
The US banks did not evaluate the loan requests or monitor how and where the 
money would be spent. The developing countries did not use the loans for productive 
investment; rather, they spent the money on immediate consumption. The loans 
benefited government officials and the business elite; however, many developing 
countries were left with large amounts of debt, and as a result, they could no longer 
obtain loans. Thus, these developing countries relied heavily on the World Bank and 
the IMF. The IMF required structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in these 
countries, which had to agree to impose strict economic programs on their countries 
to reschedule their debts and borrow more money. Most countries had to cut 
spending in education, healthcare and social services to decrease their debt and 
stabilise their currency.22 
Many developing countries amassed large debts with a high risk of default for the 
following reasons: 
1. They could not repay their debt because they imported expensive 
manufactured products from Western countries. 
2. The developing countries export raw materials such as iron, wood and raw 
diamond with low prices without adding any value to the materials. 
However, the developed countries export complex products to the 
developing countries, after adding value to the raw materials such as cars, 
furniture and jewelleries. 
3. The loans were in US dollars and the interest rates were variable; thus, if the 
interest rate increased in the US, the interest on the loan increased, thereby 
continually increasing the debt.23 
All of this was no accident; in fact, it was a targeted and coordinated strategy devised 
by seven of the most powerful Western nations. The Western powers feared that the 
new G77 coalition would put their interests at risk. Therefore, in 1975, the leaders of 
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the US, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany and Canada24 met at Château de 
Rambouillet in Northern France to form a new coalition, the Group of 7 (G7). The 
main purpose of establishing this group was to prevent developing countries from 
cooperating with each other and threatening Western interests by increasing the price 
of raw materials.25 Western countries did not want developing countries to 
modernise; they wanted them to remain poor and dependant on Western countries. 
The US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, suggested that the UN Security Council 
rather than the General Assembly should be responsible for the most important 
decisions and that it should limit the power of the G77 through the provision of 
financial aid by the richest countries to the poorest.26 
In conclusion, after the end of the 1973 war, the US forced OPEC countries to invest 
their money in Wall Street banks. This money was used to control and divide the 
developing countries, leading to more poverty and increasing the gap between the 
rich and the poor. To repay their loans, developing countries were forced to decrease 
their expenses, which in turn increased illiteracy, disease and infant mortality rates. 
6.2.8 Neoliberalism and the end of Keynesian thought 
It was not just the governments of powerful Western nations that feared the counter-
revolutionary measures being undertaken in the developing world, but the business 
elite were also unhappy to be paying higher taxes and higher wages. Milton 
Friedman, a US economist, was inspired by Friedrich Hayek, an economist at the 
London School of Economics, who argued that ‘any intervention in the economy 
would inevitably lead to the kind of totalitarianism that characterised fascist 
Germany and Communist Russia’.27 In 1947, Friedman and Hayek established the 
Mont Pelerin Society28 as a club for free market economists. They were then 
appointed to the University of Chicago, which became a hub for liberal economists. 
Friedman connected the free market and individual liberty. In 1962, he wrote 
Capitalism and Freedom to compete with the Keynesian ideology of increasing 
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wages and fixing the price of goods to be affordable. In contrast, Friedman claimed 
that the policy adapted by Keynesian economists to improve living standards was: 
doing hidden harm by disrupting the equilibrium of the market. Price controls, 
subsidies and minimum wage laws should all be abandoned, and the state should 
sell off any services that corporations could run at a profit, including education, 
healthcare, pensions and national parks. Government should cut back social 
spending so as not to interfere with the labour market. Taxes should be at a flat 
rate. And corporations should be free to sell their products anywhere in the 
world.29 
Friedman and Hayek’s ideology helped to create the theory of neoliberalism. This 
theory was ‘neo’ in the sense that it revived classical market liberalism, which had 
declined after the Great Depression in 1929. The connection of the free market to 
individual liberty was a new and unique feature of the ideology, which became 
central to its political success in the West. Neoliberal theory opposed subsidies and 
protection for the working class but provided subsidies and protection for large and 
rich corporations.30 
The end of the 1970s and the 1980s onwards saw the end of Keynesian thought as 
the directing political principle. The neo-colonial organisations (IMF and the World 
Bank) succeeded in abolishing Keynesian ideology and began a new age of neo-
colonial organisations. Neoliberal economic policies damaged people’s lives by 
privatising state companies, lifting price controls, decreasing wages and banning 
strikes. Further, neoliberal regimes were prepared to use torture and mass 
imprisonment against anyone who disturbed their interests. These policies were used 
against poor people who demanded fair wages, labour unions, universal healthcare 
and education, and fair access to land.31 Neoliberal economic strategies protected big 
business, including transnational corporations based in the US and Europe. A 
minority of businesspeople controlled the majority of the wealth. Most people 
worked hard just to survive, and they had no quality of life. The main principles of 
neoliberal policies were to: 
1. increase the gap between the rich and the poor, and increase unemployment 
by favouring a small minority of businesspeople 
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2. deregulate basic industries 
3. deregulate the financial sector 
4. weaken job safety and health and safety policies 
5. weaken anti-trust enforcement 
6. privatise public goods and services 
7. make cutbacks in social welfare 
8. provide tax cuts for businesses and the rich 
9. casual jobs.32 
In theory, the IMF and the World Bank aimed to help decrease poverty and develop 
economic growth around the world. In practice, they increased poverty, increased 
unemployment and did not help improve the economic growth of the developing 
world. Developing countries were forced to repay loans at high interest rates and 
spend a large amount of their budget on debt repayment. They were forced to take 
out new loans to repay the old ones.33 
6.3 Establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank 
6.3.1 Introduction 
From 1 to 22 July 1944, 44 countries, led by the US and the UK, met in New 
Hampshire in the US to discuss world economic plans for post-World War II peace. 
The aim was to increase economic cooperation to secure world peace and prosperity 
based on a world market. 
In response to these post-war arrangements, three international regulatory institutions 
were established: 
1. IMF 
2. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, now called the 
World Bank 
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3. International Trade Organization and General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, which became the WTO.34 
This section explains how the IMF and the World Bank controlled the world through 
debts and how countries lost their sovereignty. This thesis suggests that the 
privileges and immunity granted to these international organisations should be 
abolished because they cause poverty and discriminate against the poor by 
supporting the rich. 
6.3.2 Rule of the International Monetary Fund 
The IMF was established on 27 December 1945 and began work in 1947, when 29 
countries signed the articles of agreement resulting from the 1944 conference at in 
New Hampshire.35 According to Article 1 of the agreement, the objectives of the 
IMF were: 
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution 
which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on 
international monetary problems. 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of 
employment and real income and to the development of the productive 
resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy. 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements 
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect 
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign 
exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. 
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them 
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments 
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international 
prosperity. 
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.36 
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However, while these were the intentions of the IMF in theory, things worked quite 
differently in practice. This was largely because a number of safeguards and 
mechanisms were built into organisations such as the IMF to protect the interests of 
Western powers. For example, the IMF (and the World Bank) cannot be sued 
because they enjoy special privileges and immunity under the International 
Organizations Immunities Act of 1945. The US controls 10% of the IMF and World 
Bank shares and has voting rights. France, Germany, Japan and the UK also have 
shares in the two organisations, which means that Western powers control 60% of 
the organisations. Thus, 85% of the world’s population controls only 40% of the 
vote. That is, developing countries have no actual power in these organisations. In 
addition, the leaders of the two organisations are not elected, but are appointed by the 
US and Europe.37 Thus, while the organisations’ intentions may have been to ensure 
equilibrium in the international economy, there is in fact a huge disparity in control. 
The mechanisms for doing this are explained below. 
6.3.3 International monetary funding: remote-control power 
In 1981, Paul Volcker, the chairman of the US Federal Reserve, increased the 
interest rate by 21%. As a result, in 1982, Mexico defaulted on its loans worth $80 
billion, and Brazil and Argentina also defaulted on their loans in what became known 
as the third-world debt crisis.38 As a result, bankers asked the US to force Mexico 
and other countries to repay their loans using the IMF to balance their payments. The 
G7 then had a chance to force the southern countries to cut their government 
spending to repay their loans. The IMF would only help the developing countries to 
finance their debt if they met certain conditions in the form of SAPs.39 Debt was 
therefore used as a tool to spread neoliberalism and control developing countries, 
which affected national sovereignty. Poor people could not survive because they 
earned low wages and needed to spend their money on food, housing and healthcare. 
The IMF and the World Bank forced developing countries to begin SAPs, which 
involved selling government infrastructure and increasing their exports, especially of 
raw materials. These forced programs increased the debts of developing countries 
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and decreased the incomes of farmers and miners.40 The beneficiaries of the SAPs 
were developed countries, which once again gained access to large amounts of cheap 
raw materials for their manufacturing industries. 
The IMF’s policies were changed to directly affect approximately 185 countries, 
which caused people to lose their jobs and suffer from poverty and hardship.41 The 
IMF offered short-term conditional loans to member countries that suffered from 
balance of payment hardship. This gave the IMF the ability to interfere with the 
economic policies of these countries, which had to implement a number of economic 
policies and prescribed financial measures, including reducing tariff barriers on 
imports, eliminating jobs, increasing interest rates to cool the economy and decrease 
inflation, imposing austerity programs to reduce healthcare and education services, 
and removing state subsidies that usually kept prices low.42 In conclusion, the IMF 
used austerity, privatisation and liberalisation to: 
1. cut spending on public services, healthcare and education 
2. end subsidies for farming and food 
3. privatise public assets 
4. cut tariffs, stop capital controls and attract foreign investment 
5. adjust the economy towards exports 
6. keep inflation low as a kind of monetary austerity.43 
6.3.4 World Bank 
The World Bank was established in 1944 and consists of five institutions: 
1. the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which makes 
development loans, guarantees loans and offers advisory services 
2. the International Development Association, which provides loans to 
countries that are not creditworthy in the international financial market 
3. the International Finance Corporation, which provides loans and equity 
financing for the private sector in the developing world 
                                                          
40 Scott Mann, ‘US Power and Transnational Governance’ (2011) 15 University of Western Sydney 
Law Review 109. 
41 Peet, above n 34, 66. 
42 Ibid 67. 
43 Hickel, above n 1, 154–155. 
 205 
4. the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which provides investment 
insurance 
5. the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, which helps 
resolve investment disputes between countries and foreign investors.44 
The World Bank promotes neoliberal economics, good governance, political 
pluralism, accountability and the rule of law.45 In 1980, the World Bank started 
demanding the same conditions as the IMF. Structural adjustment was the first 
condition when financing any loans. Developing countries had no choice but to 
accept structural adjustment if they needed loans.46 
6.3.5 Washington Consensus, World Trade Organization and Financial Action 
Task Force 
In addition to the IMF and the World Bank, the developed world established a 
number of policies as extra tools to control the developing world. This was done by 
issuing policies (the Washington Consensus) and establishing organisations such as 
the WTO and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This section examines these 
policies and organisations and shows how they benefit the developed world. 
6.3.5.1 Washington Consensus 
The theory of the Washington Consensus was introduced in 1989 by John 
Williamson, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He 
used the term to summarise the policies that were common among the reform 
packages used by international financial institutions based in Washington, such as 
the IMF, the World Bank and the US Department of Treasury. Williamson suggested 
the following policies to help Latin America recover from the financial crisis of the 
1980s: 
1. fiscal policy discipline and budget deficits small enough to be financed 
without recourse to the inflation tax 
2. redirection of public spending from subsidies towards a broad-based 
provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services such as primary education, 
primary healthcare and infrastructure investment 
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3. tax reform, broadening the tax base and cutting marginal tax rates 
4. interest rates that are market-determined and positive, but moderate in real 
terms 
5. unified and competitive rate to induce rapid growth in non-traditional 
exports 
6. replacement of quantitative trade restrictions by tariffs, which should be 
progressively reduced until a uniform low rate of 10–20% is reached 
7. abolition of any barriers to the entry of foreign direct investment 
8. privatisation of state enterprises 
9. abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, 
except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection 
grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions 
10. legal security for property rights without any excessive costs, and make these 
available to the informal sector.47 
This thesis suggests that the Washington Consensus policies imposed neoliberal 
economic practices as extra restrictions that prevented developing countries from 
modernisation, thereby enshrining poverty and increasing the gap between the rich 
and the poor. 
6.3.5.2 World Trade Organization 
The WTO was used as another tool to control the wealth of some and increase the 
poverty of others. The WTO was established on 1 January 1995 to regulate the 
world’s trade in goods and services using a system of objectives and rules.48 The 
principles of the WTO are based on free trade to prohibit discrimination in favour of 
national products and reducing tariffs.49 
The WTO requested that every country decrease its tariffs and abolish industrial 
subsidies. As a result, developing countries could not compete with developed 
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countries because the WTO favoured rich countries and kept developing countries as 
sources of raw material.50 
The developing world could not compete with the developed world. Most developing 
countries were in debt and their industrialisation was years behind that of the 
developed world. Thus, they did not have the technology required to compete with 
the developed world and were again forced to rely on exports of raw materials and 
imports of goods from developed countries. 
6.3.5.3 Financial Action Task Force 
The FATF was another supra-international body that established the neo-colonial 
era. It was established by the G7 members in 1989 in Paris to address the problem of 
money laundering. In 2001, it expanded to combat terrorist funding. The FATF 
called on the UN to implement Security Council Resolution 1373 to criminalise 
terrorist funding. Under pressure from the FATF, governments and banks around the 
world adopted new measures regarding money laundering and terrorist financing. 
This placed more pressure on developing countries because if they did not comply 
with the FATF’s measures, they could be considered non-cooperative countries and 
territories and be placed on the name-and-shame list.51 
As a result of its strategic position, Egypt was a victim of imperialism during the 
colonial expansion era, as discussed in Chapter 3. Egypt also became a victim of 
neo-imperialism through military intervention in 1956, and then through aid from the 
US and pressure from international organisations such as the IMF and the World 
Bank. 
6.4 Postcolonial Egypt from Nationalisation to the Age of Neo-
Imperialism 
Egypt has experienced all of the economic shifts and pressures experienced by 
developing countries. Egypt was affected by the Great Depression because its 
economy was dependant on agricultural products—in particular, cotton. Agricultural 
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exports declined and prices dropped, which increased poverty.52 The price of cotton 
decreased by 60%. In the 1930s, the Egyptian government implemented a tariff 
reform that led to higher rates on manufactured goods. The economic, social and 
political effects of these developments were severe. Commodity prices fell, exports 
declined, the tax rate increased and real income per capita declined.53 
During World War II, Egypt became a debtor instead of a creditor because of the 
expenditure of the Allies. In 1943, whatever remained of its external debt was 
converted into a local one, for which the creditors were either local Egyptians or 
foreigners who were born in Egypt. Egypt then became a creditor to Britain, lending 
it £430 million. After the 1952 coup, Egypt received some loans and grants; 
however, these were in small quantities and did not require repayment in foreign 
currency. In 1954, the US Congress passed the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act, which was known as the Public Law 480 (PL480). The Act 
established a food aid program called Food for Peace. The PL480 program contained 
three major mechanisms: 
1. Developing countries received a credit if they bought US agricultural 
commodities at concessional prices. 
2. Food aid was provided in bilateral, government-to-government transactions 
through relief organisations and the UN World Food Programme. 
3. Agricultural products were swapped for strategic resources and cancelling of 
debt for previous purchases of US agricultural products. 
The motivation for this food program was to counter communists, develop 
commercial markets for US products and protect US interests.54 
This section discusses postcolonial Egypt, shifting from nationalisation to the age of 
neo-imperialism. It explains how developed countries used military aggression 
against Egypt after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, as well as debt pressure 
through the IMF and the World Bank to force Egypt into neoliberalism. The financial 
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aid and debt pressure prevented Egypt from any modernisation and development that 
would support its independence. As a result, Egypt lost its sovereignty and became 
dependent on Western countries, especially the US. In particular, this section 
examines: 
• the 1952 coup by the Free Officers and Egypt’s relationship with the US 
• Nasser’s nationalisation program, the accumulation of debt and the 
enshrining of military rule 
• Sadat’s open-door policy 
• Mubarak’s introduction of a neoliberal economy and the pressure placed on 
Egypt by the IMF and the World Bank to repay its debt. 
Ultimately, this section focuses on how successive regimes in Egypt, with the power 
of the military, have prevented a real democracy from flourishing in Egypt and 
justified the continuous state of emergency. 
6.4.1 Egypt from nationalisation to the age of neo-imperialism 
As previously stated, Egypt has vital strategic value for Western powers—
particularly the US—because of its strategic geographic position. In addition to the 
Suez Canal providing a vital shipping route between Asia, Africa and Europe, the 
discovery of oil made Egypt’s proximity to the Middle East oil fields crucial. 
The US wanted to prevent the spread of communism and prevent the Soviet Union 
from gaining power in the Middle East.55 This was mainly to protect the US’ 
petroleum interests in the Gulf areas, especially in Saudi Arabia.56 Over the years, oil 
supply became an increasingly important national security issue. For example, during 
World War I, the US administration claimed that the oil supply should always be 
under the US’ control.57 This thesis argues that the US used the communists and the 
Soviets as a justification to build the age of neo-imperialism. The reason for this 
argument is that the US used the same policy in Latin America to maintain it as a 
source of raw materials and to generate profits. Strategic position and Middle Eastern 
oil were vital to the US to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control in the 
region, and Egypt was a strategic part of its plan. 
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When King Farouk was ousted in the 1952 coup, the US welcomed the new 
development, especially after years of political disorder and anti-foreigner violence. 
The US claimed that the new military regime would assist with ending corruption.58 
However, this new alliance with the US did not always help Egypt. Between 1952 
and 1954, Nasser tried to buy weapons from different countries, including the US, 
Britain and Sweden. He failed because of the unacceptable conditions imposed on 
the Egyptian population, such as joining the US-dominated military blocs.59 
On 28 February 1955, Israel invaded the Gaza Strip, and on 6 April 1955, Nasser 
decided to buy arms from the Soviet Union. Both countries signed an agreement on 
12 September 1955 for the Soviet Union to supply weapons to Egypt.60 The Soviet 
Union tried to prevent any deliberate breach of the spirit of the Geneva Summit, 
which was held in July 1955.61 The Soviet Union used Czechoslovakia as a secret 
channel to supply Egypt with weapons.62 
In an attempt to repair its relationship with Egypt, in December 1955, the US offered 
to help Egypt construct the Aswan Dam, which was a vast dam and hydroelectric 
project in Egypt.63 On 19 July 1956, after a meeting between Egypt and the US, the 
US issued an official statement abandoning funding for the dam.64 Cancelling this 
funding was the breaking point between the US and Egypt. Misunderstandings 
continued to arise between both countries when Nasser refused to join the Middle 
East Defence Organization and the Baghdad Pact65 to curtail any chance of the 
Soviet Union becoming a presence in the Middle East.66 This was shocking news for 
Nasser because the dam project was necessary for a number of reasons, including: 
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1. The Egyptian population was growing rapidly, with approximately 23 
million people in 1956. 
2. The high dam would extend the year-round irrigation of the entire Nile 
valley, thereby increasing the amount of cultivated land that could be used 
by peasants.67 
3. The new regime wanted to establish social justice as a key policy to show 
people that it was willing to improve people’s lives by establishing a big 
project and distributing the newly cultivated lands to landless peasants. This 
would gain Nasser popular support.68 
Nasser launched a program of nationalisation with the goals of a socialist economy, 
state capitalism, central planning and control of the resources of production by the 
people.69 Before nationalisation began, 5% of the population held 65% of the assets 
and 3% held 80% of cultivated lands. After the nationalisation, the land was sold to 
individuals, with each purchase not exceeding five acres.70 
From Nasser’s socialist perspective, nationalisation meant the redistribution of 
ownership from a few people to the public. This meant that the public controlled 
vital production and profit-sharing, and minimum wage provisions could be 
implemented.71 On 26 July 1956, Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal Company.72 All company and stockholder assets were frozen, and 12 
Egyptians were to be appointed as members of a special board to manage the 
company. Nasser issued a decree to nationalise the Suez Canal Company. Article 1 
of the President of the Republic Order Concerning the Issuance of Law No 285 of 
1956 on the Nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal 
stated that: 
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The Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Egyptian joint-stock 
company) is hereby nationalized. All its assets, rights and obligations are 
transferred to the Nation and all the organizations and committees that now 
operate its management are hereby dissolved. 
Stockholders and holders of founder’s shares shall be compensated for the 
ordinary or founders shares they own in accordance with the value of the shares 
shown in the closing quotations of the Paris Stock Exchange on the day preceding 
the effective date of the present law. 
The payment of said indemnity shall be affected after the Nation has taken 
delivery of all the assets and properties of the nationalized company.73 
The Suez Canal was important to the Western powers because, at that time, two-
thirds of canal traffic was carrying oil, including two-thirds of the European oil 
supply. Most of the canal tolls that were collected also went to British shareholders. 
Antony Eden, the British prime minister at the time, told a visiting Russian 
delegation that: ‘I must be absolutely blunt about the oil because we would fight for 
it’. He continued that ‘we could not live without oil and … we had no intention of 
being strangled to death’.74 
In 1956, a war began between Egypt and France, Britain and Israel, and was opposed 
by the US. When the war ended, the US became the dominant power in the Middle 
East, which had huge oil reserves.75 This thesis suggests that the 1956 war gave the 
US an excuse to replace Britain and gain greater control of the Middle East. This 
objective was designed because of Egypt’s strategic geographic position and oil 
refineries. 
The Soviet Union continued to support Egypt. In 1958, the Soviet Union offered a 
$175 million loan and $100 million to help build the Aswan Dam and many other 
projects in Egypt.76 The Soviet Union supported Egypt because it wanted to increase 
the Soviet Union’s navy presence in the Mediterranean Sea and increase its prestige 
in Egypt.77 
                                                          
73 ‘Article 1 of the President Republic Order Concerning the Issuance of Law No 285 of 1956’, 
American Foreign Relations (1956) 289–291 
<http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/9/50e44f1f-78d5-4aab-a0ae-
8689874d12e6/publishable_en.pdf>. 
74 Rees, above n 57, 78–79. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt (Macmillan Press, 1979) 178. 
 213 
Nasser allowed the military to take over and control entire projects, including land 
reclamation and basic commodities. He hired high-ranking officers to replace 
civilian managers to maintain a continuous military presence and influence the 
Egyptian economy.78 Instead of giving the people the opportunity to control the 
economy, Nasser enshrined military rule. To carry out his nationalisation program, 
Nasser issued a number of decrees to nationalise many companies: 
1. In 1960, he took the first step towards controlling the media by nationalising 
the mass media and forcing them to hand over ownership to the National 
Union. He then used the media to follow and support only his own ideas, and 
later re-imposed censorship to gain more control over the media. 
2. On 20 July 1961, Nasser issued a decree to nationalise the banks and 
insurance companies. He also decreed participation of the state in private 
industrial enterprises by reducing property sizes from 200 to 100 acres.79 A 
total of 275,000 fedans80 were confiscated by the Egyptian regime.81 
3. In February 1961, the regime nationalised the Bank of Misr and the Central 
Bank of Egypt, which controlled approximately 20% of Egypt’s industrial 
output and more than half of Egypt’s textiles.82 
4. In June 1961, the government took control of the cotton trade. In July 1961, 
Law No 117 nationalised the remaining private banks and 44 companies 
trading in different industries.83 
5. Under Law No 118 of 1961, the regime controlled 86 companies trading in 
commerce and manufacturing. 
6. Under Law No 119 of 1961, the regime forcibly transferred any shares 
greater than £10,000 to the state. The remaining shares were confiscated by 
1963.84 
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The establishment of the United Arab Republic85 and Nasser’s involvement in the 
Yemen War in 1962 were other breaking points between Nasser and the US, leading 
the US to cut off its assistance in 1963. In 1967, the relationship was totally 
destroyed as a result of the US’ assistance to Israel during the 1967 war against 
Egypt.86 
Egypt suffered after the 1967 defeat by Israel. It lost the Sinai Peninsula and spent 
25% of its gross domestic product rebuilding the military. Egypt lost approximately 
80% of its aircraft, and its tanks were replaced by the Soviet Union. Egypt relied on 
military and financial support from the Soviet Union and relied on their relationship 
to obtain support to restore its occupied lands.87 Nasser’s nationalisation enshrined 
the military’s tight grip on Egypt. Since then, the military has controlled Egypt. As a 
result of the 1956 war, the 1967 war and compensation for the companies that were 
nationalised, Egypt had debts that had to be repaid. 
6.4.2 Sadat’s open-door economic policy 
After the death of Nasser, the new Egyptian president, Sadat, signed friendship and 
cooperation treaties with the Soviet Union on 27 May 1971. The Soviet Union 
pledged to continue its commitment to supporting Egypt financially, economically 
and militarily.88 The US considered this treaty a step towards consolidating the 
Soviet Union’s presence in Egypt, which was a threat to the US’ policy of gaining 
more influence in Egypt. President Nixon decided to suspend the sale of aircraft to 
Israel. The US attempted to convince Egypt that it was the only power that could 
conduct any future negotiations with Israel regarding the return of occupied Egyptian 
land. The US also promised to support Egypt financially. This was an interim 
agreement between Egypt and the US to progress peace negotiations between Israel 
and Egypt.89 
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On 18 July 1972, Sadat decided to expel the Soviet Union’s military presence and 
ordered 20,000 military advisers and technicians to leave Egypt. Sadat’s decision to 
expel the Soviet Union aimed to gain support and legitimacy among Egyptians. 
Further, it was designed to give him a strong chance of reopening negotiations for 
peace and achieving the return of occupied Egyptian land from Israel.90 This led to a 
poor relationship between Sadat and the Soviet Union, and Sadat planned to turn 
away from the Eastern Bloc to the Western Bloc. He claimed that the Soviet Union 
refused to supply the Egyptian army with significant arms during the 1973 war.91 
The 1973 war gave Sadat the opportunity to improve his position in any future 
negotiations and simultaneously gain credibility among his people.92 This was a 
clever ploy by Sadat to attract the attention of the US, which was the main power 
that could pressure Israel to enter negotiations regarding the return of occupied Arab 
land. The diplomatic relationship between Egypt and the US had been broken since 
1967, and in 1975, the US recommenced its economic aid to Egypt.93 
Sadat adopted an open-door policy, which meant opening the Egyptian economy to 
Arab and foreign investments. This policy reversed the socialism of the 1952–1970 
period, when Nasser was president.94 New policies were created, including allowing 
Egyptians to own property.95 In 1974, the Egyptian government issued Law No 43 to 
deal with the investment of Arab and foreign funds. It permitted tax concessions for 
foreign private investors and exemptions from labour laws, import and export 
licences, and exchange rate regulations.96 This strategy moved the country from a 
closed or restricted economy that dealt only with Eastern countries to an open 
economy directed towards the West.97 In his open-door policy, Sadat made it clear 
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that he wanted to attract private capital to make Egypt a leading financial centre in 
the Middle East.98 
However, Sadat’s policy shifted Egypt from dependence on the Soviet Union to 
dependence on the US. Sadat focused more on defence products by establishing the 
Arab Organization for Industrialization with the primary goal of manufacturing 
military aircrafts.99 In 1976, the Treaty of Friendship between Egypt and the Soviet 
Union was terminated, and Egypt started to depend on aid from the US instead.100 
However, Western countries, including the US and Japan, were concerned about 
Egypt’s political and economic instability. Their policy was to wait and see, even 
though Egypt presented large opportunities because of its large market, large 
population, potential oil reserves in the Nile Delta, the Western Desert and the Suez 
Canal.101 In addition, there were longstanding problems with Israel, the fact that 
Egypt had a large population living in a small area and the fact that Egypt needed 
around $1.2 billion to service its foreign loans.102 
On 17 September 1978, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty at Camp David with 
the US as a witness, which included two agreements. The first agreement provided 
the framework for peace in the Middle East, while the second agreement was the 
conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.103 The Camp David treaty 
between Egypt and Israel resulted in significant foreign aid to Egypt, which 
compensated for some of its economic shortfalls, and it gave the Egyptian regime an 
opportunity to advance the Middle East peace process. 
Thus, Egypt became the second-largest country to receive foreign and economic aid 
from the US. The purpose behind the food aid was to maintain the US’ position in 
Egypt and protect the regime.104 The US considered Egypt a partner, especially after 
Sadat became president. Egypt became an important country to the US during the 
Cold War, and the relationship became more important after the peace treaty was 
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signed between Egypt and Israel.105 The US continued to support the Egyptian 
regime with an annual average of $2 billion in aid. This was divided between 
military aid,106 which constituted approximately 80% of Egypt’s military budget,107 
and economic aid to help maintain the regime and regional stability.108 
Sadat promoted his legitimacy to prevent any opposition to his rule. He did this by 
maintaining the loyalty of the people by increasing the scope of products falling 
under the food subsidy system. This included rice, yellow maize, beans, lentils, 
frozen fish, chicken and meat. This food subsidy became a major issue when the 
price of wheat increased from US$60 to US$250 a tonne.109 The US supported 
Egypt’s demand for bread and helped the country build a capacity for distribution. 
With the US providing more than 50% of Egypt’s food imports, pressure was 
reduced on Egypt’s budget.110 
Neo-imperialist organisations began to use debt to place pressure on Egypt, which 
affected people on low incomes. During the late 1970s, the Egyptian economy did 
not perform well, which increased mistrust and the gap between the regime and the 
people. The open-door economic policy failed because of the free-trade policies and 
the increase in imports. Luxury imports increased 300-fold during Sadat’s era, and 
Egypt went into a deep budget deficit. Sovereign debt also increased, which plunged 
the country into deep financial difficulties that required financial reform and 
assistance.111 Egypt relied on aid and oil to borrow money from outside, which 
increased consumption—especially of imported products—and discouraged 
economic reform. By the end of 1980, the price of oil began to decrease, which 
affected Egypt’s ability to meet its payments for its loans. This caused a severe debt 
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crisis.112 Further, the regime faced political problems because of the austerity 
program sponsored by the IMF, which led to rioting against the government. Egypt 
was at the mercy of the IMF, which caused the country to lose its autonomy. 
Between 18 and 19 January 1977, tens of thousands of people in Egypt’s major cities 
launched a ‘bread riot’ when Sadat, under pressure from the IMF, adopted certain 
measures, including cutting subsidies for more than 24 basic commodities, such as 
flour and cooking oil.113 Sadat used a state of emergency to call on the military to 
stop the riots. The riot forced Sadat to reinstate the subsidies, and he called the 
protest the ‘thieves’ uprising’.114 During the riot, 80 people died, 800 were injured 
and 1,000 were imprisoned.115 The substantial increase in food prices in Egypt was 
viewed as a threat to the stability of the regime.116 
In 1981, Sadat was assassinated and Mubarak became president. Mubarak 
established his legitimacy by strengthening the military, which was the key supporter 
of his regime. He gained their loyalty through extensive military spending and pay 
rises. This thesis argues that pressure from the IMF forced the Egyptian regime to 
use lethal force against peaceful civilians who were protesting against cutting 
subsidies. Debt was used as another justification for the state of emergency to protect 
the security of the regime. 
6.4.3 Mubarak’s era and the introduction of a neoliberal economy 
During Mubarak’s era, the military continued its control and expanded its power to 
gain more privileges, including increasing its extra-legal oversight in different 
sectors, from petroleum to terrorism. It also maintained its influence in the industrial 
and financial sectors.117 At the same time, Mubarak’s regime inherited Sadat’s open-
door policy, which fostered a bourgeois society, increased reliance on imported 
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products and increased the defects and the debt. The regime depended on external aid 
to relieve the pressure and correct the imbalance.118 
In 1986, the regime used force against police conscripts who were demanding an 
increase in wages from approximately $4 per month. The conscripts also 
demonstrated against their officers and accused them of treating them badly, beating 
them with sticks and using them in their homes as servants.119 The regime imposed a 
curfew throughout Egypt and called on the army to restore order among the police 
conscripts in the Central Security Forces who were involved in the street 
demonstrations. During the intervention,120 107 people died and 715 were injured.121 
In 1987, Egypt and the IMF signed a structural adjustment agreement because of 
economic instability and debt. Egypt sped up privatisation by cutting tariffs and 
taxes, which affected workers by threatening their jobs, implementing longer shifts 
and reducing wages.122 In the late 1980s, Egypt was severely in debt because of its 
trade imbalance and reliance on external aid. In March 1990, an SAP was begun 
under pressure from the World Bank. In May 1991, Egypt signed an agreement with 
the IMF to receive a conditional loan of $372 million in exchange for a plan to 
privatise public enterprises and liberate prices, trade and the exchange rate.123 Egypt 
suffered from a large financial deficit, and increased public debt placed the Egyptian 
regime under pressure from the IMF to adopt a plan to raise investments, bring the 
fiscal deficit and public debt under control, and decrease taxes to make Egypt an 
attractive place for foreign investment.124 
In 2002, Mubarak created a policy committee headed by his son, Gamal Mubarak. 
The committee aimed to replace the old guard of the regime with professionals, 
including young businesspeople, professors and politicians, to prepare them to 
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establish development programs and serve as ministers in the government.125 The 
new guard, consisting of businesspeople and politicians, was headed by Gamal. This 
represented a de facto marriage between money and power. Their membership in the 
National Democratic Party and the parliament helped them to monopolise firm 
industries, and they depended on general immunity from prosecution if they were 
accused of corruption.126 
This neoliberal economy gave the new guard the opportunity to dominate the top 
positions in the country. As a result, the strategic market of iron and steel, which was 
owned by three companies, controlled 90% of Egypt’s total production. Over 50% of 
this share was taken by the company owned by the former chair of the parliamentary 
economic committee and the National Democratic Party, Ahmed Ezz.127 
The IMF and the World Bank pushed for a liberal economy, private investment, 
privatisation of the public sector and cutting of state subsidies.128 The neoliberal 
economy and corrupt bureaucracies increased poverty and the gap between the rich 
and the poor.129 Most Egyptians felt that they did not receive any benefits from the 
improvements, and they blamed the regime for the country’s economic problems.130 
In exchange for US aid, the Egyptian regime gave the US privileges such as minimal 
fees in the Suez Canal. According to the US Government accounting office, between 
2001 and 2005, Egypt gave permission for 36,553 US military aircraft and 861 US 
naval ships to pass through the Suez Canal.131 
This thesis argues that the neoliberal policy failed to achieve its goals for the 
following reasons: 
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1. The IMF used debt as a tool to pressure Egypt to adopt policies that resulted 
in poverty and injustice. 
2. The privatisation suggested by the IMF benefited a certain group of 
businesspeople and increased corruption and economic problems. 
3. Pressure from the IMF gave the Egyptian regime justification to use a state 
of emergency to tackle Egyptian people’s anger and use harsh measures 
against them. This was justified as protecting national security. These harsh 
measures led to the 2011 revolution. 
4. US aid benefited the Egyptian military and enshrined its hidden deep state 
empire. 
6.5 Egyptian Economy, International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank After the 2011 Revolution 
Egypt has a large population, and two-thirds of Egyptians are aged under 30. 
Poverty, inequality of income and the gap between the rich and the poor have 
increased, and these internal challenges have made the democratic transition 
difficult. 
After 2011, Egypt suffered from high deficits in trade and state spending. Inflation 
caused public debt to grow and external investments to shrink.132 University 
education had produced a large number of graduates—most of whom were unlikely 
to obtain a job in the future.133 Egypt is considered to have a low standard of living 
compared with other countries. As a result of unequal and unfair wealth distribution, 
20–30% of Egyptians live below the poverty line, with poor healthcare, limited food 
supplies, unclean water and crowded houses.134 The gap between the rich and the 
poor was one of the causes of social unrest that led to the 2011 Egyptian revolution. 
Egypt also suffered from poor economic performance, corruption and social 
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injustice, with around 10% of Egyptians controlling one-third of the country’s entire 
income.135 
On 25 February 2011, the Egyptian revolution began with a peaceful demonstration 
against the authoritarian regime. Protesters called for the abolition of the state of 
emergency, more freedom, social justice and an end to corruption, high 
unemployment and inflated food prices. Afterwards, Egypt faced a severe economic 
crisis because of instability, shrinking investments and high debts. In May 2011, 
Egypt requested $3.2 billion from the IMF to cover the economic damage from the 
2011 revolution. This was delayed because of public pressure, with Egyptians 
believing that the IMF and the World Bank were associated with their financial 
problems. This was because a small group of business elite connected to Gamal 
Mubarak’s sons benefited from privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalisation, 
while the IMF simultaneously imposed heavy burdens on the poor. The Egyptian 
people called the structural reform package ‘a package of bondage and slavery’ that 
would force Egypt to sell its pyramids.136 In general, Egyptians opposed the IMF for 
the following reasons: 
1. Their previous dealings with the IMF had caused financial hardship for 
people on low incomes. 
2. The military opposed the IMF’s loan because it posed a threat to the 
military’s economic empire. 
3. Public sector employees rejected the IMF’s loan because it would reduce the 
size of the public sector by 6 million employees, which accounted for one-
quarter of Egypt’s budget.137 
In August 2012, as a result of political and economic instability, the Egyptian 
government resumed negotiations with the IMF for a loan of $4.8 billion. The initial 
agreement was signed in November 2012, but on 10 December 2012, the agreement 
did not proceed. Morsi postponed signing the IMF loan because of pressure from the 
Egyptian people over delayed tax reforms and the cutting of energy subsidies. 
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The US and Europe pressured Morsi to accept the IMF’s loan agreement in the 
following ways: 
1. The US secretary of state, John Kerry, stated that Washington would support 
Egypt with $190 million of the $450 million pledged for the budget support 
fund for Egypt if Morsi agreed to sign the IMF agreement. Kerry urged 
Morsi to agree to the IMF’s terms. 
2. European officials promised to support Egypt’s economy with $6.5 billion, 
including $590 million from the European Union in 2011–2013, $1.3 billion 
in macro financial aid, concessional loans and grants, potential lending from 
the European Investment Bank of up to $2.2 billion from 2012 to 2013 and 
$1.3 billion per year for the next two years from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. However, while $900 million of these 
loans were unconditional, Egypt needed to sign and adopt the IMF’s 
agreement to gain access to the rest.138 
3. The World Bank funded only eight projects in Egypt from 2011 to 2013, 
costing a total of $1.6 billion. The World Bank stated that if Egypt required 
more loans, it first needed to accept the IMF’s agreement. The African 
Development Bank funded only four projects in Egypt in 2011 and none in 
2012. It asked Egypt to sign an agreement with the IMF before any further 
loans would be granted.139 
This thesis suggests that the US and Europe placed too much pressure on the 
Egyptian government to accept the IMF’s agreement instead of supporting Egypt’s 
economy with concessional and unconditional loans. The IMF claimed that its 
structural measures would reduce poverty, improve living standards and open new 
schools, hospitals and universities; however, in reality, the IMF’s measures increased 
poverty, decreased employment, increased taxes and increased fuel and bread prices, 
which affected only the poor. 
On 3 July 2013, a coup overthrew Morsi. The US did not criticise the coup; instead, 
a US spokesperson declared that the US could not reverse the will of ‘22 million who 
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spoke out and had their voices heard’.140 The US claimed that the military coup was 
the result of the people’s revolution. The US considered the coup a legitimate action, 
and the Pentagon then announced that the US would proceed to sell F-16s to Egypt 
as previously planned.141 According to reports at the time, the US was the main 
source of Egypt’s military weapons, as outlined below: 
1. The Obama administration asked Congress to approve $1.3 billion as a 
military aid for the 2011 fiscal year. 
2. The US–Egyptian co-production of the M1A1 Abrams battle tank is a 
cornerstone of the US’ military assistance. Egypt planned to acquire 1,200 of 
the tanks, and General Dynamics Corp was the prime contractor for the 
program. 
3. Lockheed Martin Corp built 20 new advanced F-16C/D fighter aircraft for 
Egypt. The final Egyptian F-16 under contract was delivered in 2013 to join 
the 240 Egypt had already purchased, according to Lockheed Martin, the 
Pentagon’s biggest supplier by sales. 
4. Egypt was the first Arab country to buy F-16s, widely viewed as a symbol of 
political and security ties with the US. 
5. The US has also supplied Boeing CH-47D Chinook transport helicopters, 
Northrop Grumman Corp E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning 
Command and Control aircraft and Patriot air defence systems built by 
Lockheed and Raytheon, respectively.142 
The support of the US and Europe was a mixture of cynicism and hypocrisy. For 
example, US Department spokesperson Jen Psaki declared, ‘certainly there have 
been some significant bumps in the road, but our focus is getting back on a path to 
democracy’.143 The initial aim of the Egyptian military, local crony capitalists and 
the US in instituting the coup of 2013 was to oust the Muslim Brotherhood, but the 
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ultimate target was to combat the working class that opposed the free market and 
pro-imperialist policies.144 
In 2014, the Egyptian government began reforms that were endorsed by the World 
Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank through parallel financing. The 
first wave of reforms focused on reducing energy subsidies, containing the high 
growth of wage bill and the liberation of the Egyptian pound. The second wave of 
reforms included encouraging an investment climate and improving governance by 
reforming the civil service. The reform law of 2016 removed investment barriers and 
encouraged foreign and local investment by reforming industrial licensing laws, 
investment laws and company laws.145 
In August 2016, the Egyptian government and the IMF signed an agreement to grant 
Egypt a $12 billion loan over three years to rebalance the currency market and 
reduce the budget deficit.146 Egyptian economist Wael al-Nahas stated that ‘it was a 
mistake to resort to the IMF in the first place’. He noted that public debt reached £3.5 
trillion (about US$168.2 billion in three years).147 Egypt’s external debt reached $60 
billion in the first quarter of 2016/2017. Under pressure from the IMF, Egypt 
implemented a series of reforms that focused on improving the governance and 
investment climate. A free-floating currency caused the cost of production and raw 
materials to rise and forced a reduction in energy subsidies.148 
6.6 Conclusion 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the Middle East has been crucial to the 
world energy strategy, especially for the US. Egypt found itself at the centre of this 
strategy because of its strategic geopolitical position. The intervention of the US as 
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part of the 1952 coup caused Egypt to lose its sovereignty and increasingly rely on 
US aid. This aid amounted to approximately $1.3 billion a year, which was used to 
help the Egyptian military purchase tear gas and tanks, which have often been used 
to suppress opponents. 
Nasser’s socialism and nationalisation program initially succeeded in supporting the 
growth of Egypt’s economy, including nationalising the Suez Canal. However, 
Nasser’s strategy only increased the military’s tight grip and enshrined authoritarian 
rule. Sadat’s open-door policy for investment failed to achieve its goals of national 
economic development because of heavy reliance on US aid and importation. 
Mubarak’s neoliberal policy increased privatisation, which benefited a group of 
businesspeople and increased poverty and corruption. 
Since 1952, the military has controlled most of Egypt’s economy. During this period, 
the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO have also come to control the world’s 
wealth, particularly in relation to developing countries. Western powers have 
supported successive regimes politically and financially to stabilise the regimes and 
gain their loyalty to serve the interests of Western powers. Neo-imperialist 
organisations including the IMF, the World Bank have placed pressure on different 
political regimes to use demonstrations, protests and economic instability to maintain 
a state of emergency. However, this has been a mechanism to serve the interests of 
the Western powers and ensure their access to cheap raw materials and markets for 
their higher-priced manufactured goods. 
For Egypt, resorting to reliance on the IMF and the World Bank has only served to 
increase prices, which has in turn increased poverty and inflation among Egyptians. 
Many people believe that the US should support Egyptians and their demands for a 
civilian country and end the US’ economic and military intervention in Egypt; 
however, this has not happened. Cutting subsidies, especially on fuel and bread, will 
lead to more political instability because it will only affect people on low incomes. 
This thesis suggests that different political regimes in Egypt have had limited 
opportunities to manoeuvre and escape from the structural reforms enforced by the 
IMF through debt pressure, and this has stifled any attempts within Egypt to become 
a democratically independent nation. The next chapter examines the deep state in 
Egypt. 
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Chapter 7: Deep State in Egypt 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter began to analyse the deep state in Egypt, to the extent that 
actual rule has continued to be exercised by overseas powers long after formal 
independence. This chapter focuses on the real but covert exercise of political power 
by elite groups within the country, both directly and indirectly supported by such 
overseas interference. 
Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak ruled Egypt as civilians with military backgrounds, but 
the centre of power and decision-making remained exclusively in the hands of the 
military,1 which used cosmetic changes rather than real changes to control opposition 
to the regime. The deep state prevented the development of a democratic state in 
Egypt because a democratic state would have posed a threat to deep state interests. 
Britain used martial law to protect its political and economic interests, and 
successive postcolonial political regimes used the war between the Arabs and Israel 
to justify the continuous and permanent state of emergency. After the assassination 
of Sadat in 1981, the regime justified the continuous and permanent state of 
emergency by arguing that it was necessary to fight terrorism and combat drug 
trafficking. After 2011, the regime justified the continuous state of emergency as 
necessary for fighting terrorism and protecting the gains made during the revolution. 
Contemporary imperialist assistance used debt and aid pressure to enforce policies 
that helped enshrine the authoritarian regime, which was headed by the military and 
a group of minority businesspeople who benefited from privatisation and increased 
poverty. Thus, Egypt has essentially suffered from a continuous and permanent state 
of emergency for the past 100 years or more. Traditional emergency power theories 
have failed to explain and justify the permanent state of emergency in Egypt. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to find another theory to examine, or help account for, the 
continuous state of emergency. 
Different political regimes have at times been under threat from most of the working 
class because of poverty, inequality and the increased gap between the rich and the 
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poor. Successive regimes have used emergency and exceptional laws to grant 
themselves more power, which they justified as necessary for maintaining national 
and public order. The continuous state of emergency gave regimes the opportunity to 
stabilise and protect their political and economic interests. In effect, the continuous 
state of emergency has been a tool used by those who comprise the deep state in 
Egypt to ensure that their interests are protected. 
Several questions need to be asked to examine the deep state in Egypt: 
1. What is the nature of the deep state? 
2. Who really exercised power? 
3. Why did the deep state in Egypt require a state of emergency to rule, while at 
the same time liberal democratic countries ruled without a state of 
emergency? 
To examine the deep state and its political and economic interests, this thesis 
discusses different factors that helped shape the current Egyptian deep state, as 
follows: 
• the nature of power and the meaning of the deep state 
• the separation of power 
• the political rule of the Egyptian military 
• the economic rule of the military as the head of the deep state 
• the deep state and the media 
• elite businesspeople and the deep state 
• fake opposition. 
This chapter examines the deep state in Egypt to show how political and economic 
interests have been behind the continuous use of the state of emergency. Further, it 
shows who really benefited from the continuous and permanent state of emergency. 
7.2 Nature of State Power 
In examining the nature of state power, it is important to consider the key sources of 
all social power to obtain a better idea of who really exercises power and which 
groups benefit from exercising this power. In Western democratic countries, this 
tends to be big business and lobbyists. In autocratic countries, the military elite often 
benefit from exercising this power. 
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7.2.1 Miliband’s nature of social power 
Miliband examined the nature of social power and developed a theory of social class 
based on the extended use of social power. He constructed a model of the nature of 
the contemporary state and used it to explain economic, political, legal and military 
power in liberal democratic countries.2 On the basis of this analysis, Miliband 
developed a class map of capitalist society. Miliband’s work can be used as a guide 
in discussing a class map of advanced capitalist societies. Miliband explained three 
main sources of domination: 
1. control over the main means of economic activity, involving direct power 
over investment, employment and technological development 
2. control over the means of state administration, including control of the army 
and the police 
3. control over the means of communication, including newspapers, television, 
the internet, education institutions and lobbying. 
Miliband drew a pyramid with eight levels, distinguished by the exercise of 
qualitatively different levels of social power. The first four levels contain the 
dominant class. Levels one and two are the power elite. This includes capitalist 
owners and controllers of the biggest commercial, financial and industrial 
corporations that exercise economic power and control mass communications media, 
as well as senior politicians, public servants and judges who exercise major political 
and legal power. The economic power of the former group in directing investment 
and employment translates into political power of creation and application of law. 
They can offer politicians huge financial rewards of campaign funding, future 
directorships, tax revenues from investments and positive media coverage, as well as 
huge threats of withdrawal of all such support. This underpins all ongoing and 
largely covert ‘lobbying’ of lawmakers by business interests. Levels three and four 
represent the dominant class, but not the power elite. Level three comprises people 
who control and own a number of medium-sized firms. Level four represents a large 
professional class of lawyers, accountants, middle-rank civil servants and military 
personnel.3 Levels five and six represent the petty bourgeoisie or lower-middle class 
of small business owners. Level seven represents the vast aggregate of people in 
                                                          
2 Ralph Miliband, Divided Societies (Oxford University Press, 1991) 19–21. 
3 Ibid. 
 231 
advanced capitalist societies who live on the sale of their labour power or on state-
supported social welfare. Finally, level eight represents the underclass, including 
sick, retired, unemployed and disabled people.4 
7.2.2 State power in liberal democracies 
Vital questions need to be asked about how elite groups within most liberal 
democracies, distinguished by vastly greater wealth and power than that of the 
majority, manage to rule without using a continuous state of emergency, while at the 
same time, other political elite groups have been unable to rule, and they enjoy the 
benefits of their position without using a continuous state of emergency. The simple 
answer is that such elites within liberal democratic countries have been able to 
employ a range of strategies that are not available to elite groups in less 
economically developed circumstances. This includes: 
• controlling the labour movement by engaging them in the political and 
parliamentary scene 
• imposing certain constraints to release pressure from the lower classes using 
the rule of law, national security and defence of freedom and justice.5 
The deep state in liberal democracies functions through: 
• the rule of law/democracy and the separation of powers 
• the executive directly and indirectly enforcing laws and applying policy 
• an independent judiciary applying laws. 
This thesis argues that every capitalist state has its own deep state of business elite 
with the power to influence lawmaking and the applications of law and policy. The 
minority capitalist class in liberal democracies is wealthy and manages to give 
concessions by paying reasonable wages, creating reasonable working environments 
and allowing unions, freedom of expression and free elections. At the same time, the 
group serves its own interests and gains sufficient popular support by controlling the 
ideology and convincing ordinary people to adhere to this ideology through the 
media, sport and elections. Even with these concessions to freedom and democracy, 
the capitalist class in liberal democratic states can still make huge profits. They 
should recognise that handing over any significant amount of their power to the 
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military could threaten and constrain their movements and redirect increasing 
amounts of profit to the military. 
The exception of an advanced liberal democracy lapsing into a military police state 
was Germany in the 1930s. As discussed in the previous chapter, heavy industrial 
capital—particularly the Krups and the Thyssen’s—saw such a move as favourable 
or necessary to combat communism, pull the country out of recession and drive rapid 
economic growth through militarisation. However, their support for Hitler’s rise to 
power inevitably led to greater Nazi involvement in the running of their business 
operations.6 
7.2.3 State power in Egypt 
In the case of Egypt, when Britain left, the military filled the gap without any ready 
plan. There was no strong Egyptian capitalist class to take over and lead the country, 
and most people in the capitalist class were foreigners. Different political regimes in 
Egypt have used different policies, but with the same goals. These policies increased 
and expanded the rule of the military. 
After 1952, the military controlled the main economy and nationalised the Suez 
Canal and the banks. The country was then run using state capitalism. This failed 
because Nasser used the capitalist state to consolidate his power and maintain the 
military as the main player in Egypt. He used the constitution and emergency law as 
sources of power to legalise the actions of the regime. After 1970, privatisation 
began benefiting a minority of people in Egypt in the form of the business elite of 
crony capitalists. 
From 1980 onwards, a different group of crony capitalists—namely, friends and 
relatives of those in Mubarak’s regime—benefited from neoliberalism. After 2011, 
the military regained control of the economy, which benefited a minority of 
businesspeople who had close ties with the regime. Different political regimes in 
Egypt failed to gain the support of the working class by paying reasonable wages and 
building a welfare state. Successive regimes did not want to give any concessions to 
the working class, which cost them their legitimacy. 
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As a result of years of injustice, the wealth gap, poverty and lack of freedom, the 
working class began to feel that a group of people-controlled Egypt politically and 
benefited economically, leaving most people suffering and struggling to pay their 
expenses. Different political regimes used the continuous state of emergency and 
exceptional laws in Egypt to prevent people from rising up against them. Emergency 
law gave them the power to suppress the working class and prevent any threat to 
their position and interests. 
7.3 Deep State Examples and Comparisons 
Based on Miliband’s discussion of the nature of power, it is worth examining 
different kinds of deep state to help define the deep state that can be observed in 
Egypt. In this way, we can identify the similarities and differences between different 
kinds of deep states to discover who is really exercising power and benefiting. This 
research uses Brown’s definition of the deep state and discusses examples of the 
deep state in the US, Turkey and Thailand. 
7.3.1 Definition of the deep state 
While limited studies have examined and explained the concept of the deep state and 
its roots, several authors have drawn attention to what they call the ‘dual state’, 
‘parallel state’ or ‘deep state’. The reason for examining different meanings of the 
deep state is to discern whether all deep states have the same framework, the same 
elite and the same objectives. 
Focusing only on the Egyptian situation, Brown defined the deep state as a ‘group of 
senior officials or critical institutions that collectively manage the entire political 
system—senior military officers, the security apparatus, intelligence agencies, and 
sometimes judges and some senior bureaucrats.7 This thesis argues that this 
definition is too narrow, even in relation to Egypt’s situation. The definition needs to 
be expanded to include the business elite, the media and the fake opposition. In 
addition, Brown’s definition ignores the reality in developing countries, whereby 
political and economic support from Western powers and the debt pressure used by 
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neo-imperialist organisations play an important role in the operation of the deep 
state. 
Merieau defined the deep state as a state within the state, composed of state agents, 
over which civilian governments have limited or no control. According to this 
definition, the deep state has its own ideological support system and its own 
hierarchy. It manipulates public opinion using different tactics, including creating 
crises and national emergencies.8 This thesis argues that this definition ignores 
important elements such as military rule, the goals behind creating crises or national 
emergencies, and the ideological control of the people. 
Wilson refers to the deep state as a dual state, which is ‘a state in which one can 
distinguish between a public state and a top-down deep state. The deep state emerges 
in false-flag violence, is organised by the military and intelligence apparatus and 
involves their link to organised crime’.9 This thesis suggests that this definition is too 
narrow because it does not include the rest of the elite of the deep state. As the head 
of the deep state in many autocratic sates, the military uses exceptional laws to 
suppress and justify its measures. 
The deep state arises in democratic and non-democratic countries. Democratic 
countries are ruled by an elite—a minority group of rich, powerful and influential 
businesspeople who work together to place pressure on senior politicians, public 
servants and lawmakers. Countries without liberal democratic institutions and 
practices are usually ruled by the military, by a civilian president without any 
authority, by a civilian with a military background or by undemocratic civilian rule. 
In autocratic countries, the president rules using different tactics and uses force 
against opponents. Autocratic regimes depend on the political and economic powers 
of the military to consolidate their rule and serve their agendas under the guise of 
protecting national security and democracy. 
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7.3.2 Deep state in the United States 
As a result of the lack of literature discussing the deep state, this thesis provides a 
recent definition of the US deep state. Lofgren stated that the deep state in the US is: 
A hybrid association of elements of government and parts of top-level finance and 
industry that is effectively able to govern the US without reference to the consent 
of the governed as expressed through the formal political process.10 
He added that it is not: 
A secret, conspiratorial cabal; the state within a state is hiding mostly in plain 
sight, and its operators mainly act in the light of day, it is not a tight-knit group 
and has no clear objective. Rather, it is a sprawling network, stretching across the 
government and into the private sector.11 
The concept of national security is used by both the formal and the deep states. The 
protection of the country from foreign and domestic enemies is used to justify many 
actions and policies. The deep state extends the umbrella of secrecy not only to 
protect the state, but also to cover up things that are politically untenable.12 Miliband 
examined the US deep state, which he discovered was dominated by the power elite 
controlling the major industrial, commercial and financial institutions in the US. 
This thesis argues that the US deep state includes a group of elite civilians and 
military personnel. It is a de facto marriage between the business elite, including 
bankers, oil companies and the military. The concept of national security is used to 
increase and consolidate the deep state’s power inside and outside the US, to 
generate more profit and to increase its tight grip on financial and political interests. 
Miliband stated that: 
The military occupy a distinct place in the system, but their power is not such as to 
give them a co-equal place with the other two groups. This is not to deny them a 
great deal of influence, authority and power, particularly in crisis situations and in 
war time. For the most part, however, the political regimes of advanced capitalism 
have tended to be civilian-oriented, with the military kept fairly effectively in 
subordinate positions.13 
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Miliband built his theory around Western capitalist countries, in which the military is 
not the main player, except in wartime. There are cultural and political differences 
between developing and developed countries. For example, in the deep states of 
Turkey, Thailand and Egypt, the military plays a major role in controlling these 
countries to protect its political and economic interests. 
7.3.3 Deep state in Turkey 
Turkey’s deep state operates under official cover, without any accountability, and is 
mobilised by top military commanders.14 The deep state in Turkey can be traced 
back to the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), a secret society of civil and 
military organisations that was established in 1913 by the Committee of Union and 
Progress, which was abolished after the 1918 war. Its underground network became 
the base of the Anatolian Resistance during the War of Independence led by Mustafa 
Kemal (Atatürk), who established the Republic of Turkey in 1923.15 In 1930, the 
new Republic of Turkey adopted the Kemalist ideology based on modern 
Westernisation projects, which aimed at uniting society with the military under the 
secular monolithic nation state of Turkey. When Atatürk died on 10 November 1938, 
Turkish military forces used Kemalism to gain power. They abolished the multi-
party system in 1946.16 During the 1950s, a group of Turkish politicians formed a 
coalition called derin devlet, or the deep state, which was blamed for the death of 
thousands of Turkish people.17 
The military suspended democracy through a series of five coups.18 Two coups took 
place in 1960, when the military arrested and executed the prime minister, Adnan 
Mendres. In 1971, the military forced the civilian government to resign. In the 1980 
coup, the military was accused of killing and detaining thousands of people. A new 
constitution was established, which granted the military the explicit power to 
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overthrow a civilian government.19 Bloodless military interventions again took place 
in 1997. After a number of ultimatums from the military, Prime Minister Erbakan 
resigned, and his party, the Welfare Party, was banned. The military accused him of 
opposing plans to enter the European Union and move closer to Islamists.20 
Minimising the rule of the military in Turkey went through different stages, as 
follows: 
• The Turkish military assumed responsibility for guaranteeing the republic’s 
constitution. Turkey’s constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982 stated that the 
duty of its armed forces was to protect and safeguard Turkish territory and the 
Turkish republic.21 
• The Turkish military used this constitutional authorisation to justify its 
interference in the political realm by seizing power in 1960 and 1980 and 
forcing the resignation of the government in 1971 and 1997.22 
• In September 2001, Turkey’s parliament amended the 1982 constitution to 
ensure that the Constitutional Court of Turkey could review any decision 
involving the maintenance of freedoms and allegations of unconstitutionality. 
Therefore, the military could no longer act upon allegations of 
unconstitutional acts until there had been a court review. 
• In addition, in July 2003, the Grand National Assembly passed a reform 
package that called for a civilian to lead the National Security Council.23 
• The 2000s saw the gradual decline of Turkey’s deep state, but not the end of 
the development of democracy targeted the Turkish military and the 
distribution of power changed profoundly. 
• On 15 July 2016, the military and the followers of Fethullah Gülen were 
accused of a failed coup attempt against Erdogan.24 Gülen was a Muslim 
preacher who supervised a religious and educational organisation in around 
30 countries. His followers operated a wide network of schools, colleges, 
newspapers and television channels. Approximately 265 people died and 
1,400 were injured in the failed coup. Thousands of military personnel, police 
and followers of Gülen were arrested and detained after the failed military 
coup. 
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This thesis suggests that Turkey’s deep state first functioned as a secret organisation 
and then developed to include the Turkish military as the head of the deep state, with 
the support of Western powers. The military used the judiciary, as well as a group of 
businesspeople who controlled the media and universities, to maintain its tight grip 
on the country. 
7.3.4 Deep state in Thailand 
Thailand’s deep state is composed of people of various ranks, spanning from low-
ranking civil servants to the highest-ranking officials. They are all opposed to taking 
orders from the elected government. In their opinion, the elected government is 
incapable of administering Thailand. They use the monarchy (royal legitimacy) as 
their symbolic vehicle to strengthen their social, economic and political order. Royal 
legitimacy derives from the king’s practice of the 10 Buddhist virtues and is used to 
consolidate the power of the deep state.25 
After the king of Thailand died on 13 October 2016, the deep state found a new 
source of legitimacy based on legal, rational legitimacy through the judiciary. Judges 
had an informal role as the representatives of the king and were authorised to use 
extra power in times of crisis.26 
This thesis suggests that the military in Thailand’s deep state is the head and main 
ruler of the country. The deep state first used the monarchy as its justification to 
consolidate its power, and then used the judiciary as an extra tool to increase its 
legitimacy and to continue to protect its political and economic interests. 
7.3.5 Similarities and differences between the deep state in Egypt and that of 
other countries 
The main similarities between the deep state in Egypt and that of the three countries 
considered above are as follows: 
1. The deep state is based on the military, police, the judiciary and the business 
elite. 
2. The deep state functions in secret and is invisible and unaccountable to the 
state. 
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3. The deep state uses the constitution and the law to consolidate and enshrine 
its power. 
4. The deep state prevents any civilian-elected government from genuine 
representation of the elector’s interests. 
5. The deep state uses ideological concepts—such as royal legitimacy in 
Thailand, protecting Kemalist ideology in Turkey, protecting the gains of the 
revolution and protecting the country from anti-revolution in Egypt—to 
consolidate and gain more power. 
6. The media and press, controlled by the government and businesspeople, play 
a crucial role in mobilising public opinion. 
The main differences between the Egyptian deep state and that of other countries are 
as follows: 
1. The legislative branch was part of the deep state elite in Egypt. 
2. The deep state in Egypt created a fake opposition to prevent a civilian 
president from performing his duties. 
3. The role of Western powers and neo-colonial organisations was visible and 
supported the deep state and its elite in Egypt. 
4. The military in Egypt controlled 5–40% of Egypt’s economy. 
5. The presidents of Egypt all had military backgrounds, except for Morsi. 
6. The deep state in Egypt includes effective businesspeople who share an 
interest in controlling the country. 
This thesis finds that the Miliband model is helpful and relevant in an examination of 
deep states, while making the following notes: 
1. The Miliband model is based on Western democratic countries. 
2. The US deep state was controlled by levels one and two of Miliband’s class 
map pyramid. In the US, the deep state exercises power through corporate 
lobbying and national security apparatus and arms companies to control the 
economy and ideology. However, Miliband neglected to examine the role of 
US neo-imperialist organisations such as the IMF and the WTO. 
3. In Thailand and Turkey, the military were the main authorities that exercised 
power. 
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4. The Egyptian military used the legal vacuum left by Britain. The regime 
used economic power and the ideology of being the guardian of Egypt to 
maintain control of the country. 
5. US aid to the Egyptian regime caused Egypt to lose its sovereignty. 
6. The IMF and the World Bank used debt pressure to force Egypt to adopt 
certain programs. 
7. The role of the legislature and the judiciary was as a rubber stamp for 
executive actions. 
8. The media and fake opposition were used to change people’s ideology. 
7.3.6 Broader definition of the deep state 
Thus, a broader definition of the deep state is needed than what is offered by most 
deep state theorists to encompass the diversity of real-world deep states. In some 
cases, powerful national capitalist classes play a central role; in others, foreign 
capital, international organisations and different national groups included the military 
substitute for such national capital. However, a more precise definition of the form of 
the deep state in Egypt is also needed. This thesis argues that the following defines 
the deep state in relation to Egypt. 
The deep state is a group of elites, headed by the military, anti-revolutionaries from 
the old regime, crony capitalists who benefit from having political and economic 
power, the judiciary, the business elite, fake opposition and the media. External 
financial and political support for the deep state comes from Western powers and the 
debt pressure imposed by neo-colonial organisations. This enables the deep state to 
continue controlling the country and to protect and stabilise its interests, thereby 
preventing any sharing of political and economic power. 
The Egyptian deep state can also be defined as a hidden empire that functions as a 
state within a state, headed by the military and its elite. This secret empire has its 
own loyal members who work secretly for their own political and economic interests. 
7.3.7 Role of the military in the deep state in Egypt 
The military has consistently used class division in Egypt to control the country for 
its own interests. There are numerous examples of this: 
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• During the 1919 revolution, the Wafd Party consisted of bourgeois 
nationalists who represented the urban and rural middle class, the owners of 
medium-sized agricultural properties and the urban effendiyya such as 
teachers, lawyers and Westernised journalists.27 
• The social base for Nasser consisted of army officers, civil servants, teachers, 
sons of merchants, wealthier peasants and small-scale landowners.28 
The military has also used ideology to convince people to accept its rule. For 
example: 
1. For 60 years, the military depended on the myth of the 1952 coup and called 
it a revolution. 
2. The regime used the 1956 Suez Canal, 1973 war and 2011 revolution to 
show that the army and the people were one. 
3. The military used propaganda, institutional power, security apparatus and 
hidden economic independence to maintain and enforce the military rule.29 
Before the 2011 revolution, the military was concerned about the new class of crony 
capitalists built by Mubarak and his son, Gamal, who tried to establish a new elite in 
Egypt. The military feared that the new elite would pose a threat to its political and 
economic interests in Egypt. The old military guard feared that Mubarak would 
transfer his power to his son, who was not from a military background.30 The 
military sped up Mubarak’s resignation during the uprising in 2011. Increasing 
liabilities, such as corruption and the benefits flowing to a small group of family and 
friends, affected the whole institutional power, especially the power of the military. 
At the same time, the US could no longer support Mubarak.31 
The public’s demands in the 2011 revolution included an end to corruption and fair 
distribution of wealth and income among Egyptians. The Mubarak regime, his family 
and allies benefited from corruption, especially after the regime adopted a structural 
adjustment suggested by the IMF, which resulted in reduced government investments 
in health and education and increased poverty of most Egyptians. Simultaneously, 
the privatisation of the public sector benefited the regime’s allies. Loyal people were 
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appointed to top positions in state-owned firms to gain their loyalty.32 Corruption 
helped ignite the anger of the Egyptian people and was one of the reasons behind the 
revolution on 25 February 2011. However, corruption was one of the main tools of 
the deep state, so those within the deep state actively prevented the end of corruption 
in Egypt. 
On numerous occasions, the Egyptian regime has used repressive measures to falsify 
elections. For example, many opponents have been arrested, election supervisors 
from human rights organisations have been prevented from attending polling and 
citizens have been prevented from voting. This has been achieved by hiring thugs 
with knifes and machetes to disturb opposition voters, using physical force to expel 
independent voters or intimidate voters, and placing security forces and armed 
plainclothes police at each voting station.33 The police force has regularly supervised 
the voting and counting procedures in local legislative elections and the presidential 
referendum to ensure that the presidential party wins at least 75% of the votes and 
that most people vote in favour of the president. At the same time, the police force 
has arrested people in opposition and prevented them from voting. 
In the Egyptian parliament election of 2010, the ruling National Democratic Party, 
headed by President Mubarak, won all but 14 seats, which went to the opposition and 
independent candidates. The opposition claimed that the election was rigged and 
invalid, while the regime said that the voting was clean and free from irregularities.34 
Police used tear gas to clear the opposition supporters and arrested approximately 
1,000 people, 11 of whom were sentenced to up to two years in jail for handing out 
brochures and displaying information about campaigns.35 
While initially appearing to support the uprising in 2011, the military eventually 
physically opposed it and regained control during the transition period.36 As the 
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guarantor of the peace, the Egyptian military used the US’ fears over the peace treaty 
between Egypt and Israel to convince the US not to end its $1.3 billion aid to 
Egypt.37 The Egyptian military used national security and the shared border with 
Israel to enshrine its secretive, coercive, corporatist policies.38 
During the election battle between Morsi and Ahmad Shafiq in 2012, Shafiq’s 
supporters were upper-middle class and the elite from Mubarak’s regime. Morsi’s 
supporters were lower-income Egyptians from the working class.39 Said Sadek, a 
professor of political sociology at the American University in Cairo, noted that a 
‘sharpening’ of class divisions since the run-off was ‘reflected in political choices 
and voting’. He added that ‘urban, upper and middle class and lower delta voters 
support the civil state while Upper Egypt, North Sinai Bedouins and urban residents 
of poor squatter settlements support the theocratic state of the Brotherhood’.40 
The military used the division between political parties and their supporters—
especially between secular parties and the Muslim Brotherhood—to maintain its tight 
grip on Egypt.41 It was able to present clashes between different class groups as 
threats of disorder and the breakdown of the rule of law. 
7.3.8 Separation of powers and the rule of law 
This section discusses who is really exercising power and determines whether there 
is a real separation of powers or whether there is only one authority controlling all of 
the power. 
The separation of powers in a liberal democracy means that there are three branches 
of the government: executive, legislative and judicial. Power should be divided 
between these branches to ensure that none of the branches overuse or misuse their 
power. There should be an active checks and balances system to ensure that each 
branch is enforcing its rule without violating the separation of powers. 
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This thesis has already touched upon the great concentration of power in the hands of 
a small elite in advanced liberal democracies. In part, this derives from the weakness 
of real separation of powers, with effective executive domination of both the 
legislature and the judiciary. It is this concentration of executive power that becomes 
the conduit for covert exercise of power by the business elite, bypassing the 
legislature and the judiciary to place pressure on the political leadership. 
However, while there are serious real-world limitations on the separation of powers, 
typically including executive domination of both the legislature and the judiciary 
(which becomes the means for exercising political power by big business, acting 
directly through the political leadership), a degree of real power separation still 
represents a significant defence against totalitarian autocracy. 
Authoritarian regimes pretend to have a separation of powers in theory; however, in 
practice, it does not exist. The centralised government in Egypt, ruled by a president, 
is described as a presidential system, even though the president rules as a civilian. 
However, out of six presidents, five (Naguib, Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak and El-Sisi) 
were civilians with military backgrounds. The sixth, Morsi, was a civilian. 
Since 1952, Egypt has maintained the same structure, whereby the transfer of power 
occurs upon the death of the incumbent president. Exceptions to this rule are the 
2011 revolution that ousted Mubarak and the 2013 coup that deposed Morsi. 
According to the constitution, the Egyptian president has massive power, as follows: 
• They have the authority to select a prime minister and to dismiss them. That 
is, the president controls the executive authority. 
• They can also dissolve the Legislative Assembly at any time, except in the 
case of declaring a state of emergency. The Legislative Assembly is mostly 
ruled by a dominant party. For example, the National Democratic Party, 
which was headed by President Mubarak, usually won the majority of seats in 
the Egyptian assembly. The limited minority opposition had no actual power. 
This majority in the parliament gave the president the ability to pass any 
laws. Further, the regime benefited from controlling the parliamentary seats, 
especially the one reserved for peasants and workers.42 
                                                          
42 Shana Marshall, The Egyptian Armed Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire, Carnegie 
Middle Endowment for International Peace (15 April 2015) 3 <http://carnegie-
mec.org/2015/04/15/egyptian-armed-forces-and-remaking-of-economic-empire-pub-59726>. 
 245 
• The president can use their power to issue decrees, which have the same 
power as legislative laws, to avoid formal legislative procedures that usually 
take longer to be issued. 
• The president has the authority to appoint judges in the high Egyptian courts. 
This interference in the judiciary violates the separation of powers. Further, 
the law gives the president the authority to refer civilians to any military 
court.43 
Successive Egyptian regimes have prevented any meaningful efforts towards 
political changes, especially in relation to ensuring the separation of powers. If any 
changes were to be accepted by the military, they would be minor.44 In the case of 
Egypt, the military was, and remains, the head of the regime. It controls Egypt’s 
political and economic life. As discussed earlier, the military enshrined its authority 
through the constitution and different exceptional laws. The military (armed forces 
and military intelligence) are the sole decision-makers at the executive, legislative 
and judicial levels. Even presidential advisers, ministers and governors are from 
retired, high-ranking military and police backgrounds.45 
7.4 Egyptian Military and Police as the Heads of the Deep State 
7.4.1 Background 
When Muhammad Ali resumed power, he planned to turn Egypt into a powerful 
military country that was independent of the Ottoman Empire. At first, he succeeded 
in making the Egyptian army one of the most powerful armies in the Middle East. By 
1830, the Egyptian army and navy consisted of approximately 125,000 soldiers. The 
senior ranks of the army comprised Turco-Circassians, the middle and the technical 
officers were from the West and the native Egyptians comprised the middle- and 
low-ranking troops.46 
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Given Ali’s desires beyond Egypt’s borders, the great European powers felt that he 
would threaten the balance of power and their interests in the Middle East. Thus, 
they sought to reduce the Egyptian military and, in return, promised that they would 
enable Ali’s dynasty to rule Egypt forever.47 The European powers justified reducing 
the Egyptian army by arguing that Egypt needed to pay off its debt rather than 
enlarge its military. After Britain colonised Egypt, native Egyptian officers could not 
be promoted above the rank of colonel. The higher ranks were seized for non-native 
Egyptians. There were only four Egyptian colonels in the Egyptian army during this 
period, one of whom was Urabi Pasha.48 Urabi and his followers forced Tawfik 
Pasha to appoint a nationalist prime minister, Mahmud Sami al-Barudi. Urabi 
became the war minister and promoted 400 Egyptians while simultaneously 
dismissing 40 Turco-Circassian officers.49 
In response to this nationalist uprising, Britain invaded Egypt to protect its political 
and economic interests. Britain ousted the nationalists and defeated and captured 
Urabi. In his trial, Urabi stated that: 
In 1881 the Egyptian army was composed of twelve infantry regiments, in 1881, 
during the ministry of Uthaman Pasha Rifqi, it was decided to reduce it to only six 
regiments. The practice in Egypt was to tend to discriminate by race. And so, all 
promotions, decorations, and rewards went to those of the Circassian race … After 
this faction came that of the Turks and others who were not Egyptians, along with 
those of mixed origins. Thereafter came those Egyptians by race; they were 
neither promoted nor indeed employed except by necessity, only when others were 
not available.50 
To minimise the threat of the Egyptian army to British interests in Egypt, Britain 
reduced the Egyptian army from 80,000 to 6,000, and then increased it to 16,000 
light-armed soldiers in 1900.51 Decreasing the size of the Egyptian army and giving 
them light arms was a strategy to control the Egyptians and prevent them from 
having a powerful, efficient military. The Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936 gave the 
Egyptian government greater control over the military. Between 1936 and 1937, the 
government liberalised admissions for army officers. This had only been open to 
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noble families when Britain controlled the Egyptian army. The officers’ corps was 
opened up to all Egyptians, regardless of their family background.52 
After the 1952 coup, the Free Officers resumed power and ousted King Farouk. A 
British commentator of the day stated that: 
Basically, the Egyptian army has been built up not so much for the defence of 
Egypt as for the bolstering of Egyptian prestige and pride, and its senior officers 
are appointed on the basis of their political leanings rather than their military 
qualities. Many good officers have been dismissed … the senior ones for 
becoming too popular and the juniors for being too independent.53 
After 1952, the Free Officers showed no interest in having a democratically elected 
parliament. They labelled themselves anti-imperialist, anti-corruption and the 
servants of the nation. The country moved to a dictatorial rule in which one party 
became a vehicle of corruption and favouritism.54 Between 1952 and 1970, the 
Cabinet of Egypt was controlled by the military. Even when Nasser created the 
Liberation Rally and the Arab Socialist Union, three-quarters of the general 
administration were from a military background.55 The military maintained its tight 
control of the Egyptian administrative apparatus, preventing the executive authority 
from straying from its own control.56 The regime depended heavily on military 
officers, either being in service and retired, to control sensitive positions in Egypt. To 
gain their loyalty, the regime used the rule of the armed forces to enforce its policies 
and strategies. The regime offered the military supplementary salaries and extra 
income to gain their loyalty, and the military served as the primary tool to enshrine 
the president’s authority.57 To gain the loyalty of the military and police officers, 
successive regimes also offered scholarships for officers to study overseas, as well as 
advantages in housing, appliances and medical care. Finally, the regime gave priority 
to retired military and police personnel when appointing provincial governors and 
military commissioners in London, Paris and Washington. 
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7.4.2 Military interference in political life in Egypt after 2011 
The Egyptian armed forces became the major player, the cornerstone and redline 
zone that controlled Egypt’s political scene. After ousting President Mubarak, the 
SCAF resumed power. In 2013, the military ousted Morsi and appointed an interim 
government. In May 2014, El-Sisi became the president of Egypt. The opposition 
criticised the tight grip of the military forces on Egypt’s political and economic 
activities, calling on them to return to their barracks to secure the Egyptian border 
and not interfere with political life.58 
This section discusses the interference of military political in Egypt, especially by 
Egypt’s SCAF, and particularly since 2011. 
7.4.2.1 Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
The SCAF is Egypt’s highest military body. It was established by President Nasser 
under Law No 4 of 1968. Its main purpose was to run the armed forces during 
wartime.59 After the 1979 Camp David peace agreement, the SCAF became a 
ceremonial body.60 During the 2011 revolution, the SCAF did not declare emergency 
law because the country was already under a state of emergency. Instead, it issued 
Communique No 1, stating that the military would stand beside the Egyptian people 
and protect their achievements. Mubarak then announced that he would appoint a 
vice president, but the Egyptian people called for Mubarak’s resignation.61 
Before his resignation, Mubarak promised to modify the constitution to calm the 
angry Egyptians, but they continued to demonstrate until Mubarak resigned.62 As the 
main power in Egypt, the SCAF resumed rule and overturned the 1971 constitution. 
The SCAF then announced many constitutional declarations to expand its powers, as 
outlined below: 
1. The SCAF controlled the legislative and judiciary authorities and created 
military courts to try civilians. 
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2. The SCAF retained the right to appoint a defence minister so that the future 
president could not appoint a civilian defence minister. 
3. The SCAF retained the Supreme Constitutional Council, which consisted of 
eight committee members. They retained the power to dismiss and supervise 
the elections. 
4. General Tantawi, the head of the SCAF and the defence minister, ended the 
state of emergency in theory, but in practice, the state of emergency still 
applied for hooligans and thuggery. The charge of thuggery was mostly used 
to curtail anyone in opposition to the military. The military used its authority 
to try civilians before the military courts.63 
5. The military forces expanded the scope of their power and prevented any 
criticism against the military in the form of writing or drawing. On 
13 June 2012, the justice minister authorised the intelligence services and the 
military police to arrest civilians for six months if they criticised the military 
in this way. 
6. In a constitutional declaration on 17 June 2012, Article 53/2 stated that in the 
face of internal unrest, the president could issue a decision to direct the 
armed forces, with the approval of the SCAF, to maintain security and 
defend public property.64 
7. The SCAF tried to weaken the president before the election by forcing any 
new president to take the oath in front of the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
In the absence of the parliament, the SCAF had the power to appoint the 
members of the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
8. The SCAF limited the president’s power to declare war without the approval 
of the SCAF.65 
9. Instead of electing governors in Egypt, the military appointed 15 governors, 
most of whom were from a military background.66 
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10. The military issued a constitutional annex limiting the incoming president 
from holding power over the state budget. 
11. The military tried around 16,000 civilians who were involved in the 2011 
revolution before the military courts.67 
After ousting Morsi in 2013, the SCAF appointed an interim government headed by 
an interim president, Mansour. Mansour issued a presidential decree amending Law 
No 4 of 1968 by Law No 18 and 20 of 2014 regarding command and control.68 Law 
No 18 of 2014 specified the main criteria for appointing the defence minister to 
ensure that they had held the rank of major general for at least five years and had 
previously had a central role in the armed forces.69 Law No 18 of 2014 shows how 
the military prevented civilians from becoming the defence minister, or at least 
ensured that the military would influence who was appointed. 
In addition, the above presidential decree established a National Security Council to 
be headed by the president. This consisted of the prime minister, the speaker of the 
parliament, the parliamentary Defence and National Security Committee, the chief of 
the general intelligence services and the ministers of defence, interior, foreign affairs, 
justice, finance, health, communications and education. The law required the 
National Security Council to meet once every month and, in case of war, natural 
disaster or other emergency, they must sit in permanent session. Any decision made 
by the National Security Council required a majority vote. The main duties of the 
National Security Council were to establish strategies to preserve national security, 
define political goals, develop and implement initiatives, preserve Egypt’s identity, 
determine sources of threats and establish defensive measures in case of a crisis. 
The constitution gave the president the power to declare war and send Egyptian 
troops outside Egypt with the approval of the National Security Council and two-
thirds of the parliament. When the parliament was not in session, the president was 
required to seek approval from the cabinet, the defence council and the armed forces. 
According to Article 205 of the 2014 Egyptian constitution, the National Security 
Council could invite any relevant expert to attend the meeting without counting their 
vote. 
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Presidential Decree No 20 of 2014 stipulated that the SCAF would consist of 25 
members who would set the military and defence strategy and be responsible for 
building and operating the SCAF. Decree No 20 of 2014 gave the president and the 
defence minister the power to appoint a SCAF member and ensured that the defence 
minister would be the secretary general of the SCAF unless the president was in the 
meeting, in which case the president would head the meeting.70 
The military also established a National Defence Council. According to Article 203 
of the 2014 constitution, the National Defence Council comprises the president, the 
prime minister, the speaker of the parliament, the ministers of defence, foreign 
affairs, finance and the interior, the chief of the general intelligence services, the 
chief of staff of the armed forces, the commanders of the navy, air force and air 
defence, the chief of operations for the armed forces and the head of military 
intelligence. The main responsibility of the National Defence Council is to ensure the 
safety and security of the country and discuss the armed forces’ budget as a single 
figure in the state budget. Article 203 of the 2014 constitution enshrined the secrecy 
of the military budget, although it allowed the national committee of the House of 
Representatives to attend meetings, and it gave the president the authority to invite 
any expert without counting their vote. The secrecy of the military budget shows 
how the deep state aimed to hide its financial situation and the extent of its profits. 
7.4.2.2 Examining the political rule of the military 
The military is the strongest institution in Egypt. Except for Morsi, all Egyptian 
presidents have come from a military background. The military maintains its popular 
image as the protector of national security, public order and stability. 
At the start of the 2011 revolution, Egyptians stood up to the regime. However, when 
the revolution sparked wide demonstrations throughout Egypt, the interior ministry 
and its tool, the security forces, could not handle the situation. The military refused 
to use violence against Egyptian civilians,71 which increased its popularity. The 
military was observed to be the safeguard of Egyptian national security. After 
Mubarak resigned, the military forces resumed power and promised not to interfere 
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in politics. After facing pressure from Egyptian activists, the military handed over 
limited power to the civilian president for one year, but in reality, the military 
retained most of the power. The main reason for handing over power to a civilian 
president was to buy time and placate Egyptians who were fed up with the use of the 
military as a tool for stabilising the rule of the regime. The military also wanted to 
prove to Egypt that it was not interested in politics and to show the world that Egypt 
was becoming a democratic state. 
The banned 2012 Egyptian constitution included a vital principle in its preamble to 
prevent future political interference by the military in the Egyptian political scene. 
The preamble stated that the military was a neutral institution and should only focus 
on protecting the Egyptian border and its people.72 Principle 2 of the preamble stated 
that Egypt was a democratic country based on the peaceful transfer of power. It did 
not mention whether Egypt was a civilian state.73 The preamble of the current 2014 
constitution does not mention the interference of the military. The preamble also uses 
vague and undefined concepts. Instead of ‘civilian state’, the constitution uses 
‘civilian government’, which is only one branch of the state.74 
We have observed how the military has controlled the political scene in Egypt. 
However, the military has also had a great deal of power and control in the economic 
sector. After signing the Camp David treaty, the military expanded its economic 
empire into the private sector.75 The deep military root of Egypt’s economic empire 
was one of the main reasons behind the military’s intervention in the Egyptian 
political scene, which prevented any democratic state from growing in Egypt. The 
military was protecting its own economic interests. 
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7.5 Economic Rule of the Military 
7.5.1 Introduction 
The military expanded its empire and controlled most of Egypt’s economy. This 
section provides a background of the enterprises of the Egyptian Ministry of 
Defense. It then examines the economic rule of the military after the 2011 revolution 
and the 2013 coup. 
7.5.2 Background of the Egyptian Ministry of Defence’s enterprises 
The defence ministry established three major military bodies, including: 
1. Arab Organization for Industrialization: This organisation was established in 
1975 by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar to advance 
Arab industrialisation. When Egypt signed the peace treaty, the three other 
countries pulled out their shares and Egypt became the owner of the 
enterprise, which consists of 11 factories that produce civilian and military 
equipment, with a focus on infrastructure, environmental protection and 
transportation.76 
2. National Service Projects Organisation: This organisation was established in 
1979 to supply the military’s needs and reduce the need to source supplies 
from the private market. The organisation runs 10 companies that produce a 
wide range of products, from food to construction.77 
3. National Organisation for Military Production: This organisation runs 15 
factories and produces military armaments and munitions, as well as 
electronic and sports equipment.78 
The three military bodies were established for three reasons: 
1. to absorb some of Egypt’s conscripts 
2. to provide an opportunity for generals and colonels to lead these projects 
3. to hire loyal retired senior military officers.79 
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7.5.3 Military–economic empire since 2011 
The military economy is still a taboo topic in Egypt, and few studies have discussed 
the military economy and its budget. According to Khaled Fahmy, the head of 
history at the American University in Cairo, the military economy is ‘a grey 
economy, in the sense that we know very little of them, they are not subject to any 
parliamentary scrutiny, the Egyptian government auditing office has no control or 
knowledge of them’.80 Over the years, the military has enjoyed cheap government 
land, no taxes and cheap labour. The Egyptian army controls approximately 5–40% 
of Egypt’s economy.81 The military budget is not subject to parliamentary checks 
because it is part of national security. 
The military is involved in all aspects of the Egyptian market and controls most of 
the economy, including consumer goods, refrigerators, gas bottles, real estate, 
tourism, childcare, hospitals, medical equipment, gas, energy, agriculture and 
contracts with foreign investors.82 The military can suspend any trade for security 
reasons. Further, the military refuses any interventions and any economic policies 
that could challenge its power.83 A spokesman for Transparency International stated 
that: 
There is evidence to suggest that some military officers, across all ranks, own their 
own enterprises and benefit significantly from the use of public infrastructure and 
facilities to increase profits. Furthermore, a network of military retirees either 
presides over or supervises government commercial enterprises and facilities or 
participates in consultancy contracts. This practice may extend to forming private 
companies to capture subcontracts.84 
This thesis suggests that some high-ranking military officers and retirees in Egypt 
benefit from public infrastructure by using Egyptian conscripts and tax exemptions 
to generate profits. 
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After the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian economy suffered from instability. This 
placed pressure on its foreign reserves, which decreased from $36 billion before 
2011 to $17.5 billion in May 2016.85 After 2013, the Egyptian military dominated the 
economy. Examples of this dominance are outlined below: 
1. The military controls 94% of Egyptian land through the designation of such 
land as a ‘military zone’. In addition, it controls the coastline in its role of 
protecting the border. The military makes huge profits from tourism 
projects86 and through tax exemptions, reduced costs and low-cost labour 
from conscripts. In exchange, the military maintains and protects the stability 
of the regime.87 
2. The military is engaged in business with Arabic companies such as Gulf 
conglomerates and the Kuwaiti group ‘MA Kharafi and Sons’. It is also 
engaged with European companies such as the Italian oil and gas company 
‘Eni SpA’.88 
3. After the ousting of Morsi in 2013, the former prime minister gave the 
military National Service Products Organization the right to build the Rod El 
Farag corridor for 99 years.89 This organisation would also have the right to 
collect tolls and levies and sell licenses.90 
4. In addition, the interim president, Mansour, issued a presidential declaration 
that gave the military priority in cases of emergency to avoid bidding and 
gave them $1 billion in contracts.91 
5. The Ministry of Local Development gave the military a $280 million 
contract to develop the sprawling slums of Cairo.92 
6. The Egyptian military also receives annual assistance from the US. 
                                                          
85 ‘Egypt Could Secure $10 Billion Loan from IMF’, Eyewitness News (online), 27 June 2016 
<http://ewn.co.za/2016/06/27/Egypt-could-secure-$10bn-loan-from-IMF>. 
86 Harding, above n 84. 
87 Safa Joudeh, ‘Egypt’s Military: Protecting its Sprawling Economic Empire’, Atlantic Council 
(online), January 2014 <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-s-military-protecting-
its-sprawling-economic-empire>. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ahmed Aboulenein, ‘Egypt’s Deep State Gets Back to Business’, Public Radio International 
(online), 14 January 2015 <http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-01-14/egypts-deep-state-gets-back-
business>. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
 256 
This sprawling web of dedicated funding and the wide-ranging enterprises explains 
how the military empire has maintained its tight grip on the economic and political 
scene in Egypt for more than 60 years and prevented anyone from challenging or 
interfering in its secret empire.93 The hidden military empire is part of state security. 
The military prevents the public from having any access to this empire by imposing 
legal restrictions and classifying it as a red zone. The regime’s justification is the 
protection of national security;94 however, the main reason for preventing public 
access is to protect its financial and economic interests and to protect the elite within 
the ranks. Economic interests explain why the military budget is secret. All military 
financial and industrial projects are tax-free and unaudited.95 
In conclusion, the economic strategies of successive regimes, which shifted from 
nationalisation to the open-door policy and then to a neoliberal economy, enshrined 
the deep state economic empire that benefited a group of people headed by the 
military and a minority group of elite businesspeople. The military used the police 
and security apparatus to stabilise the regime, and police played a vital role in 
suppressing the opponents of successive regimes. 
7.5.4 Role of the police and security apparatus 
When the Free Officers resumed power in Egypt in 1952, they promised to abolish 
the notorious secret police, which had been established by Britain. Instead, Nasser 
used the secret police as a weapon to suppress his opposition. Nasser learned from 
Britain’s experience and held nearly 100,000 political prisoners.96 During Nasser’s 
era, the state security service was called ‘General Investigation’. Under Sadat, the 
name was changed to ‘State Security Investigation Services’.97 
                                                          
93 Charles M Sennott, ‘Inside the Egyptian Military’s Brutal Hold on Power’, Frontline (24 January 
2012) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/inside-the-egyptian-militarys-brutal-hold-on-
power/>. 
94 Raphaeli, above n 79. 
95 Abigail Hauslohner, ‘Egypt’s “Military INK” Expands its Control of the Economy’, The Guardian 
(online), 18 March 2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/egypt-military-economy-
power-elections>. 
96 Hazem Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt (Verso, 2012) 18–19. 
97 Mariz Tadros, ‘The Securitisation of Civil Society: A Case Study of NGOs–State Security 
Investigations (SSI) Relations in Egypt’ (25 February 2011) 11(1) Conflict, Security & Development 
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2011.552248?src=recsys&journalCode=ccs
d20>. 
 257 
As the commander-in-chief, the president of Egypt in successive regimes has 
consistently used the police to counter the opposition. For example, Law No 109 of 
1971 and Law No 116 of 1981 expanded the police force’s power from securing 
public security to securing public order.98 The above laws used elastic and vague 
definitions, which explained the large number of political prisoners. By 2009, there 
were 850,450 police and administrative staff in the Central Security Forces and 
400,000 in the State Security Investigation Services.99 
Mubarak made Egypt into a corrupt police state during his reign.100 Corrupt police 
harassed people, asked for bribes from shops, ate for free at restaurants, arrested and 
tortured people to gain false confessions or forced them to work as informers and 
even harass people for identification or other documents.101 The criminal 
investigation sectors hired thugs to work for the state security forces. For example, 
during election time, thugs intimidated opponents to give security officers the 
justification to arrest them before voting, thereby stopping the voting process. In 
addition, the police hired thugs to beat and bully activists and to harass females, 
wealthy people, shopkeepers and business owners.102 Police state policy largely 
caused the uprising in 2011 that overthrew Mubarak. 
After the 2011 revolution, the State Security Investigation Services was disbanded, 
in theory. In practice, the new regime simply changed its name to the National 
Security Agency. After the 2013 coup, the interior minister ordered the return of all 
experienced police who once worked in the State Security Investigation Services.103 
The minister of the interior played a crucial rule in silencing opponents, and he 
committed a number of human rights violations. He used the state of emergency to 
enforce authoritarian rules by administering excessive and lethal force against 
civilians.104 Police brutality against civilians was one of the main reasons for the 
2011 revolution. Demonstrators also called for the resignation of the Minister of the 
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Interior, Habib El-Adly. Angry Egyptian demonstrators targeted approximately 100 
police stations, setting fire to them and releasing many innocent detainees from jail 
cells.105 
State coercion and the use of force by police authorities is not accidental. Force is 
used by authoritarian and non-democratic countries alike to suppress demonstrators 
who attempt to challenge policies. This is done largely to protect the interests of 
those in power. Even democratic countries increase surveillance and policing to 
protect capitalism and the neoliberalist system, which usually targets disadvantaged 
people, the poor and the unemployed. Police in Egypt are given wide-ranging and 
draconian powers that are justified by the regime on the grounds that there is an 
exceptional emergency situation.106 The permanent declaration of a state of 
emergency gives the police more authority to arrest, detain and search without 
following the correct criminal procedures. At the same time, it enables them to 
commit offences with impunity while dealing with civilians. In this way, the deep 
state uses the legislative and judiciary branches as an instrument to protect its 
political and economic interests in Egypt. 
7.6 Legislative and Judicial Interference 
As the head of the deep state, the military also controls the legislative and judiciary 
branches and uses them as an instrument to serve its political and economic interests. 
This section examines the military’s interference in the legislature and the judiciary 
to protect its interests, mainly after 2011. 
7.6.1 Domination of the executive power over the legislative branch 
The executive branch in Egypt comprises four sections: the president, the 
government, local administration and specified national councils.107 The president is 
the head of the state and is responsible for appointing the prime minister and the 
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cabinet. The president is also the head of the Supreme Judicial Council and the 
supreme chief of police.108 
The Egyptian legislative branch consists of two chambers. The first chamber, called 
the People’s Assembly, has 454 seats. Ten are appointed by the president and the 
other 444 are elected directly.109 The second chamber, called the Consultative 
Council, consists of 246 members. Eighty-eight of the members are appointed by the 
president and the remainder are elected directly.110 
The Egyptian parliament was dissolved in June 2012. By 2016, the country had been 
without an elected parliament for four years. The absence of the parliament gave the 
executive the opportunity to issue many decrees and legislations. After the 2013 
coup, the executive branch produced large numbers of decrees, such as protest and 
counterterrorism laws. The constitution gave the executive branch, formed by the 
military, the ability to issue decrees without the parliament. 
Article 5 of the 2014 Egyptian constitution stated that: 
The political system is based on political and partisan multiplicity, the peaceful 
transfer of power, the separation and balance of powers, authority going with 
responsibility and respect for human rights and freedoms, as set out in the 
constitution. 
According to Article 101 of the 2014 constitution: 
The House of Representatives is entrusted with legislative authority, and with 
approving the general policy of the state, the general plan of economic and social 
development and the state budget. It exercises oversight over the actions of the 
executive authority. All the foregoing takes place as set out by the constitution. 
However, the legislative branch in Egypt has effectively served as a rubber stamp for 
the executive branch without any actual oversight of the actions of the executive. The 
Egyptian parliament speaker, Ali Abdel Aal, who was elected in 2016, provided an 
example of how the executive dominated the legislative power: ‘In tough times there 
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are no [individual] legislative or executive authorities. Rather, all of them should act 
as a single authority’.111 
This shows how the elected people are expected to act in favour of the executive 
branch. This violates the Egyptian constitution, which affirms that the legislative 
branch needs to monitor the performance and actions of the executive branch to 
control its abusive measures. That is, it violates the independence of the legislative 
authority and the separation of powers. 
Abdel Khabir Ata, a political science professor at Assiut University, stated that: 
The executive branch is seeking to control the powers of the parliament and the 
judiciary. This can be considered political corruption, amounts to collapse of the 
state and neglects the people’s right to a legislature and supervision of the 
government’s performance.112 
The legislative branch should play a crucial role in overseeing governmental action. 
As an elected branch, the parliament should use its authority to prevent the executive 
from abusing its power. This is not allowed to occur in Egypt because of the power 
and control exercised by the military as the head of the deep state. 
7.6.2 Executive interference in the judiciary 
During his time as the president of Egypt, Nasser tried to curtail the independence of 
the judiciary in many ways: 
• In early 1954, the regime criticised the State Council and its chief justice, Al-
Sanhuri. 
• In 1955, the regime brought the State Council under executive branch 
supervision. 
• Nasser established a special tribunal to serve the political will of his regime113 
and used the judicial system as a tool to maintain power and control the 
country to promote the regime’s own interests. 
• In 1960, the Supreme Court was established by presidential decree, which 
granted the president the power to appoint the Supreme Court judges. The 
decree also gave the supreme council of judicial organisation, which is 
responsible for the administrative affairs of ordinary judges, the right to 
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promote and appoint judges. However, this was placed under an executive 
oversight.114 
• Nasser’s regime forced judges to become members of the socialist party 
under Article 20 of the socialist union law of 1962. This law stated that: Law 
shall clarify the form of the representation for the armed forces and judges in 
the organisations of the Arab Socialists’ Union through a decision by the 
union’s supreme executive committee.115 
• The Egyptian supreme judicial council, headed by the president of the Court 
of Cassation, was responsible for administrative affairs, judicial appointments 
and promotions for regular courts. It became a weak institution without any 
effective power.116 
• The supreme judicial council consisted of seven judges determined by 
seniority. This became a traditional principle in Egypt.117 
• In 1968, after the 1967 war, the Egyptian Judges’ Club issued a report to 
enforce the independence of the judiciary and enhance the rule of law. In 
1969, the reformer judges won the election and criticised Nasser’s 
authoritarian regime. Nasser responded by dismissing 189 judges who did not 
agree with his policies.118 He also dissolved the elected council of judges.119 
• Nasser created the Supreme Constitutional Court in Law No 81 of 1969. In 
theory, this court was an independent judicial body created to check the 
legislation issued by the legislature and the executive. In practice, Nasser 
used it as a new institution to legitimise his personal actions and policies. 
Law No 81 gave the president the authority to appoint the Supreme 
Constitutional Court judges, who had to be members of the Arab Socialist 
Union.120 
During the Sadat and Mubarak eras, reformer judges called for reforms to the 
judiciary law. They wanted to abolish the regime’s executive control over the 
judiciary through the following recommendations: 
• The judiciary should have a separate budget, similar to the parliament, to 
eliminate the financial influence of the Ministry of Justice on judges. 
• The supreme judicial council should be accountable for judicial discipline 
rather than the discipline committee of judges, which works under the 
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Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice should no longer have the power 
to issue warnings to judges. The supreme judicial council should have the 
authority to review any penalty above a warning.121 
The Egyptian Judges’ Club was established in 1939 in Cairo to develop unity among 
its members and establish a fund for the families of deceased members. Senior and 
junior judges and members of the Public Prosecution Office were able to join the 
club, which was run by an administrative board elected by the General Assembly of 
the club.122 The Ministry of Justice financially supported the Judges’ Club. The 
problem with this was that the regime used financial pressure to ensure that the 
Judges’ Club remained a club for social gatherings rather than professional 
discussions about reform. The club was first established as a social club and 
advocacy organisation in which judges and legal experts met over tea. It then became 
one of the institutional advocates for liberal reform and discussed the integrity of the 
judiciary.123 The financial support affected the independence of the club because the 
regime placed pressure on the club to minimise discussion about reforms and the 
integrity of the judiciary.124 
Egypt had two electoral commissions. One was a judicial body for overseeing the 
parliamentary elections and the other was an electoral commission for overseeing 
presidential elections. The electoral commission was established in 2005 and headed 
by the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court. This latter commission was 
used as an instrument by the regime to maintain exclusive power over the 
presidential elections. Any decision made by the commission could not be appealed 
before any courts.125 
The tension between judges and the executive began again in 2005. The judges’ 
movement uprising called for the freedom and independence of the judiciary. The 
judges warned the government that they would not supervise the 2005 election, 
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which was enshrined in the constitution.126 The judges believed that the judiciary 
should play a vital role and be the primary mediating institution between the 
Egyptian people and other branches of the government to enforce the rule of law and 
to minimise dictatorial desires.127 
Egypt’s faith in its judiciary system started to be shaken after the 2011 revolution.128 
The executive interference affected the independence of the whole legal system. 
Judges should not be politicalised and apply the law without discrimination. The 
judicial system should be independent, efficient and transparent so that it can defend 
human rights and national stability and security. At the same time, the judicial 
system should function as a check on the executive, restraining their arbitrary 
measures.129 This was not being allowed to occur in Egypt because scrutiny and 
transparency did not serve the interests of the deep state. 
After the 2013 coup, 73 out of 601 prosecution assistants who were appointed during 
the ousting of President Morsi were removed because the National Security Agency 
stated that they were members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood.130 In October 
2014, 60 judges were referred to the disciplinary board,131 and in March 2015, the 
disciplinary board forced 41 Egyptian judges to retire, accusing them of supporting 
opponents of the regime.132 An Egyptian judge was arrested in February 2016 and 
accused of contempt of court, and prosecutors ordered police to detain him for four 
days. The judge was accused of signing the Rabata Statement after the ousting of 
Morsi in July 2013. The disciplinary board of judges dismissed 15 judges who were 
excused of belonging to the judges for Egypt movement, which was established to 
support the ousted Morsi. Egyptian judicial lawyers accused these judges of violating 
Article 73 of the neutrality of judges’ law (Law No 46 of 1972), which details the 
involvement of judicial authority in political affairs.133 The disciplinary board 
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rejected the appeal of the dismissed judges, making the decision final and not subject 
to appeal.134 Dismissing the judges violated Articles 184 and 186 of the 2014 
Egyptian constitution, which stated that the judiciary is independent and judges 
cannot be dismissed.135 
The executive used the law to control the judicial authority as outlined below: 
• The president has the authority to appoint the following positions in the 
judiciary: the president of the Court of Cassation, the president of the state 
council and the public prosecutor. 
• The Ministry of Justice has administrative, disciplinary and financial power, 
as well as powers of promotion and supervision, over judges and public 
prosecution members. The ministry also places financial pressure on judges 
and public prosecution members by controlling the judiciary budget.136 
• Successive regimes used indirect methods to influence judges—for example, 
through the Judges’ Club, via generous salaries and by increasing the 
superannuation age.137 
• The judiciary created an elite class using the notion that they were the 
conscience of the country. This was done to create an elite group, similar to 
the military elite, which would be above criticism.138 Many of the judges 
were against the revolution and the opposition policies, favouring the old 
regime. In many political cases, they ruled based on their political 
preferences.139 
• When a group of Egyptian judges tried to launch a reform of the Egyptian 
judicial system to gain more independence from the executive branch, they 
faced a mix of repression and co-option from the regime, including heavy-
handed political and financial interference in the judiciary.140 
• Military courts were created to try civilians, which minimised ordinary 
judiciary power. 
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• Reformers of the judicial system faced difficulties and obstacles from the old 
regime judges, who refused judicial reform because they would lose their 
privileges and prestige.141 
• The politicisation of the judiciary raised a question regarding the relationship 
between the executive and the judicial branch, particularly after 2012. An 
example of this was the court’s decision to dissolve the 2012 freely elected 
parliament.142 
• President Morsi attempted to remove the attorney general, Abdel Meguid 
Mahmoud, who was appointed by the previous president, Mubarak. Morsi 
was later forced by his opponents to withdraw his decision. 
• The regime narrowed the scope of judicial scrutiny by issuing laws that 
prevented the courts from reviewing the actions of the regime. The regime 
appointed loyal judges to critical positions to ensure they served the regime’s 
interests.143 
Thousands of Egyptian political activists who launched the 2011 revolution were 
arrested, tortured and faced harsh punishments. Morsi and his regime were then 
arrested, and many received harsh sentences, including life imprisonment and the 
death penalty. In contrast, most officials from the old regime were cleared of all 
charges. Mubarak, the chief of police and low- and high-ranking police did not 
receive punishments for killing hundreds of civilians.144 
The judiciary used the idea of public and collective interest—undefined concepts—to 
rule in favour of the regime. They defined and redefined the meaning of ‘public 
interest’.145 The politicisation of the judiciary and judicial interference in political 
life was undertaken to protect their positions as the old guard of the regime. The 
judiciary became another one of the deep state institutions headed by the military, 
and this affected their integrity and impartiality. 
7.7 Politicisation of the Judiciary 
This section provides some examples of political trials that were based on political 
views rather than the law—namely, the trials of the Al Jazeera journalists and the 
Morsi political trials. 
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7.7.1 Trials of the Al Jazeera journalists 
In June 2014, a number of Al Jazeera journalists were accused of aiding the Muslim 
Brotherhood terrorist organisation. On 29 August 2015, they were sentenced to three 
years in jail.146 Peter Greste, an Australian who worked as a reporter for Al Jazeera 
News, was released on 1 February 2015, after 400 days in prison. A Canadian 
Egyptian bureau chief, Mohammad Fahmy, was sentenced to an extra three years in 
prison for possessing weapons. Egyptian Baher Mohammad, a producer with Al 
Jazeera, was sentenced to three years in prison. The three journalists were all accused 
of spreading false news and damaging Egypt’s reputation.147 The defendants 
described their trials as shame.148 The trials were criticised by human rights 
organisations, and Mohammad Fahmy and Baher Mohammad were released on 
13 February 2015 after being pardoned by the president.149 
The UN special rapporteur on freedom of expression, David Kaye, stated that ‘the 
journalists’ detention and subsequent trials have been inconsistent with international 
human rights law from the start’.150 Kaye added that: 
The freedom of expression plays a central role in the effective functioning of a 
democratic political system. Egypt has a responsibility under Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international covenants on civil 
and political rights to protect a media that is free to impart information and ideas 
of all kinds.151 
This thesis argues that to defend freedom of expression, the media must be protected 
from any kind of interference. Any kind of politicisation violates the Egyptian 
constitution, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
ICCPR. 
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7.7.2 Trials of President Morsi and his supporters 
Morsi, the former president of Egypt, was ousted by the military on 3 July 2013. In a 
separate trial, Morsi and 105 of his supporters were sentenced to death for a mass 
prison breakout in 2011. Morsi’s sentence was sent to the Grand Mufti, the highest 
religious authority in Egypt, for confirmation.152 Morsi was also sentenced to life in 
prison for leading a banned organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood, which the regime 
treated as a terrorist organisation. The judiciary made many rulings regarding the 
Muslim Brotherhood and seized its assets.153 Morsi was also sentenced to 15 years in 
jail for passing a secret document concerning Egyptian security to Qatar.154 
The death penalty has become the favourite tool of the Egyptian authorities to purge 
political opposition. Most people who have been sentenced to death by the courts 
since July 2013 have been Morsi supporters. The sentences against the former 
president were unfair and impartial; it was mainly a political trial. The president was 
not given the opportunity to defend himself, or have a lawyer present to defend him, 
because he rejected the legitimacy of the court. In addition, the president was held 
incommunicado in detention, without judicial charge, for 23 days.155 In April 2015, 
the president was sentenced to 20 years in prison based on evidence collected by 
police and military officers, which accused Morsi and his supporters of torturing and 
unlawfully detaining opponents of Morsi.156 Due process was violated in the court 
because the president and several other detainees were placed in a cage with a 
soundproof barrier, which prevented them from hearing the judge or talking to their 
lawyer.157 
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There has been a great deal of international condemnation of Egypt, with many 
claiming that Egypt must ensure the independence and impartiality of the justice 
system and bring to justice all those responsible for gross human rights violations.158 
Abdullah Al-Rian, assistant professor at George Washington University in Qatar, 
stated that: 
With these highly politicised trials that contravene all standards of justice, the 
judiciary is doing its part to cement a new political reality in Egypt, one that seeks 
to silence all dissent and restore the full strength of the authoritarian system that 
was in place for decades.159 
Amnesty International opposed the death sentence because it violates the right to life 
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.160 The deputy director of 
Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme also described the 
court sentence as null and void: 
Egypt’s authorities should disregard all the evidence that was obtained from 
Mohamed Morsi or any other detainee during the period in which they were 
subjected to enforced disappearance and must either release him immediately or 
retry him in a civilian court with full fair-trial guarantees. Any further criminal 
proceedings must be in line with Egyptian law and international standards. The 
authorities should also drop the charges of escaping from prison in January 2011, 
as at the time Morsi was held in administrative detention, under emergency 
powers and without a judicial detention order.161 
It is widely argued that the Egyptian government should promote the independence 
of the judiciary and end the influence of the Ministry of Justice over the judiciary to 
strengthen the rule of law. To enhance the impartiality and dignity of judges, they 
should be prohibited from holding any executive role while working as a judge, as 
well as prohibited from joining any political party.162 However, this cannot occur 
because of the continuing power of the deep state. 
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7.8 Media and the Deep State 
Different political regimes in Egypt have used the media to convince people of their 
strategies and to convince them that they are right. Further, the media played a 
substantial role in overthrowing the first democratic regime in 2013. Miliband 
discussed how big private capitalist corporations exercise control over means of 
communication such as newspapers, television and the internet, as well as education 
institutions and lobbying. The capitalist power elite and their political supporters use 
the media as a tool to control the ideology of the people and convince them of the 
legitimacy of the existing status quo.163 
At the same time, there remains scope for ideological opposition and the presentation 
of factual information—on the fringes, from radical newspapers and websites—
without ruthless oppression. The depth of entrenchment of the dominant ideology 
and the scope for concessions allowed by wealth and social stability means that 
rulers can allow such opposition without fear of significant effect; however, this is 
not the case in Egypt. 
The media is usually referred to as the fourth estate. It is supposed to be a watchdog 
over government actions and represent the interests of the people.164 Successive 
regimes have controlled the Egyptian media by employing only loyal citizens who 
serve the regimes’ interests and act as a mouthpiece for the regime.165 The Egyptian 
media has largely served as a tool and a mouthpiece to support regimes’ interests and 
serve their agenda. The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages 
that serve the dominant elite’s interests.166 
Nasser’s regime nationalised the Egyptian press, including the privately-owned 
press, and it was used as a vehicle to mobilise the Egyptian people to support the 
regime’s socialist policies and strategies.167 The Egyptian regime ultimately owned 
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and controlled the three largest newspapers in Egypt: Al-Ahram, Al-Gomhuria and 
Al-Akhbar.168 
Nasser also introduced centralised broadcasting of radio and television to dominate 
the media. The Egyptian Radio and Television Union operated to protect Egyptian 
national unity. The media was intensively used to control Egyptians, especially 
because of the high illiteracy rate in Egypt.169 Sadat and Mubarak maintained control 
of the media, allowing them a small amount of freedom. However, the media was 
retained as the regime’s public tool and used to mobilise the public for the regime’s 
political and economic agendas.170 
The Egyptian president has the authority to appoint editors-in-chief through the high 
council for media, headed by the Shura (Consultative Council) speaker. The council 
is composed of members of the former ruling party, the National Democratic 
Party.171 To gain additional control, on 15 May 2002, Mubarak established a higher 
press council, headed by the speaker of the Shura Council.172 During Mubarak’s 
presidential campaign, the regime used the state media to express its policies and 
strategies using more space and coverage than other candidates.173 
Social media began to play a vital role in Egypt during the 2011 revolution. Young 
Egyptians used Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to display the brutality of police, 
who shot at the civilians. Social media facilitated communication among citizens, 
which decreased the regime’s ability to control communication.174 Social media was 
used to mobilise uprisings and demonstrations as a form of political expression.175 
The regime responded by cutting off the internet service to eliminate communication 
via social media and to control the spread of the Egyptian uprising. However, the 
younger generation still managed to find ways to deliver their messages and opinions 
to the rest of the world. 
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Journalists were divided about the revolution. Demonstration supporters called for 
the ousting of the Mubarak regime, while other groups defended the regime and 
accused demonstrators of being conspirators funded by foreign governments.176 
Many journalists and presenters on state television declared that they would say 
whatever the military wanted them to say. These presenters and journalists became 
the regime’s mouthpiece.177 
After the coup on 3 July 2013, interim President Mansour dissolved the Supreme 
Press Council formed by Morsi. Mansour issued a declaration in the absence of the 
Shura Council, which had been dissolved. The declaration ordered the formation of a 
new press council with 15 new members. The Supreme Press Council was put in 
charge of all affairs of the press until a new constitution could be formed and a new 
parliament elected.178 
Egypt’s anti-terrorism laws punished journalists for writing any news related to 
terrorism unless it accorded with the government’s official story. This limited the 
options for providing information from different sources.179 Punishing journalists 
violates freedom of speech and freedom of receiving information from different 
sources. In Egypt, hundreds of journalists and editors-in-chief of state-owned 
newspapers signed the ‘loyalty statement’ or ‘allegiance statement’, in which they 
promised not to criticise the regime, military, police and judiciary. They justified 
their statement by claiming that there was an exceptional situation that required 
everyone to be unified. This exceptional situation referred to the need to prevent any 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood terrorist organisation.180 For example, the 
editor-in-chief of the independent newspaper Al-Shorouk stated that ‘we wanted to 
deliver a message to citizens that the media is with the state in fighting terrorism’. He 
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added that: ‘at this time of heightened nationalism, the climate does not allow for any 
criticism of the government’.181 
Many journalists also used self-censorship out of fear of being accused of supporting 
prohibited organisations or being labelled unpatriotic.182 Many journalists were 
detained and arrested for representing and reporting the truth.183 Many parts of the 
Egyptian media labelled the opposition who mobilised the 2011 revolution as traitors 
and foreign agents.184 
In conclusion, the media in Egypt has been used by regimes as a mouthpiece to 
express their policies and strategies. At the same time, successive regimes have used 
the force of the military and the threat of prosecution as a tool to suppress journalists. 
Most independent media outlets are owned by businesspeople who joined the 
military elite to protect their businesses and are fearful of appearing to criticise the 
regime because they would lose their benefits. In this way, the media has become 
another tool used by the deep state to control Egypt. 
7.9 Business Elite and the Deep State 
The business elite has played a crucial rule within the deep state of Egypt. The group 
is commonly called the ‘whales of the Nile’.185 The business elite benefited from 
crony capitalism, making money and occupying most political positions, especially 
during the Mubarak era.186 In the 2011 revolution, many Egyptians demonstrated 
against the businesspeople who benefited from the regime’s corruption. Along with 
the military, these elite businesspeople increased their economic and political 
influence in Egypt through privatisation, making them part of the deep state in 
Egypt. 
Businesspeople benefited from being part of the parliament, and the electoral system 
made it more likely for businesspeople and the regime elite to win elections.187 Once 
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elected, some were accused by regime opponents of benefiting themselves rather 
than performing their role of keeping a check on executive actions. In reality, the 
businesspeople never questioned the government because they had the same interests 
as the regime.188 A weak parliament with no real opposition was part of the regime’s 
policy to override the legislative branch. 
In 1990, a few businesspeople and families controlled key sectors in Egypt, including 
tourism, construction and telecommunications. They enjoyed tax exemptions and 
generous energy, export and land subsidies.189 In 2001, a group of businesspeople 
established the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, which was granted a $10 
million fund by the US Agency for International Development. Its aim was to apply 
the principles of neoliberalism and support privatisation by increasing and continuing 
foreign trade policies.190 Mubarak’s regime extended its ties with the business elite 
by establishing a network that helped to weaken the rule of law. For example, 
Investment Law No 8 of 2005 offered investors tax exemptions and a duty and 
custom free-trade zone.191 The business elite built social networks based on 
friendship and kinship. Professional people, high-ranking officials and politicians 
played a political role by contributing to electoral campaigns by paying money to 
political parties. These businesspeople became part of Mubarak’s political system. 
They benefited from having access to resources such as markets, land and bank 
credit. The de facto marriage between wealth and power was clear, especially when 
these businesspeople joined the ruling National Democratic Party, the parliament and 
the cabinet.192 
After the 2011 revolution, under pressure from angry Egyptian demonstrators, the 
public prosecutor issued a travel ban against some of the businesspeople who were 
accused of corruption. A number of businesspeople were arrested and detained. One 
                                                                                                                                                                    
<http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/110389/Egypt/Politics-/Mubarakera-figures-to-
dominate-next-Egypt-parliame.aspx>. 
188 Marwa Hussein, ‘Businessmen Gain More Leverage in Parliament’, Ahram Online (online), 23 
December 2010 <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/0/2458/Business/Greater-business-
leverage-in-Egyptian-parliament-.aspx>. 
189 Amr Adly, The Future of Big Business in the New Egypt, Carnegie Middle East Center (November 
2014) 3–4. 
190 Roll, above n 186, 8–9. 
191 Nadine Sika, The Political Economy of Arab Uprisings, European Institute of the Mediterranean 
(March 2012) 9 <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/165555/10.%20PapersEuromesco10_Sika.pdf>. 
192 Adly, above n 189, 5. 
 274 
example of this was Ahmad Ezz, the head of the steel company193 that controlled 
65% of the local Egyptian market. Ezz was accused of buying the largest public steel 
corporation at a low price, generating profits and raising external tariffs to achieve 
protection from foreign competitors.194 Another example was the former housing 
minister Ahmed Al-Maghrabi, who was accused of using his position to sell land to 
his largest real estate company in Egypt and to other businesspeople at cheap 
prices.195 These officials were accused of abusing their positions to make money by 
stealing Egyptian public money,196 and through unfair competition, unfair borrowing 
from state banks, unfair subsidised energy, conflicts of interest, receipt of bribes and 
illegal funding of political campaigns.197 Although some businesspeople were 
detained, most were able to leave the country with their families because of a lack of 
evidence or as a result of reconciliation with the government.198 Some were never 
investigated. 
Businesspeople in Egypt went on to play a crucial rule in ousting Morsi. They used 
their ownership of the media to shape public opinion, abstained from investing in the 
Egyptian economy, pulled some of their investments out of Egypt and froze other 
investments.199 After the 2013 coup, which ousted Morsi, the crony capitalists 
reconfigured and continued their ties with the military. However, some changes 
occurred. The old guard of businesspeople were replaced by a new guard. The 
newcomers continue to use their political connections and favours from politicians to 
protect their interests.200 
7.10 Fake Opposition 
This section examines the role of ‘fake opposition’ in the operation of the deep state. 
It examines the Tamarod (Rebellion) and the National Association for Change and 
discusses their role in overthrowing the first democratic civilian president on 
3 July 2013. 
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7.10.1 Tamarod (Rebellion) Movement 
Tamarod, which means rebellion, was a grassroots campaign that played a crucial 
role in ousting President Morsi. The movement was established in 2013 and was 
used as a tool by the military and the business elite.201 Tamarod was founded by 
three activists from the Kefaya (Enough) movement. It was established in 2005 
during Mubarak’s era and called for reforms.202 
The old guard of Mubarak’s regime and his elite formed an opposition known as 
Tamarod (Rebellion) to show that Morsi was not a suitable president and that he had 
lost his legitimacy.203 Morsi’s opponents met regularly with military generals and 
made advanced plans together before ousting Morsi. The military asked the 
opposition to gather and protest as much as possible, and then the military would 
intervene.204 Tamarod demanded the ousting of Morsi, accused him of putting the 
interests of the Muslim Brotherhood above those of Egypt and gave him an 
ultimatum to resign or face civil disobedience.205 Tamarod started to collect 
signatures for a petition that contained multiple complaints against Morsi. They 
focused on the lack of security, the collapse of the Egyptian economy and the lack of 
justice after the revolution.206 Tamarod claimed that it gathered 22 million signatures 
in eight weeks to oust Morsi.207 
The business elite also played a crucial role behind the scenes in creating Tamarod. 
Businesspeople paid money to Tamarod members to organise demonstrations. At the 
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same time, they used their networks, private newspapers and television channels to 
turn the Egyptian people against Morsi.208 
7.10.2 National Association for Change 
The National Association for Change was established in 2010. It started with 30 
politicians, activists and intellectuals who called for reform. They demanded an end 
to the state of emergency and judicial oversight over the election. They also 
demanded that local and international organisations be allowed to monitor the 
election, that Egyptians living abroad be given the right to vote, that all media outlets 
be given equal access during the election and that the presidency be limited to two 
terms.209 
When Morsi issued the constitutional declaration in 2012, the National Association 
for Change was headed by Mohamed ElBaradei, a former head of international 
atomic energy who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.210 The association started 
meeting with some of Mubarak’s followers and the military in navy officers’ clubs to 
establish plans to overthrow Morsi by gathering people to protest in the streets. 
The deep state, which was headed by the military and its elite, did not give the newly 
elected President Morsi the chance to complete his four-year presidency, but instead 
created problems to show that he was a failure. For example: 
1. The deep state created problems in every important service sector, such as 
fuel and electricity, to make the people turn against Morsi. Morsi’s 
opponents stated that the president had failed to fulfil his promise of having 
an inclusive government. They criticised government plans that made the 
country suffer from financial crises and shortages of electricity and gas.211 
2. The deep state showed that the president could not fulfil his promises to 
decrease prices and fight corruption. 
3. The politicised judiciary disbanded the Egyptian Constituent Assembly and 
the first elected parliament after the 2011 revolution. The judiciary dissolved 
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the first elected parliament in 2012, which had a majority of Morsi 
supporters. Dissolving the parliament was used as a strategy to weaken the 
president’s authority, jeopardise his actions and prevent him from fulfilling 
his promises.212 
4. Morsi offered his opponents a place in the cabinet, but they refused, which 
was another obstacle in the president’s attempt to share power with the 
opposition.213 
Morsi’s opponents claimed that the constitutional declaration in November 2012, 
which gave Morsi powers of judicial oversight, made him a dictator for the following 
reasons: 
• Thousands of Egyptians protested against Morsi’s declaration, claiming that 
it was a counter-revolutionary rule because he resumed executive, legislative 
and judicial powers. This gave Morsi more power than the president had in 
Mubarak’s era.214 
• Morsi’s opponents stated that Morsi served the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
interests rather than Egypt’s interests. They claimed that the Muslim 
Brotherhood was not a revolutionary or reformist party, but a right-wing 
bourgeois party without any roots in the workers’ movement. It was 
historically associated with attacking workers’ demonstrations and 
collaborating with US imperialists and free market economic policies.215 
• They maintained that Egypt needs a socialist political leadership that 
safeguards the interests of workers and youth rather than protecting the 
interests of the capitalist class.216 
• The most significant elements of the 2012 constitution enshrined the 
privileges and power of the Egyptian military. For example, Article 195 
stated that the defence minister should be an officer of the Egyptian military, 
while Article 197 approved a National Defence Council, not controlled by 
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parliament, with unlimited power. Article 198 allowed for military trials for 
any crimes that harmed the armed forces.217 
• The Egyptian government negotiated a $4.8 billion loan from the IMF. It was 
claimed that this would open the free market, economic liberalisation and 
privatisation, which would affect the working class by cutting food and fuel 
subsidies. The IMF also demanded that Egypt reduce its large budget deficit 
from 11% of gross domestic product in the 2012 fiscal year to 8.5% before 
the end of 2014.218 
In contrast, the military’s opponents claimed that Morsi’s constitutional declaration 
did not make him a dictator for several reasons: 
• Morsi’s decree lasted only three weeks. The decree was important because it 
was the first step towards Egypt’s democratic transition through the holding 
of parliamentary elections and to call for a referendum to vote for the new 
constitution. 
• Morsi’s decree was necessary to prevent the military from playing a dominant 
role and returning Egypt to quasi-military rule. At the same time, it prevented 
the old regime’s judiciary from political interference.219 
Morsi’s experience shows the incapacity of the deep state to give up its power to 
anyone other than its elite. It also demonstrates that even an elected president cannot 
rule without declaring a state of emergency because of pressure from the military and 
its elite, as well as debt pressure from the IMF and the World Bank. 
To achieve consensus, restore order and meet the demands of the Egyptian people, 
the SCAF—presenting itself as the guardian and saviour of the Egyptian people—
offered a 48-hour ultimatum.220 Morsi’s opponents began demonstrating and 
gathering on 29 June 2013, and on 3 July 2013, a military coup led by the defence 
minister ousted the first civilian democratic Egyptian president. The military’s 
justification for removing the elected president was that the Egyptian people had 
demanded his removal because he performed poorly during his first year of ruling 
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Egypt. However, the main reason for ousting the first elected president was that the 
old regime’s judiciary, army, security apparatus and corrupt businesspeople had 
begun to lose their privileges and benefits.221 
The defence minister suspended the 2012 constitution and nominated the head of the 
constitutional court as the interim president.222 The military arrested the president, 
placed him in military custody and prevented him from communicating. The security 
forces arrested 38 of the senior leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and placed some 
of the president’s advisers under house arrest.223 The military declared that it had no 
interest in politics and only interfered because the president had failed to fulfil his 
promise of national consensus and national reconciliation.224 After the announcement 
of the removal of Morsi, on 3 July 2013, approximately 14 people were killed, 
including two from the security forces, and hundreds were injured in clashes between 
Morsi’s supporters and the security forces.225 Many prominent revolutionaries were 
either jailed or exiled.226 The anti-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary members 
returned stronger than before, and many of Mubarak’s loyal officials were released 
with minimal accountability.227 
The military backed the interim regime and facilitated the prosecution of the 
opposition members in a number of different ways: 
1. The interim regime designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist 
organisation and justified the killing of civilians at Rabaa and Nahda 
Squares. They arrested officials from Morsi’s regime, closed the Muslim 
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Brotherhood’s social service organisation, shut their business and seized and 
froze their assets.228 
2. Political trials resulted in the issuing of mass death sentences by senior 
judges who were loyal to the regime. The judges ignored incriminating 
evidence and used their discretion and distrust while trying the opposition.229 
3. The court dropped the charges against Mubarak, but the public prosecutor 
appealed the court’s decision and the appeal was accepted. Mubarak was 
sentenced to life in prison in 2012 for murdering 239 Egyptian protesters.230 
In May 2015, the Cairo Court of Appeals sentenced Mubarak to three years 
in jail on charges of corruption during his term in office.231 In addition, 
Mubarak’s two sons were sentenced to three years in jail for corruption.232 
4. Many youth activists who led the mobilisation of 25 January 2011 were 
jailed for three to five years and fined £50,000 for violating the Protest Law. 
These sentences violated the rights of expression and assembly.233 
5. Top-ranking generals in the military had many closed-door meetings with 
Amr Moussa—the former Egyptian foreign minister, Arab League chief and 
head of the 50-member committee in charge of writing the 2014 
constitution—to persuade other committee members to guarantee the 
military extra privileges, such as the right to try civilians in secret military 
courts. The military justified its demand for more power by citing the 
increase in militant attacks.234 
7.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that an understanding of the nature and persistence of 
emergency power in Egypt requires an examination of economic and political 
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interests, as well as practices and conflicts ignored by traditional emergency power 
theories. 
Miliband examined the nature of the state and developed a class map to explain the 
political, economic, legal and military powers in liberal democratic countries. His 
work shows that each state has its own deep state. 
In liberal democratic countries, the capitalist class is able to rule without a state of 
emergency by giving some concessions to citizens, such as paying reasonable wages 
and allowing unions and free elections. A real separation of powers contributes to the 
legitimation of such class rule without undermining it. 
Less democratic and authoritarian regimes use a continuous state of emergency to 
protect their political and economic interests because they feel threatened by the 
majority of the people. In these states, the deep state is often headed by the military 
because it controls the economic and political scene with the support of Western 
powers. The military manages to survive by using a permanent state of emergency 
and exceptional laws to protect its interests. This has been the case in Egypt. 
Successive Egyptian regimes can be described as authoritarian or pharaonic. After 
the 1952 coup, the Free Officers did not have any ready plan, except for establishing 
the power of the military. Nasser, a charismatic leader from a military background, 
united Egyptians in the name of fighting imperialism and corruption and ending 
feudalism. Since then, the military has controlled the country. As the head of the 
deep state, the military has dominated the executive, legislative and judicial branches 
in Egypt. The legislative branch is powerless because most of its members belong to 
the president’s party. A weak parliament enables the executive to override the 
parliament. The military has also interfered in the judiciary by establishing military 
courts with wide-ranging authority. Judges from the old regime have prevented any 
judicial reform because it poses a threat to their privileges and prestige. The 
legislative and judicial branches served as a rubber stamp for the executive’s actions 
and interests. 
In 2011, Mubarak resigned and handed over power to the military, which led the 
country and promised a democratic transition, but instead controlled the executive 
and legislative branches of power and issued many constitutional declarations that 
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enshrined its rule and expanded its authority. After electing Morsi on 30 June 2012, 
the military and its elite created many obstacles to prevent the new president from 
performing his duties. For decades, the military has controlled the political and 
economic scene in Egypt. It has been involved in all aspects of Egyptian economic 
and industrial markets and generated large profits. The military has used 
businesspeople, the media and the fake opposition to protect its hidden empire and 
stabilise and consolidate its rule. In response to the deep state’s fear of losing its 
privileges and profits, on 3 July 2013, a military coup succeeded in overthrowing the 
first democratically elected civilian president of Egypt, President Morsi, and the 
military regained its power. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has used Egypt as a case study to understand the use of emergency law 
for several reasons, which are outlined. 
8.1.1 Failed traditional emergency power theories 
Traditional emergency power theories have failed to justify the permanent state of 
emergency in Egypt for the following reasons: 
1. Traditional emergency power theories are based on developed countries, 
whereas Egypt is a major developing country. 
2. Traditional emergency power theories ignore military interference in 
legislative and judiciary branches of power. This interference protects the 
economic and political interests of the deep state in Egypt. 
3. Emergency power theories are premised on the idea that declaring a state of 
emergency is a temporary resort for exceptional cases. 
4. Emergency power theories disregard the fact that imperial Western powers 
have supported successive authoritarian regimes, thereby preventing real 
democracy. 
5. Traditional emergency power theories overlook the economic interests 
behind declaring and extending a state of emergency. 
6. Emergency power theories assume that the purposes of declaring a state of 
emergency are to counter terrorism and protect national interests. 
7. Extending and expanding emergency law will never address the threats of 
public disturbance or terrorism because emergency law is part of the 
problem. 
8.1.2 Establishment and enshrining of martial law during the colonial period in 
Egypt 
Britain declared martial law in Egypt to protect its interests for the following 
reasons: 
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1. Britain established martial law in 1914, and it was enshrined in the 1923 
constitution, Military Rule No 15 of 1923 and the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 
1936. 
2. Britain used Egypt’s resources and raw materials to generate profits by 
buying Egyptian cotton at low prices, imposing heavy taxes on Egyptian 
farmers and then exporting cotton back to Egypt at high prices. 
3. Britain used Egypt as a military base in times of war and peace because of its 
strategic position and, in particular, its access to the Suez Canal. 
4. Britain used martial law against Egyptian nationalists and activists who 
opposed British rule and occupation. The British military and administrators 
enacted a number of repressive measures, such as declaring gatherings of 
five or more people without prior authorisation to be penal offences. They 
also exiled hundreds of Egyptian nationalists and activists. 
5. Martial law was used to end the capitulation system because it gave massive 
privileges to foreigners. In addition, martial law was used to arrest, detain 
and exile foreigners, especially Germans, Austrians and Turkish people. 
6. Controlling Egypt gave Britain the power to control other African countries 
by controlling the Nile river basin and its main resources. 
8.1.3 Developing and expanding the notion of emergency law after the colonial 
period 
After 1952, the new regime developed and expanded emergency law as follows: 
1. Nasser installed British martial law and changed the name from ‘martial law’ 
to ‘emergency law’. Emergency law was enshrined in the 1956 Egyptian 
constitution. 
2. In 1958, Nasser issued Emergency Law No 162, which gave the regime the 
power to arrest, detain, search and try civilians in exceptional courts. 
3. Sadat depended on the military to stabilise his regime. He used the war 
against Israel to justify his continuous use of a state of emergency, and he 
introduced an open-door policy and relied on US support. The open-door 
policy failed because it increased poverty and the gap between the rich and 
the poor. 
 285 
4. The 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars between the Arabs and Israel were the main 
reasons given for declaring a state of emergency, except for when a state of 
emergency was declared in 1981 without disruption after the assassination of 
Sadat. 
5. The Mubarak regime depended on the military and extended the state of 
emergency every two to three years. Mubarak’s regime justified the 
extension of the state of emergency by arguing that it was necessary to 
combat terrorism and drug trafficking. 
6. Different political regimes retained the same emergency law because it was a 
comprehensive law that gave each regime a great deal of authority. 
8.1.4 Emergency law was the main cause of human rights breaches in Egypt 
Emergency law was the main cause of human rights breaches in Egypt, as 
demonstrated below: 
1. Police brutality was the main reason for the 2011 revolution. 
2. The military and police forces used emergency law to justify employing 
coercive force against their own people. 
3. Successive regimes used exceptional laws, such as protest and terrorist laws, 
as tools to stifle opponents of the regime and consolidate their power. 
4. Mass arrests, torture, forced disappearance and detention of people for an 
unlimited time were widespread in Egypt because emergency law 
unofficially justified these acts. 
5. Military trials were enshrined in the Egyptian constitution as a parallel 
system without the right of appeal. The law expanded the military’s authority 
and increased the range of crimes considered harmful to the military, 
resulting in more human rights breaches. Military courts sentenced hundreds 
of Egyptians to death or life imprisonment. 
6. In theory, the Egyptian constitution contained articles protecting against the 
violation of human rights and protecting freedom of speech and expression. 
However, different political regimes used the concepts of protecting national 
security, maintaining public order and combating terrorism to suspend these 
laws, which resulted in an increase in human rights breaches. 
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7. The international human rights treaties that were supposed to protect human 
rights had exemptions. Different political regimes used these exemptions to 
maintain the state of emergency and its harsh measures under the guise of 
fighting terrorism. 
8.1.5 Age of neo-imperialism 
Contemporary neo-imperialist organisations have used debt pressure as another tool 
to control the developing world, as shown below: 
1. In the mid-twentieth century, the US replaced Britain as the main Western 
powerbroker and used neo-imperialist organisations to control the 
developing world. 
2. The US used its financial aid to protect and consolidate authoritarian regimes 
and safeguard its interests. The Egyptian military benefited from 
approximately $1.3 billion of military aid, which helped to stabilise its 
political and economic interests. 
3. The IMF, World Bank and WTO assisted in increasing the gap between the 
rich and the poor. The policies of these organisations increased class 
divisions, increased poverty and benefited a minority of elite businesspeople. 
4. Nasser’s nationalisation policies helped to enshrine military rule. Sadat’s 
open-door policy failed because it benefited only a small group of 
businesspeople. Mubarak’s neoliberal economy also benefited only a small 
group of businesspeople. 
8.1.6 Deep state’s political and economic interests justified a permanent state of 
emergency 
The deep state elite used a permanent state of emergency to protect its political and 
economic interests in Egypt, as follows: 
1. The deep state of each state has unique features. In liberal countries, the 
capitalist class usually succeeds in ruling without using a state of emergency 
by sharing some of its profits in fair wages, improving work environments 
and allowing unions to operate. The dominant class also manages to control 
the ideology of the people using the rule of law, media and sport to promote 
its policies. 
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2. In less democratic and authoritarian regimes, the military operates as the 
head of the deep state. The military cannot rule without a continuous state of 
emergency because it does not want to share its privileges and interests with 
the rest of the people, except for a minority of businesspeople and some 
judges. The military and its elite justify the continuous use of a state of 
emergency by arguing that it is necessary to protect national security and 
ensure public order. The military has the power, money and external support 
to justify its use of force, arrests, detention and military courts to try 
civilians, because it feels under constant threat from the majority of the 
people. 
3. In Egypt, the military interfered in the judiciary by establishing military 
courts with wide authority. Judges from the old regime prevented judicial 
reform because it posed a threat to their privileges and prestige. The 
legislative and judicial branches of power served as a rubber stamp for the 
executive’s actions and interests. 
4. The military used businesspeople, the media and fake opposition to protect 
its hidden empire and stabilise and consolidate the rule of those belonging to 
the deep state. The military generated pressure and obstacles to prevent 
President Morsi from resuming full power. 
5. The military coup on 3 July 2013 succeeded in overthrowing Morsi, and the 
military regained power. Morsi’s experience proved that the military is not 
willing to share its privileges with any democratically elected civilian 
president. 
8.1.7 Egyptians failed to achieve their goal of creating a democratic country 
1. Successive regimes generated fear among Egyptians to consolidate power. 
Successive regimes used uncertainty about the future and instability in other 
countries, such as Syria and Libya, to gain more power, because the 
Egyptian people feared disorder. 
2. There was division between the Egyptian political parties. The secularists 
and the Islamists each feared how the other would rule Egypt. 
3. To avoid becoming a failed state, Egypt needs a new, peaceful revolution to 
minimise the political and economic power of the military. This revolution 
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must ensure that the duty of the military is limited to securing the country’s 
borders, and it must minimise the military’s economic power. 
8.2 Thesis Recommendations 
Different political regimes in Egypt have issued different constitutions and laws. In 
theory, such documents are meant to ensure the separation of powers, maintain the 
rule of law and protect people’s rights. However, in practice, there is only one 
authority that controls the parliament and the judiciary in Egypt—namely, the 
military, which operates as the head of the deep state. The consequence of this is that 
the constitution consistently fails to protect the human rights of Egyptian citizens. 
Different political regimes in Egypt have adapted certain economic and political 
policies that have benefited the ruling elite. These policies and strategies have served 
to increase poverty, increase income inequality, result in an unfair distribution of 
wealth between the rich and the poor, create a high deficit and inflation, and ensure 
instability and poor healthcare for Egyptian people. 
Given Egypt’s history, it would be naïve to believe that formal constitutional or legal 
constraints could protect the population from dictatorial ‘emergency’ forms of rule. 
Further, given the country’s record of colonial and neo-colonial oppression, it is not 
realistic to conclude that the solutions lie in Egypt alone. Therefore, no attempt is 
being made in this thesis to provide a detailed prescription for Egypt’s constitution or 
legal framework. 
Certainly, to overcome the problems in Egypt, it is necessary to change the law. At 
the heart of any changes, the government must maintain the separation of powers. It 
must also abolish Law No 162 of 1958 and abolish all exceptional laws, such as 
protest and terrorism laws, because they have been the main cause of human rights 
breaches. The Egyptian government must also prohibit any derogation from 
fundamental rights and non-derogable rights to meet international standards. Further, 
it must end the military trials of civilians and abolish military courts. 
However, it is not sufficient to change the letter of the law alone. The answers lie 
deeper, in the underlying socioeconomic structures in Egypt and around the world. It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a blueprint for overturning that reality. 
However, some general principles can be suggested, including social equality, new 
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forms of genuinely participatory democracy, democratic control over all aspects of 
life (including production, finance and the key levers of the economy), guarantees of 
basic social rights such as education and health, and guarantees of core legal rights 
such as habeas corpus, open civilian trials and the presumption of innocence. 
To establish a genuine democracy in Egypt, this thesis recommends far-reaching 
economic changes to give citizens certain social rights and conditions, such as: 
• placing power in the hands of the people and ending military rule 
• expanding the welfare state, including a higher minimum wage 
• expanding the provision of public goods and services 
• providing free education and health 
• implementing a progressive income tax system 
• creating fairer distribution of income and ensuring that citizens have an 
acceptable living standard 
• guaranteeing jobs for all people of working age. 
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